• Honam Mathematical Journal
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.225-234
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• 2013

Many studies of experimental economics have produced outcomes which contradict the predictions of Nash equilibrium, which relies heavily upon the premise of selfishness of an individual. In the games involving contexts of social conflicts represented by the prisoners' dilemma game, the experiments yields outcomes quite different from what are predicted by the conventional wisdom. In order to fill this gap between the conventional Nash Equilibrium and experimental outcomes, non-selfish (or other-regarding) motives of human behavior are introduced and then a new equilibrium concept, RAE-equilibrium is developed. It is also proved that an RAE-equilibrium exists under quite general conditions. Then it is applied to the prisoners' dilemma game that some of the experimental outcomes can be explained.

• 한국ITS학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2008.11a
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• pp.244-253
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• 2008

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.379-389
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• 2002

In this paper, we study the competition between two kinds of suppliers, a bricks and mortars(B&M) and a clicks and mortars(C&M). Using the circular spatial market model, we derive and analyze the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of offline market share and efficiency of online channel of the C&M supplier. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium, (2) Under certain conditions, the price of online channel can be higher than that of offline channel, (3) It is impossible for the C&M supplier to encroach on all of the B&M supplier's market, (4) In some cases, the C&M supplier has incentive to lower the efficiency of its online channel for more profit.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.181-189
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• 2001

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies and applications has led to a new form of market place known as the electronic store. In this paper, we study competition between two shopping channels, an electronic store and traditional retailers. Based on the circular spatial market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the efficiency of the electronic store. The result shows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium for both channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the electronic store has incentive to decrease its efficiency to gain more profit.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Propulsion Engineers Conference
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• 2008.03a
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• pp.448-451
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• 2008

Three methods of nozzle flow analysis, frozen-equilibrium, shifting-equilibrium and non-equilibrium approaches, were used to rocket nozzle flow, those were coupled with the methods of computational fluid dynamics code. For a design of high temperature rocket nozzle, chemical equilibrium analysis which shares the same numerical characteristics with frozen flow analysis can be an efficient design tool for predicting maximum thermodynamic performance of the nozzle. Frozen fluid analysis presents the minimum performance of the nozzle because of no consideration for the energy recovery. On the other hand, the case of chemical-equilibrium analysis is able to forecast the maximum performance of the nozzle due to consideration for the energy recovery that is produced for the fast reaction velocity compared with velocity of moving fluid. In this study, using the chemical equilibrium flow analysis code that is combined the modified frozen-equilibrium and the chemical-equilibrium. In order to understand the thermochemical characteristic components and the accompanying energy recovery, shifting-equilibrium flow analysis was carried out for the 30 $ton_f$-class KARI liquid rocket engine nozzle together with frozen flow. The performance evaluation based on the 30 $ton_f$-class KARI LRE nozzle flow analyses will provide an understanding of the thermochemical process in the nozzle and performances of nozzle.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.277-288
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• 2005

The proliferation of the internet technologies and applications has intensified business activities on the Internet. This study considered the price competition between two shopping channels, one on-line seller and the other traditional off-line retailer. Based on the Hotelling's linear market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the cost parameters which represent the characteristics of the online and off-line channels. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, the following significant findings were obtained. First, pricing by Stackelberg equilibrium always outperformed that of Nash equilibrium. However the value of the cost parameters played a crucial role in determining both channels' preferred position (price leader or follower). Second, the online seller could benefit more in terms of profit by lowering its efficiency when its efficiency belongs to a certain interval. Third, when the online seller's efficiency is low, lowering its delivery cost has no contribution to its profit. To benefit more from lowering its delivery cost, increasing its channel efficiency to a certain level should be preceded.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Propulsion Engineers Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.105-109
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• 2007

Three methods of nozzle flow analysis, frozen-equilibrium, shifting-equilibrium and non-equilibrium approaches, were used to rocket nozzle flow, those were coupled with the methods of computational fluid dynamics code. For a design of high temperature rocket nozzle, chemical equilibrium analysis which shares the same numerical characteristics with frozen flow analysis can be an efficient design tool for predicting maximum thermodynamic performance of the nozzle. In this study, shifting-equilibrium flow analysis was carried out for the 30 $ton_f$-class KARl liquid rocket engine nozzle together with frozen flow. The performance evaluation based on the 30 $ton_f$-class KARl LRE nozzle flow analyses will provide an understanding of the thermochemical process in the nozzle and performances of nozzle.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.145-153
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• 2014

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through the online and offline distribution channels. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy heavily depends on the size of the online distribution channel's loyal customers and the difference between the retail prices of the online and the offline distribution channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the online distribution channel has incentive to downsize its loyal customers and its retail price for a better bargaining outcome.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.31-39
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• 2015

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a distributor who sells vertically differentiated, i.e. high and low brand products. We derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games among the distributor, the high brand product manufacturer and the low brand product manufacturer. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy for the distributor heavily depends on the relative quality and price level of the low brand product comparing to those of the high brand product. It is also shown that, for more bargaining profit, the distributor has strong motivation to prefer a low brand product which has lower quality level per unit price.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.41-48
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• 2011

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategies for the PB product. By analyzing the game model, it is shown that the pricing mechanism heavily depends not only on the market power of the distributor but on the quality of the PB product. It is also shown that, counter intuitively, as the market power of the distributor increases, the optimal quality of the PB product should be decreased.