• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.49
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• pp.213-236
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• 2011

Korea Shipping Act admits shipping conferences' joint actions like rate agreement, sailing agreement in some degree for development of shipping transport industries for decades. Meanwhile, EU has prohibited all kinds of shipping conferences' joint actions since October 2008, and many advanced countries also have similar position on shipping conference. The balance development between shippers and ship owners is very important in terms of national economic growth. So it is appropriate time to revise related laws such as Shipping Act and Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. First, It is direction for revision of Korean Shipping Act. The act has to define precisely the criteria of "unfairness" in case of admitting of shipping conferences' joint actions. Shipping conferences have a conference with shipper or shipper's delegation substantially on freight and transport conditions and so on. Second, It is direction for revision of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. The fair trade commission has to perform fair roles between shippers and ship owners. The judgement of fairness has to confirm according to the spirit of not Korea Shipping Act but Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act itself.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.20 no.3_spc
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• pp.201-217
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• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.

• Korean journal of applied entomology
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• v.17 no.3 s.36
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• pp.143-147
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• 1978

1. The trials were planned to test ten different fungicides for the control of ginseng damping off Caused by Rhizoctonia solani in the laboratory and in the field. 2. Fungicidal activity was tested by soil drenching in test tube in the laboratory and with seedlings in t he seedbed naturally and artificially infested with damping-off organisms. 3. Promising chemicals to control damping-off of ginseng without marked phytotoxicity were Homai, Captan, Validamycin and Tachigaren.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.158-170
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• 2009

This paper considers how the optimal export level is influenced by export risk, the degree of risk-averseness for exporting firms, and those firms' cost structure. In addition, export insurance is incorporated into some simple theoretical model to analyze the optimal export level. This paper applies genetic algorithm simulation to show that the exporting firms'risk-averseness do not affect the optimal export decision while export risk and cost function characteristic have relatively more significant effects on the optimal export level. Finally, our findings suggest that the most influential factor for the optimal export levels seems to be the monopoly power of exporting firms.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.17 no.11
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• pp.588-599
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• 2017

This paper analyzes internet access model between ISP, CP and end users where CP uses various technologies to provide direct access to ISP owning subscribers to consume its own contents in low cost and high quality. The level of access charge depends on the competitiveness of CP market. When CP market is perfect competitive, the level of access charge is identical to that of social optimum while when CP market is monopoly, the level of access charge is influenced by the sensitivity of the contents price to access charge for CP. The dead weight loss due to monopoly market in CP can be removed by the regulation of access charge. Socially optimal access charge in monopoly market of CP is lower than that in competitive market. This is because the regulator wants to set access price to lower level to reduce welfare loss from monopoly in CP market where CP determines the price to over marginal cost.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.34 no.11B
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• pp.1254-1260
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• 2009

This paper proposes history-aware random early detection (HRED), a modified version of RED, to lessen bandwidth monopoly by a few of stations employing multiple parallel TCP flows. Stations running peer-to-peer file sharing applications such as BitTorrent use multiple TCP flows. If those stations share a link with other stations with only a small number of TCP flows, the stations occupy most of link bandwidth leading to undesirable bandwidth monopoly. HRED like RED determines whether to drop incoming packets according to probability which changes based on queue length. However it adjusts the drop probability based on bandwidth occupying ratio of stations, thus able to impose harder drop penalty on monopoly stations. The results of simulations assuming various scenarios show that HRED is at least 60% more effective than RED in supporting the bandwidth fairness among stations and at least 4% in utilization.

• Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.207-234
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• 2018

A manufacturer of a durable good typically purchases supplies, including parts for assembly - that are also useful for repairs - from independent "original equipment suppliers" with which it contracts. The manufacturer is a branded monopolist of its final assembled product. To put into effect also a monopoly of the replacement parts, it must stipulate in its arrangements with independent suppliers of the parts that they not supply such patented parts to any other buyer. Durable good owners would then only be able to obtain their requirements of replacement parts from the same company that supplied the durable. This would amount to a tie-in of replacement parts to the direct purchase of new durables. And that describes the apparently widespread practice of automobile manufacturers in India, as exposed in a recent case before the Competition Commission of India (Samsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Limited and others). Here, I will argue that such tie-in enabled automotive manufacturers to more fully appropriate consumer surplus, which induced them to lower the price of new cars, sell more cars and also sell more repair parts. The tie-in expanded the auto parts industry and promoted new entry. The main restraint on expansion of India's automotive manufacturing is not monopoly. It is government protection in the form of tariffs on automobiles and auto parts.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• Korean Architects
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• s.518
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• pp.75-75
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• 2012

• Korean Architects
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• s.517
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• pp.75-75
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• 2012