The primary purpose of this study was to investigate business performance in small apparel retailer's stores operated independently. Data were collected from 167 managers independently operating small apparel stores in Busan and Ulsan. The aforementioned were analyzed utilizing frequency, factor analysis, ANOVA, regression analysis using SPSS Win 12.0. The results showed as follows; Factors influencing on perception of managers on business performance were market information, cost/quality control, opposing power to business depression, store management, product management, sales promotion. There were significant differences between factors influencing on perception of managers on business performance and business performance(the extent of success, profit and growth). It was market information and store management that the most important for the extent of success. It was opposing power to business depression, store management and product management that the most important for the extent of profit. It was market information, store management and product management that the most important for the extent of growth.
Recently, global warming, energy shortage, and environmental disruption have been serious problems in every nation. It became more and more important to reduce the emission of CO2 and to use of energy efficiently. Smart grid was also introduced using the rapidly developing information technology. It deployed the mutual communication concept between customers and the suppliers in the electricity supply. There were increasing demands to adopt the smart meter and to present incentive for efficient energy usage in many developed countries. The objective of this research was to develop the optimal real time pricing model which maximized the profit of the power retailer and reduced the usage of energy. The simulation study was given to show the usefulness of the model. Simulation considered the customer demand response rate and price elasticity rate. The price elasticity rate was compared in the condition of fixed value according to time and variable value according to the customers. The optimal price model could maximize the profit of the power retailer and reduce the energy usage of the consumers.
The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.
Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.
This paper intends to examine the antecedents to the ex-post supply price cut which is typical retailer's unfair trade practices from three perspectives such as market power, efficiency, and retailer's tendency. For the empirical research, we analyzed manufacturer's 79 key account managers who have traded with domestic discount stores. As a result, the harder a retailer tries to increase sales and margin simultaneously, the more the retailer tends to use the ex-post supply price cut against manufacturers. In addition, the most frequent pattern of ex-post supply price cut occurs after retailer's discount at discretion. Finally, we suggest this research's implications, limitations of this research with future research directions.
Purpose - The structure of retailing has changed as retailers develop markets in response to business environment changes. This study aims to analyze the general situation of retailers in order to predict future global strategy using case studies of overseas expansion strategy and the Metro Group's global strategy. Research design, data, and methodology - The backgrounds to the new retail business model and retailer classification are analyzed as theoretical data. In addition, the key success point of the Metro Group's "cash and carry" strategy is analyzed as is the Metro Group's global CFAR (collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment) strategy. Finally, the plan for cooperation and precise forecasting under the Metro Group's supply chain management are analyzed from the promotion environment viewpoint. Related materials analyzed included the 2012 annual report, the Metro Group's web page, and a video interview with the executive in charge of global strategy and the new market development department. Some data were revised to avoid disrupting essential aspects of the case studies. Results - The important finding was that the Metro Group could be a world-class retail company with its successful global expansion strategy. The Metro Group's global strategy's primary goal is to have a leading business position in Eastern and Western Europe. The "cash and carry" strategy is highest priority in its overseas expansion strategy. Moreover, the Metro Group has standardized product planning capacity, which could be applied in various countries with different structural and cultural backgrounds. This is the main reason that the Metro Group could rapidly become successful in the Eastern Europe and Asian markets through its structural overseas expansion strategies. In addition, the Metro Group emphasizes the importance of supply chain management. Conclusions - First, retailers should create additional value through utilizing the domestic market, market power, and economies of scale to launch a global strategy to maximize benefits from diversification. Second, the political, economic, and cultural background of the target country needs to be understood to successfully implement the overseas expansion strategy. Third, the main factor of successful cooperation with a local partner is how quickly the company gains total understanding of the business resources and core competence of its partner. All organizations should focus on the achievement of goals in order to successfully operate the partnership. Fourth, retailers should improve their business, financial and organizational structure. Moreover, the work processes and company culture should also be improved to respond strongly in the competitive global market. Fifth, the essential point of a successful retail business is the control capacity of its branding and format. The retailer could avoid forecasting errors through supply chain management by perfectly distributing the actual amount of its inventory. In addition, the risks along the supply chain are effectively shared between the supply chain partners. Finally, the central tendency of the market is to gain in strength with this taking place across all parts of the business.
