• 통상정보연구
• /
• 제9권4호
• /
• pp.141-158
• /
• 2007

The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity or effectiveness of the Arbitration Clause such as Model Clause I, and to confirm how other issues such as arbitrable "investment", appointment of arbitrators and law governing the agreement be reflected in the agreement. However, the parties should be sure that the arbitration clause is valid if they have checked whether, for their particular situation, the ICSID Centre has jurisdiction. For the validity of the Arbitration Clause, first the host country and the country which the investor belong to must be "contracting states" to the ICSID Convention. Second, the specific consent to arbitrate must be expressed in writing in the investment contract or in a national investment law or in an investment protection treaty. The issue of "nationality" of an other contracting state is determined by the place of incorporation or the location of the head office. In case the parties have doubts about a valid consent to arbitrate, Art. 41 of the ICSID Convention provides, regarding ICSID jurisdiction, that the tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. It follows that ICSID Arbitration has an autonomous and exclusive character. As a consequence, domestic courts may not interfere with the question of ICSID's jurisdiction, which is called as "rule of abstention".

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
• /
• 제17권2호
• /
• pp.141-165
• /
• 2007

This study aims to make a contribution to the promotion of trade and economic development of South Korea, and, at the same time, call attention to the increasing trend of investment agreements concluded within Free Trade Agreements (FTA) by examining theoretically FTAs and dispute resolution and investigating systematically the conclusion procedure of agreements, and the system, institutions, and jurisdiction of dispute resolution, and presenting these findings to the government and investors involved. The most problematic aspect in the legal process of arbitration involving disputes over investment is that of arguments concerning the right of jurisdiction. When a dispute arises, even though an investor files for arbitration at an ICSID institution, the parties become involved in another energy-consuming argument even before proceeding to the hearing and decision of the original plan in cases in which the respondent of the dispute files an objection to the decision rights of the arbitral tribunal. As the main basis for this type of plea, the point of non-existence of jurisdiction is first raised where the applicable dispute does not fall under the range of investments defined in individual investment contracts or investment agreements such as a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). To avoid an open-ended definition of investment for the range of investments, articles concerning investments in the FTA and NAFTA between Canada and the USA adopt the limited closed-list method. Article 96 of the FTA between Japan and Mexico applied the same abovementioned method of limited form of definition regarding range of investments and concluded BITs between member countries of APEC applied a similar method as well. Instead of employing the previously used inclusive definition, the BITs concluded between countries of Latin America and the USA are equipped with limited characteristics of an investment. Furthermore, to correspond with this necessary condition the three following requirements are needed : 1) fixed investment funding; 2) expected profits resulting from such investments; 3) and the existence of fixed risk bearing.

• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제68권
• /
• pp.89-121
• /
• 2015

Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS) grants a foreign investor the right to access an international arbitrator, if he believes actions taken by a host government are in breach of commitments made in an investment agreement or an investment treaty. The arbitration procedure of ICSID is made specifically to resolve investment disputes, so most of investment disputes have been settled in accordance with the procedure. Owing to limitation of dispute settlements through the ICSID arbitration procedure, several investment dispute conciliation schemes have been emerged as alternatives. In the case of a conciliation, the conciliation procedure will be in progress based on arbitrary agreement between parties, and if both parties agree on a conciliation program, then the arbitrary execution rate is relatively higher than that of arbitration procedures. In addition, it is evaluated that the time duration of conducting a conciliation procedure is in general rather short in 8 to 24months, and its incumbent cost is also rather inexpensive. Most of all, through amicable settlement of a dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, the foreign investor may continue his investment activities without a hitch, while the host state may invite more investment without any risk of losing its external credibility. In conclusion, it is desirable to lead any investment dispute between a foreign investor and a host state settle in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure as specified in the relevant investment agreement. In addition, to make the foreign investor continue his investment activities, it will be necessary to provide a separate investment dispute conciliation system aside from such arbitration procedures to cope any unexpected incident flexibly.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
• /
• 제27권2호
• /
• pp.3-18
• /
• 2017

