• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.113-122
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• 2001

This study is to examine the effect of layoff on shareholders' wealth. Firms make layoff decisions by reason of cost cutting, lower performance, demand decline, restructuring. Therefore, I think that stock market responds to layoff positively, since the firm's labor productivity and profitability is improved after execution of layoff, I find that layoff variables effect on abnormal return positively in regression analysis. This means that layoff sends positive signal to the stock market for the firm's future performance. Therefore, layoff has a good effect on shareholders' wealth.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.5-13
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• 2017

Purpose - This research analyzes the effects of Korean family ownership characteristics on firm value. The positive and negative effects of family ownership on Korean firm value were analyzed. If negative effects are evident, this research explores the factors that cause a decrease in firm value. Research design, data, and methodology - The study examined a total of 5,743 companies listed on the Korea Exchange from the period 2002 to 2012 using a panel data regression analysis. Result - An empirical analysis suggests that Korean family ownership diminishes firm value. Korean family firm value has been reduced when controlling shareholders are participated in management and pursue excessive wages, or make the management entrenchment effects associated with ownership-control disparity. When the controlling shareholders of family firms have increasing control rights over the shareholders' general meeting and the directors' board, the agency costs associated with seeking increasing executive wages or private benefits reduce firm value. Conclusions - This study has significance because it reveals the negative effect of family ownership in Korea on firm value. These negative effects can be the result of agency problems from controlling family shareholders seeking excessive wages or ownership-control disparity.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.8
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• pp.451-459
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• 2020

This study aims to examine the relationship of the four factors that increase the protection of minority shareholder investment. The factors are non-controlling shareholders, corporate governance, free cash flow, and shareholder wealth. The data for this study is obtained from the 2017 annual reports of 136 Thai public companies listed in the Market of Alternative Investment of Thailand (MAI). The analysis uses a multiple regression model to determine which factors encourage and which inhibit the protection of minority shareholder investment. The study tests four hypotheses. The results rejected H1 because non-controlling shareholders have negatively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta -0.155 and p-value 0.050). The results accepted H2, H3 and H4 as follows. H2: corporate governance has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.17 and p-value 0.031). H3: free cash flow has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.214 and p-value 0.007). H4: shareholder wealth has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.318 and p-value 0.000). The major findings suggest strong minority shareholder investment protection was enhanced by increasing corporate governance, free cash flow and shareholder wealth. The protection of minority shareholder investment needs to reduce non-controlling shareholding pattern.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.53-58
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• 2022

Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder's ownership is positively related to a firm's cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder's ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder's ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners' sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners' ability to maximize their personal wealth.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.191-213
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• 2008

This study tests and reconfirms the wealth transfer of mergers and acquisitions(M&As) by examining the changes in and the relationship between shareholder and bondholder wealth after the announcements of M&As for the publicly listed firms in Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ market during $1999{\sim}2006$. The change in shareholder wealth is measured by the Cumulative Abnormal Return(CAR) at the M&A announcements, and the change in bondholder wealth is calculated using the Yield Spread Change(YSC) and the change in acquiring firms' credit ratings. The empirical tests show that the CAR of 344 sample acquiring firms at the announcement is 3.59%, which confirms results of the prior research on M&As in Korean market. The average YSC for 35 sample acquiring firms between $2001{\sim}2006$ proves to be negative when we use the yield spread of firms with comparable credit ratings as a benchmark, which means that the acquiring firms' bondholders gain with the announcements of M&As. We find the same result using another benchmark-the yield spread of government bonds. The improvement in the acquiring firms' credit ratings one year after the M&As also indicates that the M&As, on average, increase bondholder wealth. Our test results are consistent with those of the existing studies on the effect of bondholder wealth after the M&As in the United States, which shows that the bondholder wealth increases after the M&As. We do not find the evidence that there is a wealth transfer from the acquiring firms' bondholders to the shareholders after the M&A announcements. Rather, this study confirms that the wealth of the acquiring firms' bondholders increases in the M&As in Korea.

