• 방사선산업학회지
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.411-416
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• 2023

From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• 의정연구
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• 제25권3호
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

본 논문은 현재 북한의 비핵화가 점점 불확실해지고 있고, 미국의 안보 공약에 대한 불신을 제거할 수 없는 상황이라는 전제하에 한국이 보유하고 있는 비핵전력으로 북한의 핵공격을 억제 또는 방어할 수 있는 노력의 방향을 제시하기 위한 목적으로 작성되었다. 이를 위하여 제2장에서는 비핵전력으로 핵위협에 대응하는 방법을 열거 및 설명하였고, 제3장에서는 이에 근거하여 한국의 실태를 분석하였으며, 제4장에서는 한국이 노력해야 할 방향을 제시하였다. 분석을 통하여 본 논문은 북한의 핵위협이 심각한 정도에 비해서 한국의 대비태세는 미흡하고, 특히 2018년 시작된 북한의 비핵화를 둘러싼 협상으로 인하여 기존에 추진해오던 '3축 체계'의 추진이 지체되고 있다고 평가하였다. 결국 미국의 확장억제가 제대로 이행되지 않을 경우 한국의 억제 및 방어에 심각한 문제가 발생할 수밖에 없는 상황이다. 이제 한국은 핵전략의 최소억제 개념에 근거하여 북한이 핵공격을 가할 경우 참수작전을 시행하겠다는 의지를 과시하고 그 능력을 구비하는 것에 최우선적인 비중을 둘 필요가 있다. 선제타격의 경우에도 타격시점을 더욱 앞당길 수밖에 없고, 탄도미사일방어의 경우 담당기구를 격상시키고 주한미군의 그것과 결합시켜 나가야 할 것이다. 핵폭발 시를 대비한 대피소 구축 등에도 노력할 필요가 있다.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권1호
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

한국은 과거처럼 국제관계의 예속자가 아니라 명실상부한 중견국으로서, 북한의 핵과 재래전 도발위협을 극복하고 동북아지역의 평화를 유지하는 '균형자' 역할을 할 수 있도록 군사력을 건설해야 한다. 군사력 건설을 통해 다양한 안보위협에 대한 억제력 발휘가 가능하다. 군사적 억제력 발휘를 위해 첫 번째로 '선제적 억제'(deterrence by preemptive)와 '응징적 억제'(deterrence by punishment)는 현재와 미래의 위협에 대비하여 '감시정찰체계와 지휘통제체계'(C41SR)를 공통전력으로 공격무기체계를 결합한 '공격체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 두 번째로 '거부적 억제'(deterrence by denial)는 공통전력과 방어무기체계를 결합한 '방어체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 마지막으로 자주적으로 첨단전력을 개발하기 위해서는 기존의 방위산업과 연구개발 역량을 통합하여 '인프라 축'을 구축해야 한다. 우리는 미래 한국군의 군사력을 건설함에 있어서 정부의 균형자 역할에 대한 국가적 비젼, 이에 대한 국민적 합의를 토대로 본고에서 제시한 군사력 건설 모형에 따른 일관성 있는 정책적인 노력과 신념이 반드시 필요하다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

미래 한·미 안보동맹에 있어 핵 확장억제 능력은 중요한 현안이다. 북한의 핵무기 제조 능력이 증대되고 더욱 위협적으로 진화하는 가운데, 미국 국가안보정책 추진에 있어 오바마 대통령의 핵없는 세상 선언 등에 의해 핵무기에 의한 억제 능력이 점차 감소되고 있다. 이는 한·미 연합방위태세의 중요한 한 축인 한국에 대한 "핵우산(nuclear umbrella)" 능력이 과연 충분한가에 대한 새로운 의구심을 낳게 한다. 본 논문은 상기와 같은 상황 하에 핵 확장억제의 현재와 미래 역할에 대해 평가할 목적으로 작성되었다. 이를 위해 우선 전체적인 미국 핵무기 재고 감소 추세에 대해 평가를 하고, 다음으로 최근 북한의 국지 군사도발 양상과 미국 오바마 행정부의 핵정책 그리고 이에 대응해야 하는 한·미 핵 확장억제 전망에 관해 분석을 한다. 이를 통해 본 논문이 얻는 결과는 북한의 핵위협을 억제시키는 억제의 신뢰성과 동맹국에 대한 확실한 보증이 어렵고 장기적 이라는 것이다. 아울러 북한의 소규모 핵위협 또는 재래식 무기 위협에 대해 충분히 대응할 수 있는 정도의 핵무기 재고가 점차 축소되는 추세에 어떻게 한·미 양국이 대응해야 하는가를 과제로 제시하고 있다. 또한 본 논문은 한·미 간에 연합방위태세 유지를 위해 지속적이고도 전략적이며 정치적 상호협력을 강화하여 한·미 안보동맹의 신뢰도를 증진시켜야 한다는 과제를 제시하고 있다. 본 논문은 북한의 핵위협 또는 대규모 재래식 위협에 대응하기 위해 미국이 대규모 핵무기를 보유하는 것은 비효율적 전략인 바, 이를 극복하기 위해 강력한 한·미 연합방위태세를 지속적으로 유지 발전시켜야 한다는 것을 결론으로 제시한다. 특히 북한의 핵위협과 대규모 재래식 위협에 직면해 있는 한반도의 불확실성, 복잡성 그리고 위기상황에 대비하기 위해 한·미 간 핵 확장억제 능력을 계속적으로 협의하여 발전시켜야 할 것으로 판단되며, 이를 위해 한국 해군의 역할을 증대시켜야 한다는 것을 한·미 안보동맹의 중·장기 현안으로 제시하고 있다. 궁극적으로 본 논문은 한미 양국이 한반도 주변해역에서 발생하는 북한과의 해양분쟁이 전면전으로 확대되는 것을 최소화시키고 동시에 북한의 소규모 위협(smaller-scale threats)에 대응할 수 있는 한국 해군력 발전을 고려해야 한다고 주장하면서 이에 대한 심층적인 연구가 추가로 있어야 할 것이라고 제언하고 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• 산업진흥연구
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• 제5권3호
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• pp.123-134
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• 2020

