• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.421-437
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• 2009

China has transformed her strategies for economic development from exogenous development founded on foreign capitals to endogenous development based on enhancing technology innovation capabilities since 2000. More specifically, Chinese business activities have coupled with new institutional settings which enable them to facilitate advanced technology and management methods. As a result, the characteristics of the spatial economy in China are likely to transfer from export-led developmental space to technology-oriented developmental space. In this context, this paper aims to identify the characteristics of technology-oriented space by investigating intra-, inter- and extra-firms relations of Korean FDI firms in Shanghai, China. In terms of intra-firm relations, Korean FDI firms adopted strategies for maximizing business efficiency and effectiveness by transforming their personal networks into formal networks. In terms of inter-firm relations, the distinction of Korean FDI firms' networks has been found in accordance with firm size, industrial sectors, ways of investment etc. Finally, Korean FDI firms has formal networks resulted from institutional involvement, as well as informal (personal) networks based on guanxi (inter-personal relations) in extra-firm relations. Therefore, two types of processes affecting the networks and institutional legacies of the Soviet system can be identified. First is the interaction of institutions and restructuring of pre-existing networks. Second is the insulated institutions and endurance of preexisting networks. And these two governance types have created regional economies which are embedded and over-embedded.

• Cross-Cultural Studies
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• v.43
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• pp.289-326
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• 2016

The strategy of "soft power" in the foreign and internal policies of modern Russia is one of the important factors in the implementation of public policies, and the influence of soft power is increasingly becoming stronger and gaining new forms and methods of implementation. The Russian government exerts efforts to form a positive image of Russia in the international arena, in order to strengthen the country's competitiveness, based on active use of "soft power." Currently, Russian cultural policy is developing in two main directions. In the internal policy sphere, the Russian government emphasizes national unity and civic solidarity, and fosters a sense of patriotism and national pride. In the sphere of foreign policy, the Russian government is attempting to regain its status as a great power and to create a new image of Russia that is different from that of the former Soviet Russia. In this article, we examine and analyze various aspects of the hidden political mechanisms involved in mega-sporting events, in particular the Sochi Olympics, from the viewpoint of Russian internal and foreign policy. We address the major functions of mega-sporting events and their influence in the political realm. The political impact of mega-sports projects can even compensate for economic losses incurred during the preparation and hosting of the Olympic games. In this respect, we can define mega-sporting events as one of the main components of soft power; such events reflect the basic directions of internal and foreign policy in post-Soviet Russia, which are to form and promote an image of Russia using national branding. In order to fairly and objectively analyze the recognition and perception held by Russians of the significance of mega-sporting events, in this work, we carefully studied the results of various surveys conducted by the Russian research organization VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) before and after Russia hosted the Winter Olympic games in Sochi (2014) and the Summer Olympic games in Kazan (2013). Furthermore, on the basis of the ranking of national brands by Simon Anholt (Anholt Nation Brands Index - NBI), and on the basis of the ranking of 100 national brands conducted by the British consulting company "Brand Finance" (Brand Finance Nation Brands 100), we minutely trace the development and qualitative change in Russia's image and the role of the mega-sporting projects. This article also examines the Kremlin's internal and foreign policies that were successfully carried out in practical terms. This study contributes to the understanding of the value of mega-sporting events from the point of view of cultural policy of the current ruling party of Russia. This standpoint allows us to outline the main directions of Russian cultural policy and to suggest perspectives on the branding strategy of modern Russia, including strategies related to consolidating Russia's position in the international arena.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.31-60
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• 2011

Medvedev administration has adopted new foreign policy line because of Obama administration's 'Reset' policy and Global economic crisis. The objectives of Medvedev's new foreign policy are the creation of a favorable external environment and the efficient use of external resources for Russia's economic modernization. To achieve these goals, Medvedev's government fleshed out such specific action plans as the avoidance of conflicts with other powers, the prevention of conflicts around Russia's borders, the activation of capital investment, and the introduction of advanced technology from the outside. This foreign policy line takes shape in the building of a foundation for strategic cooperation with the United States, the preparation for 'Modernization Alliance' with Europe, the management of cooperation and conflict with China and Japan, and the introduction of a dual strategy of strategic stability and economic integration in relations with post-soviet states. In Russia's new foreign policy line the strengthening of relations with the United States and Europe acquires highest priority. However, this does not mean a return to a 'pro-Western liberal line' in the early 1990s. The ultimate goal of Russia's 'modernization' program still lies in the rebuilding of a powerful Russia in accordance with the multipolar world order that was Putin administration's foreign policy line. In this context, foreign policy change under Medvedev administration could be defined as a 'program change at international level' that signifies a change in the means to achieve goals without changing them.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.46 no.5
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• pp.375-390
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• 2013

