• Korean Journal of Soil Science and Fertilizer
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• v.39 no.4
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• pp.185-194
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• 2006

A fungal strain of Trichoderma having strong chitinolytic activity was isolated from field soil enriched with crabshell for several years. Based on 5.8S rRNA, partial 18S, 28S rRNA genes, ITS1, ITS2 sequence analysis and morphological characteristics, the fungus was identified as Trichoderma asperellum and named as Trichoderma asperellum T-5 (TaT-5). The fungus released lytic enzymes such as chitinase and ${\beta}$-1, 3-glucanse, and produced six antifungal substances in chitin broth medium. To demonstrate the protective effect of TaT-5 against damping-off in cucumber plant caused by Rhizoctonia solani, TaT-5 culture broth (TA), chitin medium (CM) and distilled water (DW) were applied to each pot at 10 days after sowing, respectively. Then, the homogenized hyphae of R. solani were infected to each pot at 1 week after TaT-5 inoculation. During experimental period, fresh weight of shoot and root in cucumber plant more increased at TA treatment compared to other treatments. PR-proteins (${\beta}$-1, 3-glucanase and chitinase) activities in cucumber leaves markedly increased at CM and DW treatments, but the activity slightly increased and then decreased at TA treatment at 3 days after infection of R. solani. The activity of PR-proteins activities in cucumber roots at all treatments decreased with time where the degree of decrement was more alleviated at TA treatment than CM and DW. These results suggest that the lytic enzymes (chitinase and ${\beta}$-1, 3-glucanse) and antifungal substances produced by TaT-5 can reduce the pathogenic attack by R. solani in cucumber plants.

• Journal of Chest Surgery
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.142-149
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• 2003

To know the feasibility of the coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) for multivessel coronary artery disease with purely bilateral internal thoracic arteries (ITAs), we analyzed the short-term clinical results and the coronary angiography of the patients. Material and Method: From March 2001 to June 2002, four hundred and five patients underwent CABG. Purely bilateral ITAs were used in 159 patients (39.3%). We analyzed these patients retrospectively The mean age of these patients was $61.2{\pm}8.5$ (range: 30 ~80) years and there were 123 male patients. The preoperative risk factors were as follows: diabetes in 54 patients (34.0%), history of acute myocardiac infarction within 4 weeks in 29 (18.2%), and emergency operation in 6 (3.8%). Off-pump CABG was carried out in 128 patients (80.5%). Associated procedures were mitral valvuloplasty (5), aortic valve replacement (3), Dor procedure (1), and so on. Result: The mean number of distal anastomoses was $3.1{\pm}0.9$ (range: 2~6), the mean duration of hospital stay was $8.4{\pm}4.5$ days. There was one (0.6%) operative death. Except for one early death, no other patients suffered from low cardiac output. The other postoperative complications were occurred as follows: reoperation due to bleeding in 3 patients, perioperative myocardiac infarction in 1, transient cardiac arrest in 2, transient cognitive dysfunction in 7, and transient ischemic attack in 1, and deep sternal wound infection in 1 patient. Recently, early postoperative angiography was performed in 19 patients who had triple vessel disease. The total number of distal anastomosis was 78 (mean $4.1{\pm}0.8$/patient). All distal anastomosis sites were patent, but competition flow was observed at the bypass sites where the native coronary artery stenosis was not significant. Conclusion: The CABG with purely bilateral ITAs for triple vessel disease was performed safely. The early patency rate was relatively good in small number of patients. However the long-term patency rate and the functional study to evaluate the sites where competition flow was observed should be followed.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.29
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• pp.241-278
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• 2017

This study aims to classify broadscale anti-religious movements in Korea based on critical public sentiment and analyze the meanings of these movements. To carry out the research, global religious changes that have occurred in modern times were closely looked into first. The world religions have had an influence on the world's religious awareness. As a result, they intend to acquire universality on their own individual grounds while keeping consistency with the past. This phenomenon used to appear to retain the identity, recreate tradition, transform itself to fit in the present times, pursue innovation, or even become overshadowed by other forms of thought such as when religions have collided with nationalism. How does Korean society perceive the changes that emerged in world religions? In general, the circumstances that Korea faces in this era tend to manifest themselves via the Internet, multimedia, and Youtube wherein they sound off on religion and this includes criticism of Christianity, demand for reformation, attack on minor religions, pro-reform academic circles and media, and the propagation of anti-theism. Criticism of religion is interpreted as an anti-religious movement. The secularism and anti-theism brought up by some Western scholars and critical theories of religion from scientific or historical perspectives are being spread through bookstores. Christianity is prone to reflecting on itself and trying to emphasizing a meta-religious spirituality. This in short, characterizes anti-religious movements in Korea. Indeed, criticism against particular religions has also emerged in the past. However, anti-religious movements that have recently come into existence in Korea are in some regards unprecedented when compared to that of the past in terms of their patterns and context. Especially, the active anti-Christianity movement in general is definitely a new phenomenon. This research mainly focused on Christianity, but on-going anti-religious movements will be a major topic for further research that aims to understand the religious changes unfolding in Korea.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.175-181
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• 2024

The U.N. Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee estimated that the amount of North Korea's cyberattacks on virtual asset-related companies from 2017 to 2023 was about 4 trillion won. North Korea's cyberattacks have secured funds through cryptocurrency hacking as it has been restricted from securing foreign currency due to economic sanctions by the international community, and it also shows the form of technology theft against defense companies, and illegal assets are being used to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and develop nuclear and missile development. When North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, and declared the completion of its national nuclear armament following the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on November 29 of the same year, the U.N. imposed sanctions on North Korea, which are considered the strongest economic sanctions in history. In these difficult economic situations, North Korea tried to overcome the crisis through cyberattacks, but as a result of analyzing the changes through the North's cyber attack cases, the strategic goal from the first period from 2009 to 2016 was to verify and show off North Korea's cyber capabilities through the neutralization of the national network and the takeover of information, and was seen as an intention to create social chaos in South Korea. When foreign currency earnings were limited due to sanctions against North Korea in 2016, the second stage seized virtual currency and secured funds to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and advance nuclear and missile development. The third stage is a technology hacking of domestic and foreign defense companies, focusing on taking over key technologies to achieve the five strategic weapons tasks proposed by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. At the national level, security measures for private companies as well as state agencies should be established against North Korea's cyberattacks, and measures for legal systems, technical problems, and budgets related to science are urgently needed. It is also necessary to establish a system and manpower to respond to the ever-developing cyberattacks by focusing on cultivating and securing professional manpower such as white hackers.