• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.135-156
• /
• 2010

While there are a few ways of giving meanings to the term, "Altai" ranging from a language family to a national residing around the Altai Mountains in Russian Federation, and to the people speaking the language or the whole area where they live, there have been controversial debates whether it is a meaningful categorization. This paper argues that the basic cause lying beneath the controversies is the underdevelopment of the subject that identifies itself as a representative of the whole area where the Altaic language family is spoken. It might be true, as some Korean and Russian scholars insist, that what deserves to be called Altaic culture (or civilization) has provided a common culture and mutual interactions with the people. However, the Altaic people failed to constitute themselves as a meaningful modern group, that is a nation, and they did not fully develop national consciousness, As a result, although their way of life may be regarded as an origin of various cultures across North-East Asia, Altaic culture is not sufficient to give a momentum to claim for cultural initiative in the region. This comes at least partly from the reconfiguration of ethnic identity through a Soviet type of modernization and its geopolitical situation surrounded by super-powers such as China and Russia, as well as belated import of religions such as Buddhism and Christianity. From a wide perspective, the trouble about delimiting an area is not unique in Altai, but universally found in anywhere, as far as area studies are concerned. The delimitation of an area is not a natural outcome of physical environment but an artificial production of how cultural-political relationships have been distributed. Therefore, while the case of Alai has its own specificities, its implications that a national or regional boundary in area studies should not be taken for granted may be applied to other areas.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
• /
• v.30 no.2B
• /
• pp.191-198
• /
• 2010

Assessing seasonality of precipitation is necessarily required to establish future plans and policies for water resources management. In this regard, a main objective of the study is to introduce an effective approach for assessing the seasonality of the precipitation and evaluate the seasonality through the proposed one. We have used circular statistics to characterize the seasonality on the precipitation in Korea. The circular statistics allow us to effectively assess changes in timing of the seasonality in detail. It was found that peak time on monthly rainfall occurred between end of June and early July in southern coastal area while the timing was delayed in northern part of Korea because of monsoon moving in from south to north. In case of annual daily peak precipitation, spatio-temporal variation of the peak time was increased. It is mainly because of geophysical effects, frequency and paths of typhoons. Finally, temporal variations on the timing of the peak seasons were evaluated through circular statistics by 30-year moving average data. The peak season in the Northen part of Korea (e.g. Seoul and Gangrung) has been moved back from early July to end of July while the peak season has been moved up from middle of July to early July in the Southern part of Korea (e.g. Busan and Mokpo). It seems that changes in seasonality are mostly modulated by variability in the east-asia monsoon system.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
• /
• v.54 no.2
• /
• pp.154-169
• /
• 2021

The establishment of the Bronze Age is one of the most important achievements suggested by Korean archaeology shortly after liberation. There is no doubt that Moo-Byung Yoon is the representative figure, who refuted the ambiguous Eneolithic age (金石倂用期) created by Japanese scholars and settled the concept of the Bronze Age. In this article, the author takes a new look at Yoon's institutional role in studying the Bronze Age in Korea. Until now, Yoon's representative achievement has been his typology of the Slender dagger of the Korean Peninsula. However, it is not less important that Yoon also established the Bronze Age concept with the excavation of a dolmen and a Bronze Age subterranean dwelling in Oksok-ni, Paju during the 1960s. Of course, it was not a personal assignment for Yoon. He was aided by Prof. Kim Won-Yong's work, who had introduced newly excavated materials from North Korea and China; these materials gave some insight for establishing the Bronze Age concepts in the 1960 and 1970s. Kim's suggestion about the possibility of a Korean Bronze Age led to Yoon's refined typological study on Korea's bronze wares. However, Yoon's excessive schematic classification of artifacts and reliance on the Japanese chronology became an obstacle for making the Korean Bronze Age isolated from East Asia. As a result, it is regrettable that his research led to the "cultural lag" phenomenon of Bronze Age research. Meanwhile, Japanese archaeology, which had influenced Yoon, also faced a major change. In 2003, the Japanese archaeological community revised the Yayoi culture's beginning around the 1,000 BC. This means a shift in the perception that we should understand Japan's Bronze Age in the context of the East Asian continent. Of course, it is not appropriate to reevaluate or denigrate Yoon's research from the current view. Rather, it is necessary to recognize the limitations of Yoon's time and present a new path to research by combining the archaeological tradition of refining research on the relics he maintained with a new chronological view and a macro view of East Asian archaeology. This is why we should take a new glimpse into Yoon's research.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
• /
• v.107 no.4
• /
• pp.361-377
• /
• 2018