The Kenticha rare-element (Ta-Li-Nb-Be) mineralized zone is located in ophiolitic fold and thrust complex of southern Ethiopia and was firstly discovered by joint exploration program of Ethiopia-Soviet in 1980s. It includes Dermidama, Kilkele, Shuni Hill, Kenticha, and Bupo pegmatites from south to north. The Kenticha pegmatite intruded parallel to NS-striking serpentinite and talc-chlorite schist, and is exposed approximately 2 km length and 400-700 m width. The Kenticha pegmatite is internally zoned and subdivided into lower quartz-muscovite-albite granite, intermediate muscovite-quartz-albite-microcline pegmatite, and upper spodumene-quartz-albite pegmatite, based on their mineral assemblage. The major, trace elements (e.g., Rb, Li, Nb, Ta, and Ga), and element ratios (e.g., K/Rb, Nb/Ta, Mg/Li, and Al/Ga) suggest that the fractionation and solidification of pegmatite have progressed from the lower towards upper pegmatite. In contrast, unlike general magmatic fractionation, Mg/Li ratios of the Kenticha pegmatite tend to be increased towards the upper pegmatite. It may result from post-magmatic hydrothermal alteration and/or interaction with upper ultramafic rock. Rare-element mineralization in Kenticha pegmatite concentrates on the upper pegmatite, which contains up to 3.0 wt % $Li_2O$, 3,780 ppm Rb, 111 ppm Cs, 1,320 ppm Ta, and 332 ppm Nb. Ore minerals in Kenticha pegmatite mostly include tantalite, spodumene, and lepidolite, and tantalite has an association with coarser quartz-spodumene and relatively fine sacchroidal albite. The tantalite is classified into Mn-tantalite as a function of $Mn^*[Mn/(Mn+Fe)]$ and $Ta^*[Ta/(Ta+Nb)]$ values. Its compositions ($Mn^*$, $Ta^*$, and Nb/Ta) between coarse and fine tantalites are different and the former is strongly enriched in Ta and depleted in Nb compared to latter one. In conclusion, rare-element mineralization in the Kenticha pegmatite may has occurred in the latest stage of magmatic fractionation.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.89-122
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• 2020

The longing for submarine manufacture and the fear of her power had exited for a long time, but submarine that could submerge and attack was built from 20th century by science technology development. The question, 'Submarine can exercise her power in naval warfare?' had exited before World War I, but the effective value of submarine was shown in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare during World War I and World War II. Germany and the United States made the best use of submarines at that time. The submarines of these nations mounted fierce attack on the enemy's battleships and merchant ships and blocked the sea lanes for war material. These fierce attack on ships became impossible After World War II, and the major powers reduced and coordinated the defence budget, so they considered the role of submarine. However, submarine is still powerful weapon system because she can secretly navigate under the water, and one of the most important force in the navy. The aim of this thesis is analyzing submarine roles in each naval warfare and integrating maritime strategy and weapon system technology into her roles. First, the research about represent submarine roles like anti-surfaceship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, land attack, supporting special operation and mine landing warfare will be presented, then the major naval warfare where submarine participated(during ex-World War I, World War I, World War II, The Cold War Era and post Cold War) and the analyzing of submarine roles by time will be presented. Submarine was developed for anti-surfaceship warfare during ex-World War I but could not make remarkable military gain in naval warfare because her performance and weapon was inadequate. However, the effective value of submarine in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare was shown during World War I and World War II. The major powers put battleships into naval warfare undiscriminatingly to command the sea power and submarines did massive damage to enemy navy power, so put a restraint the maritime power of enemy, and blocked the sea lanes for war material. After World War II, the battlefield situation changed rapidly and the concept of preemption became difficult to apply in naval warfare. Therefore, the submarine was unable to concentrate on anti-surfaceship mission. Especially during the Cold War era, nuclear submarine came to appear and her weapon system developed rapidly. These development gave submarines special missions: anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering. At that time, United States and Soviet submarines tracked other nation's submarines loaded with nuclear weapons and departing from naval their base. The submarines also collected information on the volume of ships and a coastal missile launching site in company with this mission. After Cold War, the major powers despatched forces to major troubled regions to maintain world peace, their submarines approached the shores of these regions and attacked key enemy installations with cruise missiles. At that time, the United States eased the concept of preemption and made the concept of Bush doctrine because of possible 911 terrorism. The missiles fired from submarines and surface battleships accurately attacked key enemy installations. Many nations be strategically successful depending on what kind of mission a submarine is assigned. The patterns of future naval warfare that my country will provide against will be military power projection and coalition/joint operations. These suggest much more about what future missions we should assign to submarines.