International legal reviews on ISD, a procedure for resolving disputes under the Korea-US FTA, are examined from the perspective of law. If the ISD system does not exist, even if the investor suffers damage due to the illegal act of the host country, he or she must file a lawsuit through the court of the host country, which is unreasonable from the investor's point of view and makes it difficult to guarantee fairness and transparency. Some of the Koreans pointed out that there are some problems with the KORUS FTA dispute settlement regulations, and that the United States federal courts are taking a friendly attitude to the decisions made by the US Customs in determining the dispute by the KORUS FTA Agreement and the US Customs Act. In cases where the State does not violate international law but results in harmful consequences, the responsibility of one country is borne by the treaty. Foreign investment always comes with many challenges and risks. Therefore, the ISD system is a fair and universal arbitration system, which is considered to be a necessary system even for protecting the Korean companies investing abroad. In the investment treaty, compensation for the nationalization of foreign property and reimbursement under the laws of the host country were dissatisfied with foreign investors. In particular, some Koreans have pointed out that there are some problems in the KORUS FTA dispute resolution regulations and there is a need for further discussion and research. Based on the experiences and wisdoms gained in the course of Korea-US FTA negotiations, the dispute arbitration mechanism is urgently needed to reduce the possibility of disputes and to make amicable directions.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
• /
• 제32권2호
• /
• pp.85-114
• /
• 2022

When human rights disputes are related to the cross-border investments treaties, the investment arbitral tribunals are confronted with the question of how to adjudicate connected human rights violations. The traditional structure restricts arbitration proceedings to the parties named within an investment treaty, i.e., Investor-Claimant and State-Respondent. If human rights issues occur, States must act as proxies for citizens with human rights claims. This effectively excludes individuals or groups with human rights concerns and contradicts the premise of international human rights law that seeks to empower human rights-holders to pursue claims directly and on an international stage. The methods for intorducing human rights issues in the context of investment arbitration proceedings are suggested as follows: First, human rights arguments can be introduced into ISDS by the usual initiator of investment disputes: the investor as the complainant. Especially, if the jurisdictional and applicable law clauses of the respective international investment agreements are sufficiently broad to include human rights violations, adjudicating a pure human rights claim could be possible. Second, the host state may rely on human rights argumentation as a respondent of an investor claim. Human rights have played a role as a justification for state measures undertaken to comply with human rights laws. Third, third party interventions by NGOs and civil society groups as amici curiae may act as advocates for affected populations or communities in response to the reluctance of governments to introduce their own human rights duties into the investment dispute. Finally, arbitrators have also referred to human rights ex officio, i.e., without having a dispute party referring to the specific argument. This was mainly the case in the context of determining the scope of property rights and the existence of an expropriation. As all U.N. member states have human rights obligations, international investment laws must be presumed to be in conformity with the relevant human rights obligations.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
• /
• 제24권4호
• /
• pp.49-97
• /
• 2014

