• Korean Business Review
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• v.11
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• pp.195-216
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• 1998

Ownership of an asset can be identified with the right to exercise "residual control" where the contract is silent about decision rights, or with the right to receive any "residual returns" that remain after contractual. obligations are fulfilled. Although the concept of "ownership" seems reasonably clear in many of the cases, the concepts of residual control and the residual returns that define ownership are actually quite elusive. For large corporations, there is really no single individual who owns both the residual returns and the residual control. Despite the limited qualifications, ownership is clearly. the most common and effective meas to motivate people to create, maintain, and improve the value of assets. In this paper, we try to clarify the relationships among financial structure, ownership, and corporate control with the concept of ownership defined as the residual control and the residual returns, Financial securities are not just claims to part of a firm's net income. They give the security holder certain rights. A careful matching of rights of control and returns can create incentives that increase total value of the firms. In the corporate firms, managers, lenders, and shareholders have different interests. And the financial structure affects how different those interests are and what decisions management will make. Managers are, in general, better informed than investors about the firm's prospects. The financial decisions by managers may affect investors' beliefs and, therefore, the price of shares and the value of the firm.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.12
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• pp.129-139
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• 2016

Purpose - This paper examines the explanatory power of the agency theory in the determination of cash holdings for Korean retail firms. If the agency theory holds, a firm with strong corporate governance structure tends to have low cash holdings. A strong governance structure makes the CEO of this firm to behave in the interests of shareholders and thus the CEO has low incentive to stockpile cash holdings, which can be easily diverted for the CEO's own managerial purposes. We investigate this relationship between corporate governance structure and cash holdings, by using corporate governance scores as a proxy variable that captures the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. Research design, data, and methodology - We adopt the sample of publicly listed retail firms in KOSPI market from 2005 to 2013. Financial and accounting statements are gathered from the WISEfn database. We also use the corporate governance scores published by Korean Corporate Governance Service. The relationship between the corporate governance scores and cash holdings is cross-sectionally estimated based on the ordinary least square method. This estimation method is widely accepted in the existing literature. The sample of large conglomerates, Chebol, and the remainder firms are separately examined as well, to account for the distinctive internal financing environment in these large conglomerates. Results - We mainly contribute to the extant literature by providing empirical evidence against the agency theory of cash policy. Unlike the prediction of agency theory, we confirm statistically insignificant or even positive correlations between the set of corporate governance scores and cash-asset ratios. Almost all the major corporate governance attributes including total score, shareholder rights, board structure, and the quality of information disclosure do not show negative correlations with cash holdings, which poses a strong challenge to the validity of the agency theory in the determination of retail firms' cash holdings. Conclusions - This study presents interesting empirical results with respect to the cash policy in Korean retail firms. Consistent to prior studies, I verify that the agency theory only limitedly explains the level of cash holdings. Future studies may obtain more robust results by examining a longer sample period.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.121-133
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• 2015

A classical commercial insurance, which is used widely as the risk management methods for risk transferring and risk financing, includes the factors of interests, gambling and uncertainty, In 1985 Islamic Fiqc Academy declared that the classical commercial insurance violates the Islamic fundamental principles and beliefs, alteratively recommending a mutual insurance and takaful. A basic principle of takaful is the mutual aid in the Islamic community. On the basis of mutual aid, takaful participants (insurance policyholder) establishes the takaful fund, which is cooperation fund by participant contribution. Takaful fund is separated from shareholders' fund, and the profit and loss of takaful fund are responsible for takaful policyholder. Ownership and operation right of takaful belong to the takaful participants. In takaful, takaful company takes a role of agent or management operator. Comparing to the classical insurance, takaful has the rights of profit dividend, voting of executives, access to accounting books etc. which are additional favors for business company or individuals as takaful participants. Business companies and individuals should consider to use takaful to transfer risk and to enjoy takaful's additional advantages.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.119-127
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• 2022

In order to analyze the effect of strengthening the disclosure of remuneration for high-paid workers among the measures to improve the governance structure of financial companies by the Financial Services Commission in 2018, this study demonstrated the compensation system, management performance, and improvement of governance for Korean financial companies from 2015 to 2020. Analysis was performed. As a result of the empirical analysis, it was found that financial companies after 2018 decreased the employee compensation disparity and the majority shareholding ratio, while the stock performance and foreign ownership ratio increased. This study has the greatest contribution in that it is the first domestic study to verify the effect of applying the so-called Say on Pay, which discloses management's remuneration and allows shareholders to check its appropriateness through voting.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.141-150
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• 2021

Although management decisions centered on the board of directors and directors must be made in order to effectively promote ESG management, the company's management is not obligated to make decisions considering ESG factors. A Korean corporation(company) is an established organization for commercial or other profit, and the purpose of treating a legal organization as a corporation is to easily handle the legal relationship of a group (corporate's property) and individual property of a group member, but legal person such as rights to "harm public rights" or "defend fraud". Criminal liability for illegal acts of a corporation, but the liability of a corporation (natural person) for illegal acts of a corporation is recognized within a limited range, but the criminal liability of a corporation (natural person) is limited. As the social responsibility of a corporation is great, limiting the responsibility of a corporation-related person (natural person) to civil responsibility will halve its effectiveness if considering the impact on the corporation's national economy. Objective requirements such as the completeness of control, hybridization of property, infringement of creditors' rights, and small-capitalization, and the subjective intention of abusing the company system to avoid legal application to controlling shareholders should be denied. Despite the increasing influence on corporate society, such as large-scale projects and astronomical business profits, corporate officials (natural persons) are forced to be held liable for negligence and intentional liability within a limited range. In such cases, it is necessary to introduce criminal responsibility separately from civil responsibility to legal persons (natural persons) in consideration of the maturity of capitalism in Korean society and the economic status of the world. In Korea, the requirements for recognition of corporate denial are strict, but the United States says that it is sufficient to have control or fraud. Therefore, it is not about civil responsibility, but about criminal responsibility of a legal person (natural person), so if fraud is recognized, it can strengthen the corporate social responsibility.