International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology

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Ownership Structure and Labor Investment Efficiency

  • Jungeun Cho (College of Business Administration, Pukyong National University)
  • Received : 2023.02.17
  • Accepted : 2023.03.13
  • Published : 2023.03.31
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Abstract

This study examines the association between ownership structure and labor investment efficiency. Specifically, this study investigates whether owner-manager firms, where managers own a large percentage of shares in the firm, involve in more efficient labor investment. Based on the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers are more likely to make labor investment decisions to maximize their private benefits rather than creating value for shareholders, resulting in lower efficiency in labor investment. On the other hand, according to the incentive alignment hypothesis, managers tend to make labor investment decisions that will improve future firm performance as their interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In this situation, owner-manager firms are expected to have higher efficiency in labor investment. Our empirical results show that owner-manager firms engage in more efficient labor investment, which contributes to long-term firm value. This study provides empirical evidence that firms' labor investment behavior can vary depending on the characteristics of the ownership structure.

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