• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.9 no.3
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• pp.215-220
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• 2020

This paper deal with estimating the direction of arrival (DOA) of GNSS signal using two antennae for spoofing detection. A technique for estimating the azimuth angle of a received signal by applying the interferometer method to the GPS carrier signal is proposed. The experiment assumes two antennas placed on the earth's surface and estimates the azimuth angle when only GPS signal are received without spoofing signal. The proposed method confirmed the availability through GPS satellite placement simulation and experiments using a dual antenna GPS receiver. In this case of using dual antenna, an azimuth angle ambiguity of the received signal occurs with respect to the baseline between two antennas. For this reason, the accurate azimuth angle estimation is limits, but it can be used for deception by cross-validating the ambiguity.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.137-144
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• 2016

In this paper, the performance of ranging measurement, which is generated using two receiver clock offsets in one receiver, was analyzed. A spoofer transmits a counterfeited spoofing signal which is similar to the GPS signal with hostile purposes, so the same tracking technique can be applied to the spoofing signal. The multi-correlator can generate two receiver clock offsets in one receiver. The difference between these two clock offsets consists of the path length from the spoofer to the receiver and the delay of spoofer system. Thus, in this paper, the ranging measurement was evaluated by the spoofer localization performance based on the time-of-arrival (TOA) technique. The results of simulation and real-world experiments show that the position and the system clock offset of the spoofer could be estimated successfully.

• The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.97-102
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• 2019

The GNSS(Global Navigation Satellite System) provides important information such as Position and Navigation, Timing(PNT) to various weapon systems in the military. as a result, applications that employ satellite navigation systems are increasing. therefore, a number of studies have been conducted to deceive the weapon systems that employ GNSS. GNSS spoofing denotes the transmission of counterfeit GNSS-like signals with the intention to produce a false position and time within the victim receiver. In order to deceive the victim receiver, spoofing signal should be synchronized with GNSS signal in doppler frequency and code phase, etc. In this paper, Civilian GPS L1 C/A spoofing signals have been evaluated and analyzed by SDR receiver.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.32-38
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• 2011

In this paper, code and carrier tracking error which resulted from spoofing signal was analyzed by simulation. For a start, the types of spoofing signals and methods were classified. For the simulation, search spoofing method is assumed because a perfect position and velocity are not generally informed to spoofing device. In most cases, the tracking error is increased but a complete deception does not happen because of the inherent anti-spoofing characteristics of the GPS signal.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.37-45
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• 2015

These days many systems use the gps signal to get their own position. Because it's cheap and accurate and convenient. But, the strength of gps signal is very weak and can be easily interrupted by GPS jamming and GPS spoofing. Normally, fighter can use DME, TACAN, etc to correct their position error when GPS is not working. But, many aircraft which does not have those kinds of hardware need to pay additional cost to get it. In this paper, we propose how to overcome GPS jamming and GPS spoofing by only using data link system. The main purpose of this paper is to make the data link protocol to get an exact position information of own unit at gps error environment.

• Journal of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.139-146
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• 2018

In recent years, a satellite navigation signal authentication technique has been introduced to determine the spoofing of commercial C/A code using the cross-correlation mode of GPS P(Y) code received at two receivers. This paper discusses the technical considerations in the implementation and application of authentication system simulator hardware to achieve the above technique. The configuration of the simulator consists of authentication system and user receiver. The synchronization of GPS signals received at two devices, data transmission and reception, and codeless correlation of P(Y) code were implemented. The simulation test result verified that spoofing detection using P(Y) codeless correlation could be achieved.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.43 no.5
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• pp.941-949
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• 2021

In this study, a spatial spectrum method is proposed to cope with the pilot spoofing attack (PSA) problem by exploiting the of uplink-downlink channel reciprocity in time-division-duplex multiple-input multiple-output systems. First, the spoofing attack in the uplink stage is detected by a threshold derived from the predefined false alarm based on the estimated spatial spectrum. When the PSA occurs, the transmitter (That is Alice) can detect either one or two spatial spectrum peaks. Then, the legitimate user (That is Bob) and Eve are recognized in the downlink stage via the channel reciprocity property based on the difference between the spatial spectra if PSA occurs. This way, the presence of Eve and the direction of arrival of Eve and Bob can be identified at the transmitter end. Because noise is suppressed by a spatial spectrum, the detection performance is reliable even for low signal-noise ratios and a short training length. Consequently, Bob can use beamforming to transmit secure information during the data transmission stage. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations are performed to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme compared with conventional methods.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2015.07a
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• pp.1306-1307
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• 2015

As a basic research for the detection of GPS spoofing signal we study to generate a GPS fake signal which can mislead GPS receivers, and show that the fake signal is generated and transmitted through a pseudolite and the GPS receivers produce a wrong position as designated in the fake signal.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.431-437
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• 2024

Drones in the contemporary landscape have transcended their initial public utility, expanding into various industries and making significant inroads into the private sector. The majority of commercially available drones are presently equipped with GPS receivers to relay location signals from artificial satellites, aiming to inform users about the drone's whereabouts. However, a notable drawback arises from the considerable distance over which these location signals travel, resulting in a weakened signal intensity. This limitation introduces vulnerabilities, allowing for the possibility of location manipulation and jamming attacks if the drone receives a stronger signal than the intended location signal from satellites. Thus, this paper focuses on the safety assessment of drones relying on GPS-based location acquisition and addresses potential vulnerabilities in wireless communication scenarios. Targeting commercial drones, the paper analyzes and empirically demonstrates the feasibility of GPS spoofing attacks. The outcomes of this study are anticipated to serve as foundational experiments for conducting more realistic vulnerability analysis and safety evaluations.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.396-409
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• 2012

With the proliferation of diverse wireless devices, there is an increasing concern about the security of location information which can be spoofed or disrupted by adversaries. This paper investigates the characterization and detection of location spoofing attacks, specifically those which are attempting to falsify (degrade) the position estimate through signal strength based attacks. Since the physical-layer approach identifies and assesses the security risk of position information based solely on using received signal strength (RSS), it is applicable to nearly any practical wireless network. In this paper, we characterize the impact of signal strength and beamforming attacks on range estimates and the resulting position estimate. It is shown that such attacks can be characterized by a scaling factor that biases the individual range estimators either uniformly or selectively. We then identify the more severe types of attacks, and develop an attack detection approach which does not rely on a priori knowledge (either statistical or environmental). The resulting approach, which exploits the dissimilar behavior of two RSS-based estimators when under attack, is shown to be effective at detecting both types of attacks with the detection rate increasing with the severity of the induced location error.