This study is about the availability of Chinese internal arbitration institutions by Korean invested companies. Generally, Chinese internal arbitration institutions lack independence from government. However, because parties seeking an arbitration award have ways to get neutrality from internal arbitration institutions that guarantee party autonomy, these Korean companies can use Chinese internal arbitration institutions to resolve disputes in China. Special attention should be given to the following. First, because Korean companies invested in China are legally in the same position as Chinese companies, unless foreign-related factors intervene, when disputes occur with Chinese companies or individuals, the disputes correspond to internal dispute, and when it comes to choosing the arbitration institution, these Korean companies must choose either a Chinese internal arbitration institution or foreign-related arbitration institution. Second, most Chinese internal arbitration institutions still lack independence from government, which can influence the fairness of arbitration in the future. Therefore, Korean companies invested in China should think about alternative ways to get a minimum impartiality in arbitration cases. Third, the parties are allowed to choose arbitration rules freely in Beijing, Xian, Chongqing, Guangzhou, and Hangzhou arbitration commissions. Therefore, in arbitration cases, the parties can get impartiality by choosing arbitrators according to the arbitration rules which they agree on, or by choosing partially modified arbitration rules of those arbitration commissions. Fourth, in order to get an impartial arbitration award from Chinese internal arbitration institutions in China, it is important for Korean lawyers or arbitration experts -- fluent in Chinese -- to be registered in the List of Arbitrators of Chinese internal arbitration institution by way of signing a MOU between the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board, or the Korean Association of Arbitration Studies and arbitration commissions such as those of Beijing, Xian, Chongqing, Guangzhou, and Hangzhou which comparatively do guarantee party autonomy. Fifth, because application of the preservation of property before application of arbitration is not approved in China, in practice, in order to preserve property before application of arbitration, it is best to file another suit in China based on other legal issue (e.g., tort) independent from the contract which an arbitration agreement is applied to. Sixth, in arbitration commissions which allow different agreement regarding arbitration procedures or arbitration rules, it is possible to choose a neutral arbitrator from a third country as a presiding arbitrator via UNCITRAL arbitration rules or ICC arbitration rules. Seventh, in the case of Chinese internal arbitral award, because the court reviews the substantive matters to decide the refusal of compulsory execution, the execution rate could be relatively lower than that of foreign-related cases. Therefore, when Korean companies invested in China use Chinese internal arbitration institution, they should endure low rate of execution. Eighth, considering the operational experiences of public policy on foreign-related arbitration awards so far, in cases of Chinese internal arbitration award, the possibility of cancellation of arbitral award or the possibility to refuse to execute the award due to public policy is thought to be higher than that of foreign arbitral awards. Ninth, even though a treaty on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters has been signed between Korea and China, and it includes a provision on acknowledgement and enforcement of arbitral award, when trying to resolve disputes through Chinese internal arbitration institution, the treaty would not be a big help to resolve the disputes, because the disputes between Korean companies invested in China and the party in China are not subject to the treaty. Tenth, considering recent tendency of conciliation by the arbitral tribunal in China and the voluntary execution rate of the parties, the system of conciliation by the arbitral tribunal is expected to affect as a positive factor the Korean companies that use Chinese internal arbitration institution. Finally, when using online arbitration, arbitration fees can be reduced, and if the arbitration commissions guaranteeing party autonomy have online arbitration system, the possibility of getting impartial arbitration award through them is higher. Therefore, the use of online arbitration system is recommended.

• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제58권
• /
• pp.313-328
• /
• 2013

Today FTA extends over the world and Korea as a main member of international trade is no exception. In the past Korea, as the developing countries, has made endlessly effort to induce foreign investment from foreign enterprise and/or government to be a truly OECD countries today and made it. Korea's trade economy was reached 1 trillion dollars in 2012. Now we have to find a new way to produce, process, procure goods from foreign investment and also need to protect our profit and/or rights within foreign judicial territory. There are two method to protect foreign enterprise or government. First they rely on general principles in WTO or Bilateral Investment Treaty that the principle of equality, national treatment, and most-favored-nation treatment, you can create a predictable environment to protect foreign enterprise and/or government. Second they need to incorporate contractual clauses in their agreement such as stabilization clause, force majeure, arbitration, governing law or sovereign immunity. Of course there are many things left behind to consider I hope it will be helpful to those who prepare foreign investment contract.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
• /
• 제22권3호
• /
• pp.187-213
• /
• 2012

