• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• 제11권1호
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• pp.103-109
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• 2023

This study examines the association between ownership structure and labor investment efficiency. Specifically, this study investigates whether owner-manager firms, where managers own a large percentage of shares in the firm, involve in more efficient labor investment. Based on the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers are more likely to make labor investment decisions to maximize their private benefits rather than creating value for shareholders, resulting in lower efficiency in labor investment. On the other hand, according to the incentive alignment hypothesis, managers tend to make labor investment decisions that will improve future firm performance as their interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In this situation, owner-manager firms are expected to have higher efficiency in labor investment. Our empirical results show that owner-manager firms engage in more efficient labor investment, which contributes to long-term firm value. This study provides empirical evidence that firms' labor investment behavior can vary depending on the characteristics of the ownership structure.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제19권4호
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• pp.394-402
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• 2019

본 연구는 경영자 지분율이 기업의 보유현금의 가치에 미치는 영향에 대해 검증하였다. 경영권 방호가설에 의하면 경영자는 자신의 사적이익을 위해 주주의 가치를 훼손시킬 수 있는 의사결정을 할 유인이 존재한다. 이러한 상황에서 경영자 지분율이 증가할수록 투자자들은 해당 기업의 보유현금이 비효율적으로 운용될 것으로 평가하여 보유현금의 가치는 감소할 것으로 예상된다. 반면 이해일치가설에 따르면 경영자 지분율이 증가할수록 경영자는 주주들과 이해관계가 일치함에 따라 자본시장에서는 보유현금이 기업가치를 증대시키기 위해 효과적으로 사용될 것으로 인식하여 보유현금의 가치는 증가할 수도 있다. 실증분석 결과, 경영자 지분율이 증가할수록 보유현금의 가치는 감소하는 것으로 나타나 경영권 방호가설을 지지하는 결과를 보고하였다. 본 연구는 경영자 지분율에 따라 기업의 보유하는 현금이 시장에서 차별적으로 평가되는지에 대한 실증적 근거를 제시하였다는 점에서 공헌점을 찾을 수 있다.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제6권3호
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• pp.67-79
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• 2019

This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.