• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.49 no.3
• /
• pp.621-631
• /
• 2017

Many developing countries considering the introduction of nuclear power find that large-scale reactor plants in the range of 1,000 MWe to 1,600 MWe are not grid appropriate for their current circumstance. By contrast, small modular reactors are generally too small to make significant contributions toward rapidly growing electricity demand and to date have not been demonstrated. This paper proposes a radically simplified re-design for the nuclear steam cycle for a medium-sized reactor plant in the range of 600 MWe. Historically, balance of plant designs for units of this size have emphasized reliability and efficiency. It will be demonstrated here that advances over the past 50 years in component design, materials, and fabrication techniques allow both of these goals to be met with a less complex design. A disciplined approach to reduce component count will result in substantial benefits in the life cycle cost of the units. Specifically, fabrication, transportation, construction, operations, and maintenance costs and expenses can all see significant reductions. In addition, the design described here can also be expected to significantly reduce both construction duration and operational requirements for maintenance and inspections.

• Ocean and Polar Research
• /
• v.35 no.4
• /
• pp.355-371
• /
• 2013

The purpose of this study is to explore the history of the relationships between Japan and the Pacific Island Nations in the context of its ocean policy, and to survey the current situation. Particularly, this paper inquires into how Japan's maritime policy, nuclear policy, and official development assistance policy have affected relationships with countries in this region. Firstly, this paper gives a brief overview of the socio-political situations of Pacific Island Nations. Secondly, the history of the 'Southward Advance Theory' adopted as national policy by Japan in the Meiji era is summarized. Thirdly, how Japan successfully re-entered this region despite conflicts surrounding the nuclear issue after the Second World War is explored. Lastly, this paper investigates how official development assistance and PALM (Pacific Island Leaders Meeting) helped to develop relations between Japan and the Pacific Island Nations.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.5-26
• /
• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.232-260
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.39
• /
• pp.185-215
• /
• 2014

Since North Korea has used terror crime as a means of unification under communism against South Korea, South Korea has been much damaged until now. And the occurrence possibility of terror crime by North Korean authority is now higher than any other time. The North Korean terror crimes of Kim Il Sung era had been committed by the dictator's instruction with the object of securing governing fund. However, looking at the terror crimes committed for decades during Kim Jung Il authority, it is revealed that these terror crimes are expressed as a criminal behavior because of the conflict to accomplish the power and economic advantage non powerful groups target. This study focused on the power conflict in various causes of terror crimes by applying George B. Vold(1958)'s theory which explained power conflict between groups became a factor of crime, and found the aspect by ages of terror crime behavior by North Korean authority and responding plan to future North Korean terror crime. North Korean authority high-ranking officials were the Labor Party focusing on Juche Idea for decades in Kim Il Sung time. Afterwards, high-ranking officials were formed focusing on military authorities following Military First Policy at the beginning of Kim Jung Il authority, rapid power change has been done for recent 10 years. To arrange the aspect by times of terror crime following this power change, alienated party executives following the support of positive military first authority by Kim Jung Il after 1995 could not object to forcible terror crime behavior of military authority, and 1st, 2nd Yeongpyeong maritime war which happened this time was propelled by military first authority to show the power of military authority. After 2006, conservative party union enforced censorship and inspection on the trade business and foreign currency-earning of military authority while executing drastic purge. The shooting on Keumkangsan tourists that happened this time was a forcible terror crime by military authority following the pressure of conservative party. After October, 2008, first military reign union executed the launch of Gwanmyungsung No.2 long-range missile, second nuclear test, Daechung marine war, and Cheonanham attacking terror in order to highlight the importance and role of military authority. After September 2010, new reign union went through severe competition between new military authority and new mainstream and new military authority at this time executed highly professionalized terror crime such as cyber/electronic terror unlike past military authority. After July 2012, ICBM test launch, third nuclear test, cyber terror on Cheongwadae homepage of new mainstream association was the intention of Km Jung Eun to display his ability and check and adjust the power of party/military/cabinet/ public security organ, and he can attempt the unexpected terror crime in the future. North Korean terror crime has continued since 1980s when Kim Jung Il's power succession was carried out, and the power aspect by times has rapidly changed since 1994 when Kim Il Sung died and the terror crime became intense following the power combat between high-ranking officials and power conflict for right robbery. Now South Korea should install the specialized department which synthesizes and analyzes the information on North Korean high-ranking officials and reinforce the comprehensive information-collecting system through the protection and management of North Korean defectors and secret agents in order to determine the cause of North Korean terror crime and respond to it. And South Korea should participate positively in the international collaboration related to North Korean terror and make direct efforts to attract the international agreement to build the international cooperation for the response to North Korean terror crime. Also, we should try more to arrange the realistic countermeasure against North Korean cyber/electronic terror which was more diversified with the expertise terror escaping from existing forcible terror through enactment/revision of law related to cyber terror crime, organizing relevant institute and budget, training professional manpower, and technical development.