The purpose of this article is to examine Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Agreements. Most BITs and other investment treaties provide for FET of foreign investments. Today, this concept is the most frequently invoked standard in investment disputes. It is also the standard with the highest practical relevance: a majority of successful claims pursued in international arbitration are based on a violation of the FET standard. The concept of FET is not new but has appeared in international documents for some time. Some of these documents were nonbinding others entered into force as multilateral or bilateral treaties. Considerable debate has surrounded the question of whether the FET standard merely reflects the internationalminimum standard, as contained in customary international law, or offers an autonomous standard that is additional to general international law. As a matter of textual interpretation, it seems implausible that a treaty would refer to a well-known concept like the "minimum standard of treatment in customary international law" by using the expression "fair and equitable treatment." Broad definitions or descriptions are not the only way to gauge the meaning of an elusive concept such as FET. Another method is to identify typical factual situations to which this principle has been applied. An examination of the practice of tribunals demonstrates that several principles can be identified that are embraced by the standard of fair and equitable treatment. Some of the cases discussed clearly speak to the central roles of transparency, stability, and the investor's legitimate expectations in the current understanding of the FET standard. Other contexts in which the standard has been applied concern compliance with contractual obligations, procedural propriety and due process, action in good faith, and freedom from coercion and harassment. In short, meeting the investor's central legitimate concern of legal consistency, stability, and predictability remains a major, but not the only, ingredient of an investment-friendly climate in which the host state in turn can reasonably expect to attract foreign investment.

• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제38권
• /
• pp.181-226
• /
• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to describe the settling procedures of the investor-state disputes in the FTA Investment Chapter, and to research on the international arbitration system for the settlement of the investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCTAD reports that the cumulative number of arbitration cases for the investor-state dispute settlement is 290 cases by March 2008. 182 cases of them have been brought before the ICSID, and 80 cases of them have been submitted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID reports that the cumulative 263 cases of investor-state dispute settlement have been brought before the ICSID by March 2008. 136 cases of them have been concluded, but 127 cases of them have been pending up to now. The Chapter 11 Section B of the Korea-U.S. FTA provides for the Investor_State Dispute Settlement. Under the provisions of Section B, the claimant may submit to arbitration a claim that the respondent has breached and obligation under Section A, an investment authorization or an investment agreement and that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of that breach. Provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of the ICSID(Chapter 2), arbitration(Chapter 3), and replacement and disqualification of arbitrators(Chapter 5) as follows. The jurisdiction of the ICSID shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the ICSID. Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party. The tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree. The tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention Section 3 and in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. The award of the tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by members of the tribunal who voted for it. The award shall deal with every question submitted to the tribunal, and shall state the reason upon which it is based. Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. In conclusion, there may be some issues on the international arbitration for the settlement of the investor-state disputes: for example, abuse of litigation, lack of an appeals process, and problem of transparency. Therefore, there have been active discussions to address such issues by the ICSID and UNCITRAL up to now.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
• /
• 제27권2호
• /
• pp.37-57
• /
• 2017

On 9 March 2017, a Tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention issued its ruling in the case of Ansung Housing v. People's Republic of China, dismissing with prejudice all claims made by the Claimant, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd., in its Request for Arbitration, pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5). Ansung Housing v. PRC has drawn attention since it is the first case where an investor with Korean nationality initiated an ICSID arbitration on the basis of the Korea-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) as amended in 2007 between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Tribunal finds that its ruling is about a lack of jurisdiction of the ICSID and of its own competence as well as regarding manifest lack of legal merit due to a lack of temporal jurisdiction, since a Respondent's Rule 41(5) objection is concerned with the three-year limitation period in Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT. The Tribunal held that, under Article 9(7) of the Korea-China BIT, the limitation period begins with an investor's first knowledge of the fact that it has incurred loss or damage, not with the date on which it gains knowledge of the quantum of that loss or damage. Finally, the Tribunal held that Ansung submitted its dispute to ICSID and made its claim for purposes of Article 9(3) and (7) of the BIT after more than three years had elapsed from the date on which Ansung first acquired knowledge of loss or damage and that the claim is time-barred and, as such, is manifestly without legal merit. It remains to be seen whether the aggrieved Claimant initiates annulment proceedings before an ad hoc committee under the ICSID Convention. It is quite interesting to see whether the decisions by the Tribunal should be reversed on the basis of the Claimant's arguments as to the start date as well as the end date of the limitation period under the Korea-China BIT.