• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• 한국재난정보학회 논문집
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.78-100
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• 2009

This study is to protect peoples' life, minimize the property damage by coping with threats quickly and take more preventive measures in advance against nuclear bomb, CBR, and potential explosive. For this, CBRNE(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive) program research was used. Thanks to advance in technology, terrorist groups and even individuals make or keep nuclear and CBR weapons. And also it's likely that disaster and threats from a toxic gas, acute pathogens, accidents in the nuclear power plants and a high explosive could be happened a lot. Recently more organized terrorist groups maintain random attacks for unspecified individuals and also it's highly likely that a large-scale terrorist attack by WMD and CBRNEwill be done. To take strict measures against CBRNE attacks by terrorists is on the rise as an urgent national task. Moreover biological weapons are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain or produce and cause mass casualties with a small amount. For this reason, more than 25 countries have already possessed them. In the 21 st century, the international safety environment marks the age of complicated threats : transnational threats such as comprehensive security and terror, organized crime, drug smuggling, illegal trade of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental disruption along with traditional security threats. These cause military threats, terror threats, and CBRNE threats in our daily life to grow. Therefore it needs to come up with measures in such areas as research development, policy, training program. Major industrial nations on CBRNE like USA, Canada, Switzerland, and Israel have implemented various educational programs. These researches could be utilized as basic materials for drawing up plans for civil defense, emergency services and worldwide countermeasures against CBRNE.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• 대한토목학회논문집
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• 제40권4호
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• pp.429-435
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• 2020

북한은 2017년 6차 핵실험 이후 스스로 핵 무력의 완성을 선언하였다. 한반도 비핵화를 위한 국내외의 노력에도 불구하고 그 해결전망은 밝지 않다. 북한의 WMD위협을 억제하기 위한 정치·외교적 노력과 함께 유사시 예상되는 '재앙적 상황'에 대비한 사후관리 능력의 강화가 요구된다. 이에 따라 본 연구는 CBRN 위협에 대비한 사후관리 강화방안을 제시하기 위해 수행되었다. 연구모델은 국가 차원의 재난관리 계획발전모델 중 미 국토안보부가 채택하여 활용 중인 THIRA 프로세스를 일부 보완하여 활용하였다. 한국의 사후관리 체계는 재난에 대비한 위험관리와 위기관리를 포괄한다. 이 체계는 전·평시 CBRN의 확산 또는 사용의 억제, 위협의 대응, 예상피해 최소화 등을 목적으로 민·관·군 통합방위작전의 형태로 수행된다. 예방단계에는 CBRN의 개념과 사후관리 절차를 국가관리체계 속에 반영, 통합경보체계의 보완, 대피시설의 준비 그리고 통합훈련체계의 구축 등이 요구된다. 대비단계에는 관련 법규와 매뉴얼의 정비, 정부 조직의 정비와 수행절차의 발전, 통합대응이 가능한 현장 지원체계의 구축, 그리고 주기적인 훈련 등이 필수적이다. 대응단계에는 응급처치와 구호를 위한 의료지원체계의 정상가동, 제염시설의 설치 및 운영, 그리고 피해평가 및 통제지침의 발전이 중요하다. 복구단계에서는 안정화 평가 기준 및 절차의 발전, 피해복구에 필요한 자원의 확보 및 운용, 그리고 지역방위군과 향토예비군, 민방위가 연계된 지역피해복구 역량 강화가 필요하다.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제18권2호
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• pp.167-177
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• 2018

