• 제목/요약/키워드: North Korea's provocations

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북한의 대외정책 기조와 전망 (The North Korea's Foreign Policy Stance and Prospect)

  • 김성우
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제14권6_1호
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    • pp.57-63
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    • 2014
  • 한반도는 탈냉전이라는 역사적 변화에도 불구하고 냉전적 구조가 해제되지 않고 북한의 대남도발은 계속되고 있다. 북한의 천안함 폭침과 연평도 포격도발은 파국적인 남북관계 초래와 동북아 불안정의 요인으로 작용하고 있다. 북한의 도발은 미국과 한국 및 북한 내부 요인이 북한의 의사결정체계에서 복합적으로 작용하여 군사 비군사적 수단에 의해 자행되고 있다. 북한은 한반도의 적화통일이라는 전략기조을 유지하기 때문에 공세적으로 지속될 수밖에 없을 것이다. 북한의 대외정책은 지속성과 상황에 따라 변화하는 양면성을 지니고 있다. 북한 대외정책의 목표와 이념은 비교적 일관성 있게 지속하고 있지만, 정책전개의 전략 전술과 행동 유형에서는 상당한 변화가 있다. 즉, 지속성은 곧 국가 체제유지와 국가 생존 명분의 문제이며, 변화는 지속성과 명분을 유지시키고 발전하기 위한 전술적 종속개념에 해당한다. 합리적인 시각으로 본다면 북한의 대외정책 기조는 군사력과 핵무기 개발을 생존수단으로 삼아 긴장을 조성하여 외교적, 경제적 보상을 얻는 외교방식을 과감하게 탈피하여야 하며 국제사회에 참여하여 하나의 국가로서 국제관례를 지키는 자세를 견지해야 하나 여러 가지 여건상 기존 대외정책 방향을 고수하고 있다.

북한군의 군사적 도발 및 대응방향 - 목함 지뢰 도발에 이어진 비대칭전력 위협을 중심으로- (North Korean military provocations and the corresponding direction - Focus on the threat that resulted in unequal power wood box mines provocation -)

  • 김규남
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제15권6_1호
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    • pp.59-67
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    • 2015
  • 우리가 북한을 보는 시각은 크게 두 가지로 대적해야 할 주적이라는 점과 통일을 염두에 둔 교류협력의 대상이라는 시각이 존재하고 있다. 주적으로 북한은 1950년 6월 25일 불법 남침을 하였고 1953년 7월 27일 정전협정 조인이후 지금까지 정전협정 위반과 불법도발을 계속하고 있다. 2015년 8월 4일 북한은 또다시 DMZ 목함 지뢰 도발에 이어 준전시 상태를 선포하면서 전면전 초기에 운용되는 전력을 시차별로 운영하였다. 그 과정에서 한미 군 당국은 북한군의 전력운용을 실시간 탐지하였고 그 결과가 언론을 통해 생중계 되었다. 이러한 군사적 도발을 보면서 북한의 군사적 위협 중 비대칭전력의 위협에 우리는 어떻게 대응할 것인가를 제시하고자 한다.

북한 및 지역 해양안보 위협 극복과 대한민국 해군발전 (Challenges of Republic of Korea Navy : How to Cope with Old and New Threats from North Korea and Others.)

  • 배형수
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권37호
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    • pp.32-64
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    • 2015
  • This paper examines the types and trends of North Korea's military provocations and regional maritime threats against South Korea, and is focusing on the Republic of Korea's naval development and modernizations by the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) on future actions, what directions of the ROKN has taken thus far in response, as well as an examination of how the ROKN might respond to vulnerabilities identified throughout modern history. Importantly, this paper does not consider the domestic, bilateral, multilateral, regional and global political dimensions of the situation on the Korean Peninsula; nor does it consider the North Korea's transitional power politics, but including North Korea's nuclear program and submarine-launched ballistic missile developments, as a caveat, this paper is based on open sources in Korean and English language, and thus information concerning provocations is indicative only.

North Korean Leaders' Personality Reflection on Provocation Patterns: Narcissism and Fear

  • Lim, Sora;Ko, Sunghwah
    • Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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    • 제19권2호
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    • pp.216-233
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    • 2020
  • Over the last 70 years, South Korea has gone through countless provocations from North Korea. Provocation is something that must be delicately calculated before the actual action, since it can be extended to a serious conflict. Among the possible factors, this paper focuses on the leader's characteristic, because 1) under North Korean dictatorship, the leader's thoughts are critical influence to policies and 2) personal characteristic, especially if it is the dictator's, hardly changes even when the external circumstances change. The purpose of this paper is in analyzing the correlations between North Korean leader's characteristics and provocation pattern. First, three generations of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un's personal characteristics will be described. Next, particular provocation features in respective leader's period will follow. Lastly, how each leader's characteristic and concerns were reflected on the provocations will be analyzed.

