• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.65 no.12
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• pp.2030-2036
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• 2016

This paper presents a hardware development procedure of the ASB(Active Seat Belt) control system to comply with ISO 26262. The ASIL(Automotive Safety Integrity Level) of an ASB system is determined through the HARA(Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) and the safety mechanism is applied to meet the reqired ASIL. The hardware architecture of the controller consists of a microcontroller, H-bridge circuits, passive components, and current sensors which are used for the input comparison. The required ASIL for the control systems is shown to be satisfied with the safety mechanism by calculation of the SPFM(Single Point Fault Metric) and the LFM(Latent Fault Metric) for the design circuits.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.66 no.9
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• pp.1373-1378
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• 2017

This paper presents a basic ECU(Electronic Control Unit) hardware development procedure for the functional safety of in-vehicle network systems. We consider complete hardware redundancy as a safety mechanism for in-vehicle communication network under the assumption of the wired network failure such as disconnection of a CAN bus. An ESC (Electronic Stability Control) system is selected as an item and the required ASIL(Automotive Safety Integrity Level) for this item is assigned by performing the HARA(Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment). The basic hardware architecture of the ESC system is designed with a microcontroller, passive components, and communication transceivers. The required ASIL for ESC system is shown to be satisfied with the designed safety mechanism by calculation of hardware architecture metrics such as the SPFM(Single Point Fault Metric) and the LFM(Latent Fault Metric).

• The Journal of The Korea Institute of Intelligent Transport Systems
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.222-234
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• 2020

Autonomous vehicles are equipped with a wide rage of sensors such as GPS, RADAR, LIDAR, camera, IMU, etc. and are driven by recognizing and judging various transportation systems at intersections in the city. The accident ratio of the intersection of the autonomous vehicles is 88% of all accidents due to the limitation of prediction and judgment of an area outside the sensing distance. Not only research on non-signalized intersection collision avoidance strategies through V2V and V2I is underway, but also research on safe intersection driving in failure situations is underway, but verification and fragments through simple intersection scenarios Only typical V2V failures are presented. In this paper, we analyzed the architecture of the V2V module, analyzed the causal factors for each V2V module, and defined the failure mode. We presented intersection scenarios for various road conditions and traffic volumes. we used the ISO-26262 Part3 Process and performed HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) to analyze the risk of autonomous vehicle based on the simulation. We presented ASIL, which is the result of risk analysis, proposed a monitoring concept for each component of the V2V module, and presented monitoring coverage.

• The Journal of The Korea Institute of Intelligent Transport Systems
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.251-261
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• 2019

The importance of autonomous driving systems that utilize V2X services such as V2V(Vehicle to Vehicle) and V2I(Vehicle to Infrastructure) for safer and more comfortable driving is increasing with the recent development of autonomous vehicles. Partly autonomous vehicles based on environmental sensors have limitations for predicting and determining areas beyond the recognition distance of the mounted sensors and in response to atypical objects that are difficult to detect. Therefore, it is important to utilize the V2X service to improve the limit of sensor detection performance and to make driving safer and more comfortable. However, there may be an accident risk of autonomous vehicles due to incorrect information provided by V2X. Thus, the application of technology to prevent this needs to be considered. In this pater, we used the ISO-26262 Part3 Process and performed HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) to derive the risk sources of autonomous vehicles due to V2I malfunctions by using the communication between vehicles and infrastructure among V2X. We also developed ASIL ratings based on the simulations and real vehicle tests of the malfunctions of major cases of usnig V2I.