• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.138-156
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• 2021

The aim of this article is to describe direction of Sino-Russian relations toward a new epoch - as the decision-making centers of both countries define them - indicating the commitment to building the future international order. It includes the synthesis of evolution of relations, descriptions of cooperation building of mutual confidence by both sides in variety of institutions; analyses of geo-economic relations emphasizing their geostrategic dimension and finally dynamics showing how two great powers want to achieve new areas of cooperation focused on building multipolar world order which is the essence of "new epoch". The argument goes towards recognizing the relationship as a "hhybrid alliance". This hybridity is a structural factor that can constrain the use of new dimensions of asymmetric interdependence as political leverage especially by United States against the two non-western powers but also facilitate to use it against West.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

For the main countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States, China and Russia, a situation of "new normality" is emerging. Moreover, for each of the countries, this "new normality" has its own meaning. For the United States, this is an aggravation of the military confrontation with China in the Taiwan Strait. For China, this is an increase in the degree of rivalry with the United States and a slowdown in the pace of economic development with a very high probability of their decline in the future. For Russia, this is an almost complete curtailment of relations with the United States against the background of a special military operation and imposed sanctions. These nuances, in addition to the results of the 20th CPC Congress, will determine the main trends in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. It seems that China's attitude towards Russia will not change against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. Beijing will maintain a position of "benevolent neutrality" towards Moscow. At the same time, the balance between "goodwill" and "neutrality" may vary depending on the scope of Sino-Russian cooperation. For example, in the economic sphere, Chinese companies will be afraid to cooperate with Russian partners for fear of secondary sanctions. However, in general, Russia will retain its importance for China as the strongest anti-American pole. In relations with the United States, China will continue to firmly defend its interests, while at the same time not excluding the normalization of relations with Washington in certain areas of cooperation: strategic stability, non-traditional threats, ecology, etc. In general, the decisions of the 20th CPC Congress do not allow us to say either in favor or against the idea of China's readiness to resume dialogue with the United States in the post-congress period. Sino-American relations, as noted above, have their own logic and will probably continue to develop within its framework. However, so are Sino-Russian relations. Within the framework of these logics, Beijing seems to continue to balance between the two vectors of its foreign policy. On the one hand, this is the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions in the confrontation with the United States: military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises, political cooperation based on anti-Americanism, economic cooperation with an eye to the risks of secondary sanctions. On the other hand, it is unacceptable for China to recognize the collapse of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with the United States and the extreme undesirability of further aggravation of relations with the United States on the factor of Chinese friendship with Russia.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.7-44
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• 2024

This article attempts to analyze the changes and prospects of the Northeast Asian security environment in the era of New-Cold War & multipolarity that has been spreading since the outbreak of the US-China strategic competition and the war in Ukraine. Since the war in Ukraine, changes in the new strategic triangle between the United States, China, and Russia have begun to have an unprecedented impact on the Northeast Asian security environment. This article analyzes how the two factors, the U.S.-China strategic competition and the war in Ukraine, have led to changes in the Northeast Asian security environment. More specifically, the recent changes and prospects of the China-Russia-North Korea triangle and the three bilateral relationships, China-Russia, China-North Korea, and Russia-North Korea. To analyze this research topic, the research design is based on three variables: independent, mediating, and dependent variables. The independent variables are changes in U.S.-China relations and changes in U.S.-Russia relations. The mediating variables are the US-China strategic competition and the war in Ukraine. On the one hand, the confrontation between the U.S.-China relationship led to a strategic competition, and on the other hand, the conflict between the U.S.-Russia relationship led to the war in Ukraine. In addition, the two independent variables can only be influenced by the two mediating variables. In particular, we assume that the domestic political factors of the three major powers, the United States, China, and Russia, played a significant role in causing the two mediating variables. The independent variables and mediating variables work together to promote the Northeast Asian security crisis. As a result, threats to the Northeast Asian security environment have emerged as the dependent variable. The dependent variables are the North Korea-China-Russia triangle, changes in the three bilateral relationships within the triangle, and the confrontation of Northern Triangle versus Southern Triangle. The first mediating variable, strategic competition, has led to several changes in the Northeast Asian security environment: the quasi-alliance of Sino-Russian relations, the restoration and strengthening of North Korea-China relations, the strengthening of trilateral security cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea, and the increasing necessity of Sino-Russian-North Korean trilateral cooperation. The second mediating variable, the war in Ukraine, has led to the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations, re-alignment of North Korea-Russia relations, the promotion of the US-Japan-ROK triangular alliance, and the emergence of the China-Russia-North Korea triangular cooperation.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.