5.24 대북조치와 향후 대북정책 과제 (May 24 Measures and Future North Korea Policy)

  • 김태우
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.128-148
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    • 2014
  • In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망 (Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an)

  • 김성만
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

북 핵·미사일 시대의 억제전략 : 도전과 나아갈 방향 (Deterrent Strategy in the era of North Korea's WMD and Missile Threats : Challenges and the Ways to go)

  • 이상엽
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권41호
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    • pp.232-260
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    • 2017
  • The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

북한의 대남 도발 사례분석 (The Study on the North Korea's Provocation)

  • 김성우
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제14권3_1호
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    • pp.79-89
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    • 2014
  • 북한의 도발은 지상 해상 공중으로 다양하게 침투 및 국지도발을 일삼아 왔다. 최근 제1 연평해전과 연평도 포격 사건까지 국지전시 합동작전을 보면 북한의 선제 사격 및 도발에 따라 우리 군은 대응 사격위주의 방어만 해왔으며, 항공력의 무력투입은 없었다. 북한의 대남도발 의지와 강도는 김일성, 김정일, 김정은 체제로 전환되면서도 변화가 없다고 판단된다. 지금까지 한반도에서 전쟁위험을 안겨줄 만한 강도 높은 위기사건만을 중심으로 북한 군대의 의도를 파악해 본다면 그러한 사실이 더 명확해진다. 이제까지의 북한의 도발행태를 요약하면 다음과 같은 특징이 부각된다. 첫째, 시기적으로 도발형태가 변하고 있다. 둘째, 위기사건의 목표를 분석하면 군사적 목적에 의한 도발이 가장 많다. 셋째, 북한은 화전양면전략을 구사한다. 넷째, 도발행위를 은폐하.려고 한다. 한반도 위기사건이 발생하였을 때마다 북한측은 자신의 의도를 숨기고 한국에 의한 조작행위로 비난하는 행태를 보여 왔다. 북한의 도발은 미국요인과 한국 및 북한 내부요인이 의사결정체에 복합적으로 작용하여 군사적, 비군사적 수단에 의해 자행되었고 대남도발은 한반도의 공산화 통일이라는 북한의 국가전략체계의 영향을 받기 때문에 공세적으로 지속될 수밖에 없음을 알 수 있다.

북한의 제4세대전쟁 위협전망과 극복방안 연구: 향토예비군 운용 개선을 중심으로 (A study on overcoming the prospect of North Korea's fourth-generation war threats : Focusing on the Homeland Defense Reservists)

  • 김연준
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제16권6_1호
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    • pp.3-13
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    • 2016
  • 우리는 전쟁에서 당연히 강한 자가 약한 자에게 승리한다고 생각한다. 그러나 현대전쟁에서 약한 자가 강한 자를 상대로 승리한 사례들이 많음을 알 수 있다. 이는 제4세대전쟁 이론을 통해 논리적으로 이해할 수 있다. 북한은 열세한 국력임에도 한반도 무력통일 정책을 포기하지 않고 있다. 그들은 국제사회와 남한을 상대로 다양한 정치 사회 군사적 수준의 도발을 계속하고 있다. 최근에 북한은 5차례의 핵실험, 대륙간탄도미사일 시험발사와, DMZ 도발 등을 자행하였으며, 앞으로도 제4세대전쟁 차원의 도발을 계속할 것으로 예상된다. 이에 점증하고 있는 북한의 제4세대전쟁 위협과 도발에 대한 본질을 이해해야 한다. 이를 통해 그들의 제4세대전쟁 위협에 대한 근본적인 대책중 하나인 향토예비군제도에 대한 가치를 재인식하고 관련 제도를 보완해야 한다. 우리는 개선된 향토예비군제도를 통해 한반도에 세력균형 변화와 힘의 전환점으로 이행을 단호 거부할 수 있다. 즉 예상되는 북한의 제4세대전쟁 위협에 대하여, 우리의 향토예비군제도는 우리의 단호한 전쟁 수행을 위한 의지(意志)이자, 정치 사회 경제 군사적인 수단이며, 최적의 대안으로 기능발휘가 가능하다.