The aim of this study was to examine whether the guideline by the Ministry of Environment (ME) successfully and appropriately applied the IUCN Red List criteria at regional level and the rare and endangered national list considered eligible. A certain number of vascular plants, which are widely distributed in the world or in east Asia, deemed to be ineligible for assessment at a regional level as Not Applicable category (NA), because it occurs at very low numbers in South Korea. Among 377 vascular plant taxa evaluated by the ME, NA included 238 species, which represented 63.1%. The number of synonymized species or illegitimate name species were 13 species, which accounted for 3.4%. 21 species (9.3%) were threatened at global level and 103 species were possibly candidates species list for Red List assessments at regional level in the near future. The proportion of NA or waiting list was 66.6% among the list assessed by the ME. The most common errors involved incorrectly application of species extinction in case of population extinction in South Korea to the assessment and provided incorrect interpretation of the Red List criteria at regional level. The most assessments proposed by ME were not backed up without quantitative data quality, justifications, and sources. It is suggested that the risk of extinction should be reassessed at least in the Korean peninsula within the light of their overall distribution including far eastern Russia and North eastern China in north and for Japan and Taiwan in south for regional assessment. The results obtained here using the IUCN criteria at regional level showed that the list proposed by the ME produced an overestimation of the number of threatened vascular plants. Also, the misapplication of the term 'species extinction' for regional assessment was open to some degree of subjectivity and misinterpretation.

• The Journal of Art Theory & Practice
• /
• no.4
• /
• pp.145-180
• /
• 2006

In Korea, nation and nationalism are undeniable justice, absolute virtue and moreover system of desire. From the late Chosun Dynasty when the Korean Peninsula had to survive from the critical situation of being the arena of competition, and through the colonial period under Japanese imperialism, nationalism became stronger as a logic of survival. The policy of seclusion under closed and exclusive nationalism that didn't recognize the world situation well enough, eventually gave more pain to the nation. Nationalism in colonial Korea which was as reformed nationalism and on the other hand, as intransigent, resisting nationalism. Since the purpose of this writing is not for clarifying the argument raised on Korean nationalism, there is no use mentioning how it went with the change of time. But we have to focus on the fact that the word 'nation' which appeared under the influence of popular revolution and capitalism meaning 'a group of people', was translated and understood as a racial concept for strengthening the unity of 'single-race nation with five thousand years' history. First of all, there is nationalism used to fortify the system. 'The Charter of National Education' and 'The Pledge of Allegiance' were ornaments to intensify the ruling ideology and dictatorship to militarize entire South Korea for 'settling Korean democracy' professed nationalism. Also, another ruling ideology armed with 'self-reliance' put North Korea into the state of hypnosis called nationalism. Nationalism, claiming 'nation' outwardly, but in reality, being an illuminating, instructing ideology isolating each other was indeed a body with two faces. This made 'nation' in Korea mysterious and objective through work such as. The statue commemorating patriotic forefathers' and picture of national records' in South Korea art. Nationalism used to strengthening the system encountered the magical 'single-race' and made 'ghost' being an extreme exclusion to other nations. We can find pedigreed pureness not allowing any mixed breeds from the attitude accepting western art -via Japan or directly- and making it vague by using the word Korean and Asia. There's nationalism as a resistant ideology to solidify the system on the other side. It came out as a way of survival among the Great Power and grew with the task of national liberation to became as a powerful force facing against the dictatorship dominating South Korea after the liberation. This discussion of nationalism as a resistance ideology was active in 1980s. In 1980, democracy movement against the dictatorship of 5th Republic originated from military power which came out suppressing the democratic movement in Gwangju, spread out from the intellects and the students to the labors, farmers and the civilians. It is well known that the 'Nation-People(Minjoong)'s Art Movement could come out under this social condition. Our attitude toward nationalism is still dual in this opening part of 21st century. On one hand, they are opposing to the ultra-nationalism but are not able to separate it from nationalism, and on the other, they have much confusion using it. In fact, in a single-race nation like Korea, the situation of being nationalism and jus sanguinis together can cause dual nationalism. Though nationalism is included in the globalization order, it is evidence that it's effective in Korea where there are still modern fetters like division and separation. In particular, in the world where Japan makes East Asia Coalition but exposed in front of nationalism, and China not being free from Sinocentrism, and American nationalism taking the world order, and Russia fortifying nationalism suppressing the minority race after the dissolution of socialism, Korean nationalism is at the point to find an alternative plan superior to the ruling and resisting ideology.

