• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.281-285
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• 2024

Within five years of Kim Jong-un's rise to power, North Korea conducted four nuclear tests and launched the Hwasong-15, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in 2017, declaring the completion of its nuclear forces. During the period when Kim Jong-un completed nuclear forces to maintain the regime, foreign policy factors of the United States, China, Russia, and South Korea drove North Korea's accelerated nuclear development. The main motivating factors were the hostile policies and external threats as security factors. The completion of nuclear forces is also the result of the interplay of domestic political factors, normative factors, and hereditary factors. North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons and missiles for the survival of its regime. To achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, a new modus vivendi must be sought. It is necessary to set the ultimate goal of North Korea's complete denuclearization and engage in strategic thinking for a realistic and effective phased approach.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• Journal of People, Plants, and Environment
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• v.22 no.6
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• pp.563-573
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• 2019

The North Korean government conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 and more recently the sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017. In order to identify how North Korea's nuclear tests have affected the environment, a scientific approach is required. Although North Korea's nuclear tests and their environmental destruction are not a severe threat to the environment of the Korean Peninsula at this time, identifying environmental damage and taking countermeasures in advance are essential to minimize their potential threats to the environments. The purpose of this study is to study the environmental impact of North Korea's nuclear tests using Google Earth image analysis. As a method of the study, we compare Google Earth images taken before and after each nuclear test was conducted in North Korea. To overcome limitations of the suggested comparison method, we cross-checked our results with those of previous scientific research. After the 1st-3rd nuclear tests, green spaces were found to be considerably reduced. In particular, when comparing the Google Earth images before and after the second nuclear test, some ground subsidences were observed. Such subsidences can cause tunnels on the mountainsides and cracks in rocks around the mountains, leading to the release of radioactive materials and contaminating groundwater. Besides, after the 4th-6th nuclear tests, decay and deforestation were observed not in the nuclear test sites, but in their surrounding areas. Especially after the 5th and 6th nuclear tests, the topography and the forests of the surrounding areas were severely damaged. In relation to North Korea's nuclear tests and their impact on the natural environment, we need to prepare various policy measures to reduce North Korea's environmental pollution and natural environment destruction. Those policy measures include the establishment of various cooperative governance between the Korean government, the private sector, the academia, NGOs, and international organizations.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.3-22
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• 2010

The objective of this paper is to analyze why China's policy toward North Korea after the second North Korean nuclear crisis have plunged into the dilemma between pressure and inducement. This paper stress that dilemma between China's two aims toward North, that is, stability in Korean peninsula and North East Asia, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that can explain China's inconsistent policies on North Korea. As North Korea publicly revealed the intention of nuclear development and China has played the mediator role for protecting its security, China's two aims toward North have faced the situation of a dilemma. Because China's two aims are directly related with stability in the neighbor that pursuit to perform 'economic development' since 1978, China's two aims toward North would not be changed easily. Therefore, as long as North Korea would not make an effort on denuclearization and China continually would maintain two aims on North, it will be continued a dilemma between China's policies toward North.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.5
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.3
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• pp.169-196
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• 2005

The point of Bush administraion’s foreign policy is to support the promotion and stability of Democracy in Iraq and counter terrorism and spread of WMD with his strong propulsive force caused by his reelection. In such an environment, there are his leadership, his team, himself, Kim Jung Il, and a new understanding of North Korea after September 11 as the effective factors of Bush administration’s policy toward Pyongyang. Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea also shows the process of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program and the future scenario of the Korean Peninsula with "the persistence of solving North Korea’s nuclear weapon program such as the method having done in Lybia", "the holding unconditional talks with Pyongyang, and "the continual concerns with human rights in North Korea." The purpose of Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea is to make North Korea do not support terrorism rather than remove the nuclear weapon in North Korea. The process of outlining South Korea’s policy toward North Korea must be considered for "national interest" with reasonable analyses not just hopes For this, South Korea must access systematically human rights of North Korea, prepare projects for a daring approach on North Korea, and strengthen South Korea’s defense ability toward North Korea with deep alliance with U.S and systematize the mutual understanding channel between U.S and South Korea. In conclusion, South Korea must try to get specific methods and practices about Bush administration’s foreign policy of North Korea with national wisdom

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.127-135
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• 2017

Today, Kim Jong-un, the third-hereditary regime in North Korea, is committing Nuclear Provocation more aggressively than the past when Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il dominated. Past South Korea government had suggested plans to restrain the provocation from North Korea and bring stabilization in the Korean Peninsula. However, consequentially it was limited to the primary role of the President. When President Trump takes over the government in February 2017, it has attracted the expectation about the issues occurred on the Korean Peninsula due to the pledge that he promised during the presidential election and his govern style. However, various speeches about the Korean Peninsula that he spoke recently made situations depressed about what South Korean currently encounters. Furthermore, previous regime in North Korea has laid the foundation for Kim Jong-un to be obsessed more on the nuclear and missile which has led him to provoke more imprudently by highlighting the light weight, advanced, and various kinds of nuclear and missiles. Thus, we would like to propose counter measures in order for South Korean government to handle and solve the issues that they encounters by themselves based on North Korea's Nuclear Provocation instead of relying on other countries to get involved and help.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.271-309
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• 2010

The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.