미국, 영국, 독일 등 주요국들은 2001년 9/11 테러 이후 초국가적이고 비대칭적이며 포괄적인 위협에 직면하여 국가정보체계를 개혁하고, 대테러리즘, 대량살상무기(WMD) 확산저지, 국토안보, 극우 극좌 과격주의 위협에 대한 정보역량을 강화하였다. 2017년 출범한 한국의 문재인 정부는 국가정보원의 불법적 정치적 개입과 권력남용을 청산하고, 국가안보를 위한 효율적인 국가정보기관으로 재탄생시키기 위해 개혁방안을 마련하여 논의하고 있다. 국가정보원의 개혁방향을 논의할 때 중요한 사항은 첫째, 정보기관의 분리형 모델을 채택하여 국가정보원의 국내정보 활동을 일부 제한하고 국외정보 활동에 전념하게 할 것인지 또는 새로운 국내정보활동 기관을 설치할 것인지에 대한 심층적인 검토가 필요하다. 둘째, 국가정보원의 대공수사권을 경찰에 이관하는 문제는 북한의 지속적 군사도발, 대남공작 및 사이버 위협이 지속되는 상황에서, 정보기관 활동의 효율성과 전문성의 균형 측면에서 신중히 접근해야하는 사안이다. 셋째, 행정부와 국회의 정보기관 통제 감독 기능을 강화하여 민주화시대에 부합하는 국가정보원의 정치적 중립성 유지, 시민기본권 보장 및 예산집행의 투명성 제고를 위해 노력해야할 것이다.

• 한국방재안전학회논문집
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• 제16권2호
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• pp.1-13
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• 2023

코로나 19 이후 도시 안전에 대한 관심이 높아지면서, 여러 기관에서 도시의 안전성을 평가하는 지표가 개발되어 활용되고 있다. 용산구는 2021년 사회안전지수 평가에서 1위로 선정되어 한국에서 가장 안전한 도시로 선정되었으나, 2022년 이태원 참사로 인해, 많은 인명 피해가 발생하기도 하였다. 이것은 도시의 안전을 평가하는 지표가 담지 못하는 영역이 있으며, 이에 대한 연구가 필요함을 의미한다. 본 연구의 목적은 국내·외 안전도시 모델을 살펴보고 이를 통해 각 모델의 차이점과 안전도시를 평가할 때 사용되는 지표를 검토하기 위한 것이다. 본 연구에서 11개 안전도시 모델을 수집하고 각 평가지표를 분석한 결과, 안전도시 모델은 세계보건기구의 국제 안전도시와 유엔재해경감기구의 국제안전도시와 같이 기관에서 인증을 하는 "프로그램 기반의 안전도시 모델"과, 기관별 안전 관련 평가지표의 점수에 의해서 안전도시 순위 및 등급이 결정되는 "점수기반의 안전도시 모델"로 분류할 수 있으며, 안전한 도시가 되기 위해서는 이 두 가지 모델이 상호 보완적으로 활용될 때 도시 안전을 위협하는 제반 요소를 전방위적으로 대응할 수 있음을 알 수 있었다. 안전에 대한 위협이 다양해짐을 고려해볼 때 안전도시를 평가할 때 디지털 보안, 보건 안전, 인프라 안전, 개인 안전, 환경 안전, 교통 안전, 화재 안전, 범죄 안전, 생활안전, 자살, 감염병 등을 종합적으로 고려하는 것이 타당하는 결론을 얻었다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제8권6호
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• pp.435-439
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• 2022

2022년 2월 24일, 우크라이나-러시아 전쟁이 발발했다. 이 전쟁에서 특이한 현상들이 발생하고 있는데, 그중에 하나가 2차 세계대전 이후 장군들의 전사율이 가장 높다는 것이다. 이것은 우크라이나군이 러시아군의 장군들만을 제거하는 핀셋작전을 전개하고 있기 때문이다. 이를 위해, 우크라이나군은 군사정보팀이라는 특수작전 부대를 운용하고 있는데, 이들은 자체, 미군·나토군, 민간 등의 자산을 융복합하여 다영역에서 활용함으로써 시너지를 창출하고 있다. 특히, 이들은 스타링크를 활용하여 '감시-결심-타격' 활동을 실시간 초연결함으로써 생존성과 작전효용성을 극대화하고 있다. 한국군 또한 다양한 특수작전부대를 보유하고 있고, 한반도에는 대량살상무기 위협이 내재되어 있다. 따라서 우크라이나군에서 운용하는 군사정보팀의 조직편성, 무기체계 및 운용 방법은 한국군이 미래 위협을 상쇄하는데 방향성을 제공할 수 있다.