• Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
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• 2006.11b
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• pp.371-396
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• 2006

To see the implication of trade policy in endogeneous growth model, we introduce trade protection that takes the form of an import tariff and represents one plus the rate of protection provided to industry sector. We showed that considering goodness of fit of regression model, we can see that the empirical evidence is strongly in favor of the character of trade policies as the instrument spurring economic growth. As for import tariff, we see that 1% increase in the rate of tariff that protect domestic market causes the rate of growth to increase by 0.87%. An import tariff to final product significantly spurs product development and faster growth come as a result. But, we should note that the effects of trade policy are muted by the induced changes in the output of intermediates in an economy that is relatively unproductive in the research lab.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2008.07a
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• pp.568-569
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• 2008

Recently, the electric power industries around the world are moving from the conventional monopolistic or vertically integrated environments to privatization, deregulation, and competition environments, where each participant is concerned with the maximization of profits in the marketplaces rather than system-wide costs minimization. To reduce difference of viewpoint about power planning between Genco and regulator, adjustment procedures need. This paper presents that game theory can be applied by systematic decision-making means.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.107-129
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• 2002

Expansion and enhancement of information and communication infrastructure can create a market closer to an ideal type for a perfect competition, utilizing a cyber space in the network (with the expanded usage of Internet and e-commerce) and it could be a market of a monopolistic form. The government can take one of the two approaches responding to this monopolization of the digital market. First, the government maintains laissez-faire policy since the monopoly cannot be maintained over a long period of time due to an increasing in the production, decrease in the price, profit resulting from this and rapid technology evolution. Second, the government can actively interrupt the monopolization of the digital market. Monopolization in a digital market can lead to a market failure. Unstable market structure and too much frequent merger and acquisition contribute to making the digital market very dynamic. Information goods exchanged in the digital market have the features of very low marginal cost required to copy the original product whereas its initial fixed cost is very high. This explains why the information products are not priced based on the existing marginal price determination principles and why companies producing them have various product sales strategies (price/product differentiation strategy, and other sales strategies).

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.50 no.12
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• pp.549-555
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• 2001

Due to the development of information technology, the operating power systems under the deregulated environment has the advantages of a introduction of the market function, a competition in sales and purchases of Power, as well as the difficulty of maintaining reliability on the same or high level with it in a monopolistic market. This paper presents a basic scheme of the congestion management in the Korea electricity market under the deregulated environment. We investigated some cases of the congestion management in the world and the effects of the congestion management in the power systems. A basic idea of the congestion management in the Korea is presented based on the analysis of transmission congestion management in the competitive electricity market.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.49-56
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• 2019

Purpose: Corporate social responsibility is a self-regulating business model that helps a firm be socially accountable to the public. By practicing corporate social responsibility, firms can be conscious of the kind of impact they are having on all aspects of society, including economic, social, and environmental. Corporate social responsibility activities are not directly linked to increasing corporate performance and corporate value, but rather involve spending expenses. Based on these facts, this study verifies whether the effects of corporate social responsibility activities differ depending on the firm's situation. Research design, data and methodology: This study analyzed the effect of market competition on corporate social responsibility activities using logistic regression analysis on listed companies in the KOSPI and KOSDAQ for fiscal years 2014 through 2016. In this study, market competition was measured using the Herfindahl-Herschman Index(HHI). Higher HHI value can be interpreted as a lower degree of market competition. We also measured corporate social responsibility activities using the KEJI Index published by the Korea Economic Justice Institute (KEJI). If a firm-year is included in the top 200 companies of the KEJI Index, it is classified as a good corporate social responsibility activity firm. Results: We find that companies in less competitive market were not included in the KEJI Index. This result indicates that firms in the market with lower market competition perform less corporate social responsibility activities that incur costs. An additional analysis showed that there was a significant negative relationship between the market competition and the corporate social responsibility activity scores published by the KEJI Index. These result adds robustness to the result of the hypothesis that firms that have a monopolistic place in the market practice passive corporate social responsibility activities. Conclusions: The results show that managers of a firm in the lower market competition have a lower incentive to use limited resources for projects that are not directly related to revenue. The results of this study imply that corporate social responsibility activities vary according to the position of the business. Therefore, this study suggests that market investors should consider the degree of competition in the market when they evaluate corporate social responsibility activities.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.47-89
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• 2020