• East Asian Journal of Business Economics (EAJBE)
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.10-26
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• 2017

This paper explains the concept of Economic Value Added (EVA) that is gaining popularity in India. We also examine whether EVA is a superior performance measure, both for corporate disclosure and for internal governance. Of late, companies in India have started focusing on shareholders wealth creation by adopting value-based models for measuring shareholder value that helps to align managerial decision-making with the firm preferences. In recent years, the EVA framework is gradually replacing the 'traditional' measures of financial performance on account of its robustness and its immunity from 'creative' accounting. Even though some leading Indian companies have already joined the band wagon of their American counterparts in adapting the EVA-based corporate performance systems, many other are hesitating as there is no strong evidence that the EVA system works in India. Till now, EVA disclosures are "not mandatory for the Indian companies." Also, we examine the value-creation strategies of selected Indian companies by analyzing whether EVA better represents the market-value of these companies in comparison to conventional performance measures. The study indicates that "there is no strong evidence to support Stern Stewart's claim that EVA is superior to the traditional performance measures in its association with MVA." As part of this study, we have also extensively surveyed the EVA disclosures in the Annual Reports made by the same sample group of 500 corporations from India.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.45-61
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• 1990

This study examines shareholder wealth effects in tender offers and attempts to explain abnormal return variations of bidding and target firms at announcement of takeovers using the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen. On average, bidders with large free cash flows pay higher premia (apparently more than fair market value) to targets than do other bidders with no free cash flows. Thereby, these bidders experience negative wealth effects on announcement of tender offers. Cross-sectional regression analysis suggests that for the subsample of takeover bids where bidders have large free cash flows, the increase in the debt ratio resulting from takeover has a significant positive wealth effect for bidding firm shareholders, while it has no effect in other subsamples. The evidence is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.1-25
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• 2004

From the perspective of corporate governance, we examine the acquirers' performance of mergers and acquisitions. The empirical results of our study show that outside active shareholders, such as block shareholders or institutional shareholders, affect acquirers' performance in M&A's : the ownership of outside active shareholders is positively correlated with the performance of acquirers. However, the ownership of insiders, such as that of encumbent manners or major shareholders, does not have any significant effect on the performance of M&A's. We also found that the ownership of foreign investors increased its explanatory power after the financial crisis of Asia. Since the current literature concludes that the improvement of corporate governance would enhance the shareholders' wealth, the results of our study implies that outside active investors, rather than insiders, are playing an important role in the corporate governance.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2006.11a
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• pp.327-332
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• 2006

Entering legal management, shareholders receive some payment. We call this phenomenon the deviations from absolute priority. This study focuses on incremental effect and determinants of equity to shareholders by wealth transfer from creditors to stockholders in the process of legal management. The main results of this study can by summarized as follows. First, the incremental effect of equity to shareholders is common in the sample of this study. The sample contains 46 non-listed firms that filed for legal management and had confirmed their reorganization plans. Second, the results of the regression model analyzing the determinants of incremental equity to shareholders in legal management show that it is negative related to the solvency(total debt/total asset), firm size, and weight of claims for secured creditors and banks significantly. but corporate reorganization period(from filing to confirmation)are not significant.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.209-255
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• 1991

This paper develops a simple model to explain the reasons why foreign acquirers pay significantly higher premiums for U.S. target firms than do U.S. buyers. We also provide empirical work on the valuation effect of foreign takeovers and the determinants of the wealth gains of U.S. target shareholders involved in foreign takeovers. The results indicate that target wealth gains are significantly higher in foreign takeovers than in domestic takeovers, after controlling for the wealth effects of payment method, acquisition type, tax status, size and time period of bids. This confirms the valuation effect of foreign takeovers. Furthermore, the results of cross-sectional regression analysis show that the variation in U.S. target wealth gains is explained by extra tax benefits stemming from double tax deductions for acquisition-related interest expenses incurred by foreign acquirers. These findings imply that differential taxation across tax jurisdictions is the main source of the valuation effect of foreign takeovers. In addition, we find that there exists a valuation effect of the nationality of the foreign acquirers. Japanese companies pay significantly higher premiums than do non-Japanese acquirers. The finding also indicates that competition among bidders increases the abnormal returns to U.S. target shareholders in foreign takeovers.