본 연구는 탈냉전이후 역대 한국정부의 북핵전략내용들을 규명하고, 동일시기 한반도에 영향을 준 미국의 B. 클린턴과 G.W.부시 행정부의 대북핵정책과 북한의 핵전략 및 전술이 한국정부의 북핵전략에 어떠한 인과론적 결과를 파생하였는지 상호연계·분석하여 향후의 대응방안을 제시하는데 있다. 탈냉전직후인 1991년 12월 13일 남북한이 공동 합의한 '남북기본합의서'는 한국이 남북관계를 주도해 가는 토대를 마련해 주었고, 북핵해결의 기점이라 하는 '한반도비핵화선언'은 냉전종식에 대한 미국의 '해외전술핵무기폐기선언'과 직결되는 일련의 조치로, 냉전해체후 국제질서 재편과정의 파생물이자 북한의 교묘한 핵전략에 말려든 오판의 산물이었다. 이후 김영삼의 문민정부-->김대중정부의 햇볕정책-->노무현정부의 평화·번영정책--> 이명박 정부의 상생·공영정책과 비핵·개방·3000 전략은 남북관계발전을 정부정책의 제일기조로 삼고 제시한 정책적 모토이고 추진과정에서 방법상의 차이가 있었다. 그러나 북핵문제대응에 대한 공통적 측면은 북핵문제해결을 위한 주도적이고 적극적인 대응책 마련과 실행의 노력보다는 국제기구나 다자적국제체제 및 미국역할에대한 기대심리가 지대했음을 인지할 수 있었다. 본 연구에서는 이의 미흡한 점을 보강하기 위한 결론적 제안으로 일치단결된 국민의식으로 북핵폐기를 위한 단호한 대전략(大戰略)수립과, 북핵문제해결을 위한 다자협의체제와 국제레짐의 공조(共助)를 통한 보다 쇄신되고 강력한 미래의 역할주문과 한국의 역대정부에서 이룩한 남북한 5대합의문의 재보강을 통한 확대된 억지책(extended deterrence)강구를 제언하였다.

• 방사선산업학회지
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.451-456
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• 2023

The subject of this research is what is the most effective strategy of the nuclear sharing strategy of South Korea through the nuclear strategy that the U.S. is pursuing now. The U.S. Nuclear Strategy-related change can be found in a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report released by the U.S. The first NPR was announced in 1994 and after that, the U.S. has additionally announced a total of four NPRs along with administration changes. The change in the U.S. nuclear strategy and nuclear power are considered both deterrence and offset strategies. It can be summarized in two ways. First, by maintaining overwhelming nuclear power against the enemy, the U.S. is to lead nuclear advantage that is the core of the U.S. nuclear strategy. Second, the U.S. is to limit the competition of nuclear power with nations seeking to challenge the U.S. nuclear power advantage. Additionally, the U.S. is to actively sign an agreement with nations on the reduction and restriction of nuclear weapons. Through the NPR of the U.S., South Korea should know its unclear power and strategy and have an effective nuclear strategy of South Korea. Therefore, this research is to deal with the suitability of the nuclear sharing strategy with the U.S., which is one of the various nuclear strategies of South Korea.