• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

This paper is to analyse the development of the U.S.-China relationship and pending issues and implications. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the relationship between the US and China in the early and hostile confrontation period; the relationship of US-Chinese approach/normalization period and the relationship in the 1980s and 1990s; the relationship by mid-2010 since the opening of the G2 era; the US-China relations and major pending issues and implications in the era of Trump-Xi Jinping; and conclusion. The rapid growth of China over the past three decades has changed the existing US-centered international order and has triggered competition between the two countries. The United States and China have become the only countries that regularly hold strategic and economic dialogue, and the topic has also developed into a country that discusses not only bilateral relations but also global issues. The issues of US-China cooperation and conflicts encompass global issues as well as bilateral relations issues. For example, the South China Sea, the North Korean nuclear issue and the THAAD, the economic and financial order, and the Taiwan issue. It is not a matter of another country, but a problem that directly or indirectly leads to Korea's diplomacy, security and economy. In order to prevent 'Korea passing' in the US-China relationship, we need a hedging strategy that maintains and strengthens the strong ROK-US security cooperation and harmonious promotion of ROK-China economic cooperation.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.15 no.6_1
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• pp.79-92
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• 2015

It is required to expand area of inter-Korean economic cooperation, being limited to non-military field, to military field and then, to positively promote arms control in order to establish foundation for peaceful reunification in Korean peninsula. Reasons why arms control has not been promoted between South and North Korea in the meantime were such original factors as follows; (1) limit of confidence building between the South and the North, (2) functional limit of arms control itself, (3) institutional structural limit between the South and the North, (4) environmental limit at home and abroad. It is necessary to get out from existing frame and to seek a new paradigm in order to overcome above factors and to realize arms control between the South and the North. First, it is required to have prior political dialog at the South-North high-level talks in order to promote arms control and to exercise 'strategic flexibility' during negotiation and promotion process. For this, 'flexible reciprocity' has to be adopted in compliance with situation and conditions. Second, it is necessary to get out from existing principle of 'confidence building in advance and arms reduction later' but to seek the 'simultaneous driving principle of confidence building and arms reduction' as an eclectic approach. Namely, based on reasonable sufficiency, it is required to promote military confidence building and limited arms reduction in parallel, which is a lower level of arms control. Third, as an advisory body of Prime Minister's Office, it is necessary to install an organization exclusively responsible for arms control and to positively handle arms control issue from the standpoint of national policy strategy. If the South-North high-level talks take place, it is necessary to organize and operate 'South-North Joint Arms Control Promotion Board (tentative name)'. Fourth, it is required to exercise more active diplomatic competence in order to create national consensus on necessity of arms control for peaceful reunification and to form more favorable international environment. Especially, it is necessary to think about how to solve nuclear issue of North Korea together in collaboration with international society and how to maintain balance between ROK-US alliance and Sino-Korean cooperation relations.

• Maritime Security
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.1-29
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• 2023

For the last 70 years, the U.S.-led bilateral security system, or "Hub-and-Spokes" system, has been applied to Northeast Asia, and the system has been successfully settled in terms of stability and economic achievements of the region. Given the increasing complexity of the security environment of East Asia, it is plausible to consider the possibility of a security system shift from bilateral alliances to collective security. In order to analyze the driver of collective security system, this study developed three factors of formation and development of collective security system - main threat, intensity of the threat, and confidence among countries in the system - by reviewing international political theories related to security cooperation. Comparing the formation, development, and achievements of NATO and SEATO, the study figures out that the existence of the main threat, the high intensity of the threat, and the strong confidence among countries in the security system are the primary drivers for a successful collective security system. Based on the result, the study also analyzed the possibility of a security system shift in East Asia. Considering contemporary international conflicts such as U.S.-China strategic competition, Russia-Ukraine War, and growing threats posed by North Korean nuclear and missiles, the study anticipates that the necessity of a collective security system that will replace the current security system of the region would arise. Still, although some issues between countries should be overcome, the growing intensity of the threats will promote cooperation among countries by improving their confidence.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.26
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• pp.29-58
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• 2011

Since 11 September 2001, warnings of risk in the nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons and materials which poses one of the gravest threats to the international community have continued. The purpose of this study is to analyze the aim, principles, characteristics, activities, impediments to progress and developmental recommendation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT). In addition, it suggests implications of the GICNT for the ROK policy. International community will need a comprehensive strategy with four key elements to accomplish the GICNT: (1) securing and reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world, (2) countering terrorist nuclear plots, (3) preventing and deterring state transfers of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, (4) interdicting nuclear smuggling. Moreover, other steps should be taken to build the needed sense of urgency, including: (1) analysis and assessment through joint threat briefing for real nuclear threat possibility, (2) nuclear terrorism exercises, (3) fast-paced nuclear security reviews, (4) realistic testing of nuclear security performance to defeat insider or outsider threats, (5) preparing shared database of threats and incidents. As for the ROK, main concerns are transfer of North Korea's nuclear weapons, materials and technology to international terror groups and attacks on nuclear facilities and uses of nuclear devices. As the 5th nuclear country, the ROK has strengthened systems of physical protection and nuclear counterterrorism based on the international conventions. In order to comprehensive and effective prevention of nuclear terrorism, the ROK has to strengthen nuclear detection instruments and mobile radiation monitoring system in airports, ports, road networks, and national critical infrastructures. Furthermore, it has to draw up effective crisis management manual and prepare nuclear counterterrorism exercises and operational postures. The fundamental key to the prevention, detection and response to nuclear terrorism which leads to catastrophic impacts is to establish not only domestic law, institution and systems, but also strengthen international cooperation.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.141-151
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• 2023

Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, European countries have cut defense costs and reduced armaments as an era of peace without large-scale wars continues, and as a result, the West's defense industry base has gradually weakened. On the other hand, South Korea, the world's only divided country, was able to achieve high growth in the defense industry as a result of continuous arms strengthening in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. With the rapid increase in demand for conventional weapons systems and changes in the structure of the global defense market due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Korea's weapons system drew great attention as a large-scale defense export contract with Poland was signed in 2022. In 2023, K-Defense ranked ninth in the world's arms exports and aims to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027. Therefore, this study analyzed the case of Korea-Poland defense exports to derive problems, and presented development strategies related to export revitalization of K-Defense, a national strategic industry. In order for the defense industry to become Korea's next growth engine, it is necessary to establish a defense organization, prepare government-level measures to protect defense industry technology, and expand military and security cooperation with allies linked to defense exports.