• Journal of East-Asian Urban History
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.113-128
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• 2020

Right before the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937-1954), the Great Eastern Broadcasting Station (GEBS) was established in Shanghai under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Prior to the launching of the GEBS, Japan had not owned similar radio stations in China for years. As a result, the Embassy of Japan in China held rounds of discussions on the plan and Japanese governments, ranging from the MOFA, the Navy, the Army, the Ministry of Communications (MOC), and NHK-Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyoku) provided financial, technological, and equipment support. In the mid-1930s when the Sino-Japanese relations became intensified, the GEBS assumed the primary role of disseminating government policies to over 30,000 Japanese expatriates in Shanghai to make sure that they could remain settled while supporting military endeavors of the Japanese army once the war between China and Japanese broke out. After 1937, the GEBS became an essential propaganda tool to advance imperial policies of Japan. Although the station differed from the Army-controlled Greater Shanghai Broadcasting Station (Dai Shanhai Hoso Kyoku) in many aspects, it was in line with the latter in terms of advancing wartime ideology of the Japanese empire. As the Japanese-occupied areas were enlarged, target audience of the GEBS also expanded to Chinese people and foreign nationals when Japanese, English, Russian, and Shanghai-dialect news was broadcast by the station. Suffice it to say that the GEBS was closely related to wartime propaganda of the Japanese imperial expansion.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.27
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• pp.223-254
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• 2009

This thesis is aimed at researching the formation of democracy in socialist China. Due to a sense of cultural superiority on the basis of their developed civilization, they already formed a strong cultural nationalism, which has come to firm up into "Sinocentrism" through long periods of time. However, there arose a sense of crisis due to the Western invasion after the Opium War and the intellectuals in China happened to seek the solution to rescuing their mother land from ruin; in the midst of this process, the theory of social evolution of the West was introduced and accepted. The acceptance of this theory of social evolution gradually transformed in confrontation with a logical limit that China defeated in international competition could not but be plundered by imperialism after all, but it contributed to Chinese intellectuals' forming the concept of the modern state nationalism of the West deviating from cultural Sinocentrism. After the Russian Revolution, a large number of Chinese progressive intellectuals developed their socialist movement with the recognition that Marxism was a practicable alternative to rescue China from its crisis. The Chinese Communist Party was under guidance of the Comintern from the early process of its formation, in which they emphasized the fact the national liberation struggle in colonialized countries was an indispensable element in the world communist movement under the condition of the control of the world by imperialist capital at that time and subsequently, Marxism characterized by resistant nationalism in China gained its cause. Afterwards, the People's Republic of China was established by the Chinese Communists which came to get widespread support from the Chinese through anti-imperialism &feudalism in the process of the Sino-Japanese War, and thus China equipped with a full-blown socialism system set sails. However, with the relations with the Soviet Union getting worse under the international conditions of a cold war, the development of the Chinese socialism couldn't but resort to the concentrated power of its people, which was linked to the boost of continuous patriotism of the Chinese Communists. Particularly, due to the newly-emerging contradictions after reform & opening [gig kifng], China underwent disruption; thus, as an ideology to integrate such disruptive elements, Sinocentrism based on China's cultural pride re-appeared. Recently, a very strong form of Sinocentrism has come to the fore as their superiority of traditional cultures is emphasized in China whose international position as an economic power has been raised.