Purpose - This study aims to find out what impacts large retailers' behaviors appearing when they promote the strengthening of their market dominating power in the trade relations with small and medium suppliers or in the market can have on consumers. Research design, data, methodology - This study analyzed negative information (news) on large retailers (Lotte Mart, E-Mart and Homeplus) based on the monthly data over the past five years from 2008 to 2012 and also analyzed the correlation between dependent variables that are likely to affect sales through large retailer economic index, Results - This study conducted a correlation analysis on the time lag of the factors that have an impact on the negative information and sales of large retailers in order to analyze how consumers respond to the choice of large retailers' store (store sales) when they perceived negative information about the un- ethical behaviors of large retailers. Conclusions - Unfair and negative information on large retailers appeared significant for the hypothesis that sales will be affected by the image of large retailers and change of consumer attitudes.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the Internet channel introduction on the channel composed of a monopoly manufacturer and an independent physical retailer. This study also examines what would be the best strategy for the Independent physical retailer to respond to the new internet channel entry. The game theoretic model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an internet store. The audition of the internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new internet store is launched by the manufacturer. The results show that an Internet channel entry has the following impacts on the existing channel members. First, the manufacturer's internet channel introduction mitigates the double marginalization problem of the traditional channel. Second, the manufacturer could enhance Its channel power by introducing its own internet channel while it diminishes that of the incumbent independent physical retailer. Third, manufacturer's adding a new internet store leads to a higher demand. Finally, with its own internet direct channel, the manufacturer has an opportunity to practice price discrimination. The manufacture leaves only those with a strong preference for the physical store to be served by the Independent physical store. The results suggest that the independent physical store's best strategy to the entry of the manufacturer's Internet channel is to focus on the consumers who are highly loyal to the physical store while maintaining a high retail price.
With the enormous growth and various applications of private brands, national brand manufacturers are confronted with a dilemmatic situation. That is, paradoxically, some manufacturers have come to produce private brands of retailers which are potential competitors to their own brands. This study reveals why manufacturers with their own brands let themselves do the consignment production of retailers' private brands although those private brands may become strong competitors of their own brands and then investigates the condition in which manufacturers may benefit from such consignment production. Through an analysis of a game theoretical model assuming a monopoly market, the present study presents the theoretical backgrounds and provides new insights about consignment production of manufacturer with its own brand for retailer's private brand. First, such consignment production can play a role in mitigating the loss in the consignee manufacturer's own brand sales caused by the private brand in the competitive environment. Second, the effectiveness of such role is affected by the quality of the private brand produced under consignment. In other word, only if the consignee manufacturer keeps the quality of the private brand low, the manufacturer can maintain the benefit from its own brand. In addition, a consigner retailer needs to consider the final objective of launching its private brand, when it chooses its consignee manufacturer of the brand. Finally, a manufacturer with its own brand may consider consignment production as not merely an unavoidable option compelled by a retailer's power but a reasonable strategic choice to reduce the risk from competition.
This study identified the present state of store and selection criteria of supplier from the regional fashion buyer point of view and examined the effects of the factors of relative impact between buyer and supplier on the relational bond. The interviews and questionnaires were administered to the owners or the sellers of 85 fashion retail stores in Gwangju. For analysis of data, frequency, means, factor analysis, Cronbach's shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel ( shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities. (a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in (c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (
summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers.
A Study on the Antecedents of a Retailer's Ex-post Supply Price Cut
(유통업체의 사후 납품가 인하 행위의 선행요인에 관한 연구: 대형마트를 중심으로)
A Study on the Retailer's Global Expansion Strategy and Supply Chain Management : Focus on the Metro Group
(소매업체의 글로벌 확장전략과 공급사슬관리에 관한 연구: 메트로 그룹을 중심으로)
The Negative Impact Study on the Information of the Large Discount Retailers
The Impact of the Manufacturer's E-business through Direct Internet Channel on the Incumbent Independent Physical Store and the Market
(생산자의 직접경로인 전자상거래 도입이 전통적 독립중간상과 시장에 미치는 영향)
Why Do Manufacturers Produce the Private Brand, Even if They Have Their Own National Brands?
(독립 브랜드를 가진 제조업체의 유통업체 브랜드(Private Brand) 공급 전략)
The Effects of the Transaction Character Factors between Buyer-Supplier on Relational Bond in Dongdaemoon Fashion Market -From the Perspective of Region Retailer-
(동대문 패션시장의 구매자-공급자 간의 거래특성이 관계결속에 미치는 영향 -지역 패션 소매업체의 관점에서-)
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