• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제49권3호
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• pp.621-631
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• 2017

Many developing countries considering the introduction of nuclear power find that large-scale reactor plants in the range of 1,000 MWe to 1,600 MWe are not grid appropriate for their current circumstance. By contrast, small modular reactors are generally too small to make significant contributions toward rapidly growing electricity demand and to date have not been demonstrated. This paper proposes a radically simplified re-design for the nuclear steam cycle for a medium-sized reactor plant in the range of 600 MWe. Historically, balance of plant designs for units of this size have emphasized reliability and efficiency. It will be demonstrated here that advances over the past 50 years in component design, materials, and fabrication techniques allow both of these goals to be met with a less complex design. A disciplined approach to reduce component count will result in substantial benefits in the life cycle cost of the units. Specifically, fabrication, transportation, construction, operations, and maintenance costs and expenses can all see significant reductions. In addition, the design described here can also be expected to significantly reduce both construction duration and operational requirements for maintenance and inspections.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제35권4호
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• pp.355-371
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• 2013

The purpose of this study is to explore the history of the relationships between Japan and the Pacific Island Nations in the context of its ocean policy, and to survey the current situation. Particularly, this paper inquires into how Japan's maritime policy, nuclear policy, and official development assistance policy have affected relationships with countries in this region. Firstly, this paper gives a brief overview of the socio-political situations of Pacific Island Nations. Secondly, the history of the 'Southward Advance Theory' adopted as national policy by Japan in the Meiji era is summarized. Thirdly, how Japan successfully re-entered this region despite conflicts surrounding the nuclear issue after the Second World War is explored. Lastly, this paper investigates how official development assistance and PALM (Pacific Island Leaders Meeting) helped to develop relations between Japan and the Pacific Island Nations.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• 시큐리티연구
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• 제39호
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• pp.185-215
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• 2014

한국은 지금까지 북한의 테러범죄로 인해 많은 피해를 입었다. 현재 북한정권에 의한 테러 범죄행위 발생 가능성은 그 어느 때보다 높은 시점이고, 김일성 정권의 북한 테러범죄 행위는 통치자금 확보라는 목적 하에 독재로 자행되어 왔다. 이후 김정일 김정은 정권 동안 테러범죄 행위를 살펴보면, 비(非)권력 집단의 목표인 권력쟁취 경제이권 확보 등을 성취하고자 하는 갈등이 원인으로 작용하여 범죄행위로 표출되고 있음이 드러난다. 본 연구는 테러 대책의 궁극적인 목적이 장차 발생할 가능성 높은 위협에 대하여 사전예측 대비해야 한다는 측면에 초점을 맞추었으며, 이를 위해 집단 간 권력 갈등이 범죄의 한 요인이 된다고 설명하는 George B. Vold(1958)의 이론을 적용했다. 이에 다양한 북한 테러범죄 원인 중 각 시대별 고위층 권력 갈등으로 인한 테러범죄 행위를 분석하고, 이러한 시대적 흐름에 맞는 향후 대응방안을 제시하였다. 북한의 테러범죄 행위는 김정일 정권 이후, 고위층 간 권력 판도가 시대별로 급격히 변화하면서 세력 쟁취와 이권 강탈을 위한 권력 갈등으로 인해 더욱 심화되었다. 북한 고위층의 권력 갈등이 북한 테러범죄에 많은 영향을 미치고 있음에도 불구하고, 이에 관련된 정보 첩보 수집이 단편적인데다가 미국에 의존하는 등 실제적인 대응이 미약한 실정이다. 게다가 북한 테러범죄에 대한 심각성 및 시급함의 공감도 역시 높지 않아서 체계적인 국제공조가 이루어지지 않고 있으며, 공조 방안에 대한 논의조차 원활하게 진행되지 않고 있다. 더욱이 최근 DDoS공격 청와대 홈페이지 변조 GPS 교란전파 발사 무인정찰기 침투 등 수 많은 테러범죄 행위가 있었음에도 불구하고, 한국은 이 같은 비(非)대칭 테러범죄 행위가 미칠 파문에 비해 그 심각성을 깊이 인식하지 못하고 있다. 이제 북한 테러범죄의 원인을 밝히고 대응하기 위해 휴민트(HUMINT) 테킨트(TECHINT) 등을 통한 고위층 정보 수집을 확대하고, 이를 종합 분석하는 전담부서를 설치하는 한편, 탈북자 등 정보원의 보호 및 감독을 통한 포괄적인 수집체제를 확립해야 한다. 그리고 북한 테러와 관련된 국제협력에 적극 동참하여, 국제협약을 이끌어낼 수 있도록 국제적인 공조를 구축해야 한다. 또한 핵 미사일 테러와 함께 한층 정교해지고 첨단화 되어가는 사이버 전자 테러 전문기술에 대비하기 위해 법령 제 개정 및 관련 기구 예산 등 제도적 정비와 기술을 보완할 수 있는 전문 인력 양성 및 기술개발 등 실질적인 대응방안을 마련해야 할 것이다.