We introduce a simple theoretical model to analyze the welfare impact of a competition policy in the natural gas market in South Korea. An incumbent monopolistic firm currently owns essential facilities, but the competition policy mandates that the firm provide open access to any entrant firm, charging an access fee. When no regulation is imposed on the fee pricing, this policy increases social welfare as well as the profit of the incumbent firm. When the pricing is regulated, however, social welfare depends on whether there is information asymmetry between the government and the firm regarding the operating cost of the facilities. If the government has complete information, social welfare can be maximized by choosing the optimal prices. Otherwise, the government has to set the prices based on the information that the firm delivers. We formulate a Bayesian game to analyze this case and identify a set of perfect Bayesian equilibria to compare social welfare.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.201-211
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• 2016

This paper uses the Panzar Rosse model to investigate the competitive conditions in the Korean life insurance companies over the period of 1999 2012. We break down the entire sample period into four distinctive groups and analyze the competitiveness of each period. The results indicate that for the pre-introduction of Bancassurance period, the H-statistic is -1.3984 and the life insurance market is found to be in monopoly or cartel. However, for the post-introduction of Bancassurance period, the H-statistic is 0.9107 and the life insurance market appears to be in monopolistic competition. The results from the introduction of retirement pension system are very similar to those of the introduction of Bancassurance. Overall, the findings indicate that the Korean life insurance market is in long-run equilibrium before the new system introduction, but make adjustments to the new equilibrium.

• The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.145-153
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• 2016

Cable TV with largest subscription base in pay TV market has difficulty in managing the task of digital switch over. This study analyzed the factors in delay of cable TV switch over and examined the impact of pay TV market structure and competition. The delaying factors turned out to be the lack of incentives and resources of cable TV operators, insufficient policy measures and acceptance tolerance issues of subscribers. Since cable TV operators with monopolistic status in pay TV market had continuous profit from analog service, they were not responsive to digital switch over which requires additional investment. Policy measures including support for the low income household and mandatory cut-off point for stopping analog broadcasting. Subscriber's willingness to accept digital broadcasting in terms of price sensitivity and preference for convenient operation also played a role. Introduction of IPTV in pay TV market influenced the speed of digital switch over of cable TV operators. MSOs with economies of scale showed higher digital switch over rate than independent SO.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.247-267
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• 2006

This paper formulates a monopolistic competition model by incorporating Leontief product function into Dixit and Stigliz model to analyze and compare the effects of two environmental policy instruments-fuel efficiency regulation and environmental tax-on a market which reflects characteristics of international vehicle market. As expected, both policy instruments raise equilibrium market prices. The effect of fuel efficiency regulation on firm output, the number of firms, and industry output, however, depends on three determinants-the increasing rate of the ratio of consumer expenditure to the income, the increasing rate of fixed cost, and the increasing rate of marginal cost. On the other hand, the imposition of the specific environmental tax reduces the firm output, but does not influence the number of firms. If these two instruments are assumed to lead to the same increasing rate of marginal costs, the environmental tax reduces the firm output as well as the industry output more than the fuel efficiency regulation. And it will induce more firms to exit the market than the fuel efficiency regulation if the increasing rate of the ratio of consumer expenditure to the income is larger than the increasing rate of fixed cost.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.1-13
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• 2009

In this paper, we develop theoretical game models to determine the level of government subsidies for banks to provide policy loans to Innovative SMEs(small and medium sized enterprises) through banks, which otherwise would not finance them for the sake of their own profitability. For this, we compare net cash flows of each bank using different strategies against high risk innovative SMEs. A bank can decide whether to provide them loans or not In each period. Following Kim(2003)'s Infinite horizon model on the soft budget constraint, we introduce a situation in which banks compete against each other for higher net long-term payoffs from their loans to innovative SMEs and non-innovative SMEs. From the models, we show that competition among banks in general leads to a tighter decision against innovative SMEs, as a Nash equilibrium. It is not because the government bank is simply loose in providing loans, but because competition among commercial banks for fewer riskier borrowers results in tighter loan decisions against innovative SMEs. Thus, the competitive market for policy loans to innovative SMEs fails to reach the socially optimal level of loans for innovative SMMs. Commercial banks in the competitive market may require additional supports from the government to make up for the differences in their payoffs to support innovative SMEs, possibly much riskier due to moral hazards and poor discounted cash flows. The monopolistic government bank might also request such supports from the government to fund otherwise unqualified SMEs. We calculate an optimal level of governmental support for banks to guarantee funding such high-risk innovative SMEs over periods without deviating from their optimal Nash equilibrium policies.