• Korean Journal of Agricultural and Forest Meteorology
• /
• v.8 no.2
• /
• pp.86-96
• /
• 2006

Ecoclimap-1, a new complete surface parameter global database at a 1-km resolution, was previously presented. It is intended to be used to initialize the soil-vegetation- atmosphere transfer schemes in meteorological and climate models. Surface parameters in the Ecoclimap-1 database are provided in the form of a per-class value by an ecoclimatic base map from a simple merging of land cover and climate maps. The principal objective of this ecoclimatic map is to consider intra-class variability of life cycle that the usual land cover map cannot describe. Although the ecoclimatic map considering land cover and climate is used, the intra-class variability was still too high inside some classes. In this study, a new strategy is defined; the idea is to use the information contained in S10 NDVI SPOT/VEGETATION profiles to split a land cover into more homogeneous sub-classes. This utilizes an intra-class unsupervised sub-clustering methodology instead of simple merging. This study was performed to provide a new ecolimatic map over Northeast Asia in the framework of Ecoclimap-2 global database construction for surface parameters. We used the University of Maryland's 1km Global Land Cover Database (UMD) and a climate map to determine the initial number of clusters for intra-class sub-clustering. An unsupervised classification process using six years of NDVI profiles allows the discrimination of different behavior for each land cover class. We checked the spatial coherence of the classes and, if necessary, carried out an aggregation step of the clusters having a similar NDVI time series profile. From the mapping system, 29 ecosystems resulted for the study area. In terms of climate-related studies, this new ecosystem map may be useful as a base map to construct an Ecoclimap-2 database and to improve the surface climatology quality in the climate model.

• The Korean Journal of Quaternary Research
• /
• v.33 no.1_2
• /
• pp.1-23
• /
• 2021

In response to the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases, the global mean temperature is rising rapidly. In particular, the warming of the Arctic is two to three times faster than the rest. Associated with the rapid Arctic warming, the sea ice shows decreasing trends in all seasons. The faster Arctic warming is due to ice-albedo feedback by the presence of snow and ice in polar regions, which have higher reflectivity than the ocean, the bare land, or vegetation, higher long-wave heat loss to space than lower latitudes by lower surface temperature in the Arctic than lower latitudes, different stability of atmosphere between the Arctic and lower latitudes, where low stability leads to larger heat losses to atmosphere from surface by larger latent heat fluxes than the Arctic, where high stability, especially in winter, prohibits losing heat to atmosphere, increase in clouds and water vapor in the Arctic atmosphere that subsequently act as green house gases, and finally due to the increase in sensible heat fluxes from low latitudes to the Arctic via lower troposphere. In contrast to the rapid Arctic warming, in midlatitudes, especially in eastern Asia and eastern North America, cold air outbreaks occur more frequently and last longer in recent decades. Two pathways have been suggested to link the Arctic warming to cold air outbreaks over midlatitudes. The first is through troposphere in synoptic-scales by enhancing the Siberian high via a development of Rossby wave trains initiated from the Arctic, especially the Barents-Kara Seas. The second is via stratosphere by activating planetary waves to stratosphere and beyond, that leads to warming in the Arctic stratosphere and increase in geopotential height that subsequently weakens the polar vortex and results in cold air outbreaks in midlatitudes for several months. There exists lags between the Arctic warming and cold events in midlatitudes. Thus, understanding chain reactions from the Arctic warming to midlatitude cooling could help improve a predictability of seasonal winter weather in midlatitudes. This study reviews the results on the Arctic warming and its connection to midlatitudes and examines the trends in surface temperature and the Arctic sea ice.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.1-53
• /
• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.13
• /
• pp.687-738
• /
• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Information Systems Review
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.25-51
• /
• 2012

The purpose of this study is to analyze the key factors affecting satisfaction of the visually impaired SNS users so that they may use SNS more effectively in the future. This study has used three factors such as the information factor, the relationship factor and the speed factor and the usability as independent variables. The social presence factor was used as a parameter and the SNS user satisfaction as a dependent variable. For the research, 195 visually impaired SNS users have participated in this survey. The major findings of this study are that the relationship factor has strong effects on the self-identification factor, the social presence factor and the SNS usage satisfaction among the factors affecting the visually impaired users to be satisfied with SNS. On the other hand, the information factor and usage factor have no effects on the self-identification factor and the social presence factor. However, they have effects on the SNS usage satisfaction. Additionally, the self-identification factor has no effect on the SNS usage satisfaction, but the social presence factor has effect. Based on the above study results, this paper proposed for the government to enhance the educational program on the use of SNS for the visually impaired and to increase its financial and political support on this subject. Additionally, technical supports on SNS service accessibility and usage by the government are vital for the visually impaired. Academically, this study provides a concrete groundwork for the research on the use of SNS by the visually impaired by providing a solid research direction for further study on this subject. Socially, this study helps the visually impaired use SNS more effectively by increasing the general public awareness of the importance of SNS usages by the visually impaired so that the information gap of the society may be diminished in the future.