• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.127-145
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• 2022

Vaccine diplomacy is a manifestation of competition for political influence among great powers amidst the Covid-19 pandemic's blatant illustration of ineluctable interdependency across the global community. The reinforcement of trends bolstering global polity construction intensify concomitantly with nationalist populist value and attitude expressions increasing political polarization. The interdependency graphically illustrated in the Cold War-era's mutual assured destruction incentivized competition into indirect competitive intervention in the internal politics of third actors. Indirect international influence contestations included extended, de facto challenge competitions to generate soft power on behalf of the victor, e.g., the space race. The Covid-19 pandemic has intensified this competition to offer alternative development models while intense domestic political polarization undermines the mobilizational capacities for achieving sustainable development. In contrast to multinational and multiethnic states, nation states have an inherent mobilizational advantage because of the enhanced control capabilities available to the authorities without emphasizing coercion. Control through Gramscian hegemonic mechanisms is more readily feasible in nation states through the greater feasibility of commodification of social relations by states authorities regulating and channeling social competition to encourage social mobility and creativity. The regulation of the so-called private sector serves to manage and contain social competition while channeling it to develop the institutional capacities for control and allocation of developing societal human resources. It enhances developed state control mechanisms and international influence capacities. The appeal of offers of aid and assistance to the so-called developing world becomes ever more urgent amidst Anthropocene crises including its most recent, current Covid-19 pandemic disaster.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.698-700
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• 2004

Electric power restructuring offers a major change to the vertically integrated utility monopoly. Deregulation has had a great impact on the electric power industry in various countries. Bidding competition is one of the main transaction approaches after deregulation. The energy trading levels between market participants is largely dependent on the short-term price forecasts. This paper presents the short-term System Marginal Price (SMP) forecasting implementation using backpropagation Neural Network in competitive electricity market. Demand and SMP that supplied from Korea Power Exchange (KPX) are used by a input data and then predict SMP. It needs to analysis the input data for accurate prediction.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.157-173
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• 2021

In the transition to a multipolar international system, the literature has focused on great power competition while little attention has been given to the strategic possibilities of smaller states. However, as a result of globalization, states are so closely interconnected that the primary strategies of even major powers are not to achieve zero-sum solutions but to create asymmetric dependency through which they can influence the behavior of other states and non-state actors. States are assisted in this effort by a variety of tools, including setting up institutions, direct economic influence and through building different forms of infrastructure connectivity networks. By discussing asymmetric dependency situations from the perspective of the great powers, the literature presents smaller states primarily as passive actors, paralyzed by their dependence on great powers. Our paper argues that interdependence allows smaller states to effectively influence larger actors and examines strategies from which smaller states can choose in order to influence the behavior of larger states. Despite an extremely asymmetric relationship between Myanmar and China, actors in Myanmar have sought to influence China's Myanmar policy. We examine a case study of the Myitsone Dam, including Myanmar's strategic aims, chosen strategy and limitations in maneuvering space. Semi-structured interviews with local decision-makers and stakeholders are conducted in order to portray the full picture. Our study concludes that further research on the influencing strategies of small states in response to asymmetric dependence can contribute to a better understanding of the interdependence of states.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.151-184
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• 2021

Global warming due to climate change is one of the biggest challenges in the 21st century. Global warming is not only a disaster that threatens the global ecosystem but also an opportunity to reduce logistics costs and develop mineral resources by commercializing Arctic routes. The Arctic paradox, in which ecological and environmental threats and new economic opportunities coexist, is expected to have a profound impact on the global environment. As the glaciers disappear, routes through the Arctic Ocean without passing through the Suez and Panama Canals emerged as the 'third route.' This can reduce the distance of existing routes by 30%. Global warming has also brought about changes in the geopolitical paradigm. As Arctic ice begins to melt, the Arctic is no longer a 'constant' but is emerging as the largest geopolitical 'variable' in the 21st century. Accordingly, the Arctic, which was recognized as a 'space of peace and cooperation' in the post-Cold War era, is now facing a new strategic environment in which military and security aspects are emphasized. After the Cold War, the Arctic used to be a place for cooperation centered on environmental protection, but it is once again changing into a stage of competition and confrontation between superpowers, heralding 'Cold War 2.0.' The purpose of this study is to evaluate the strategic value of the Arctic Ocean from geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives and derive strategic implications by analyzing the dynamics of the New Cold War taking place in the Arctic region.

• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.37-46
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• 2009

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.26-57
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• 2014

Revolution of Shale gas literally brings about great changes in many spheres. In the past most academic research had been focused on the influence and innovative change in term of economic perspective. But nowadays we should more concern about the security approach and perspective as its status of the future's core energy resources. Revolution of Shale gas has an great influence on the reshaping of global and regional alliance order. There are many international political implications as follows. Contribution of energy hegemony with leading U.S.; Acting as strategic leverage on the reshaping international order; Deepening competition among major states on the construction of energy security and so on. We'd better make a good solution and systematic policies which are preparing for the Shale gas's revolution period including on the understanding about the change on the global energy structure and making a national policy agenda of energy security issues and so on. The thesis like 'to get the energy resources is to get the hegemonic power in the world' will persist. The same holds good of Shale gas case. To meet the revolution of shale gas era, we have important tasks as like making an opportunity to develope not only regional but also international prosperity.

• International Journal of Railway
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• v.1 no.4
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• pp.129-133
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• 2008

Over the last $15{\sim}20$years, many countries have adopted policies of railway privatization to keep up with increasing competition from road and air transport. Although each country and case has its own history, market characteristics, political context as well as administrative process, railway privatizations (including railway restructure, concession etc.) in the west usually are accompanied with the establishment of new regulatory regimes. Therefore, railway governance has been innovating towards an interaction of government, regulator, industry bodies, user groups, trade unions and other interested groups within the regulatory framework. However, it is not the case in China. Although China had seen a partial privatization in some branch lines and is experiencing a much larger-scale privatization by establishing joint-ventures to build and operate high-speed passenger lines and implementing an asset-based securitization program, administrative control still occupies absolutely dominant position in the railway governance in China. Ministry of Railway (MOR) acts as the administrator, operator as well as regulator. There is no national policy that clearly positions railway in the transportation network and clarifies the role of government in railway development. There is also little participation from interested groups in the railway policy making, pricing, service standard or safety matter. Railway in China is solely governed by the mere executive agency. Efficiency-focused economic perspective explanation is far from satisfaction. A wider research perspective from political and social regime is of great potential to better explain and solve the problem. In the west, separation and constrains of power had long been established as a fundamental rule. In addition to internal separation of political power(legislation, execution and jurisdiction), rise of corporation in the 19th century and association revolution in the 20th century greatly fostered the growth of economic and social power. Therefore, political, social and economic organizations cooperate and compete with each other, which leads to a balanced and resonable power structure. While in China, political power, mainly party-controlled administrative power has been keeping a dominated position since the time of plan economy. Although the economic reform promoted the growth of economic power of enterprises, it is still not strong enough to compete with political power. Furthermore, under rigid political control, social organizations usually are affiliated to government, independent social power is still too weak to function. So, duo to the limited and slow reform in political and social regime in China, there is an unbalanced power structure within which political power is dominant, economic power expanding while social power still absent. Totally different power structure in China determines the fundamental institutional environment of her railway privatization and governance. It is expected that the exploration of who act behind railway governance and their acting strength (a power theory) will present us a better picture of railway governance as a relevant transportation mode. The paper first examines the railway governance in China and preliminarily establishes a linkage between railway governance and its fundamental institutional environment, i.e. power structure in a specific country. Secondly, the reason why there is no national policy in China is explored in the view of political power. In China, legislative power is more symbolic while party-controlled administrative power dominates political process and plays a fundamental role in Chinese railway governance. And then, in the part three railway finance reform is analyzed in the view of economic power, esp. the relationship of political power and economic power.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.3-30
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• 2020

This paper analyzes how the current Global Value Chain (GVC) of East Asia has been established, and attempts to project the future trajectory of GVC under New Normal in the global trading system. For this purpose, the framework of Ideology-Technology-Institution nexus is presented with focus on the dynamics of interplay between ideology and technology, duly recognizing the dual-aspect of technology- a platform for business and also for national defense. The paper analyzes how the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) of the 1990s played a role of "facilitator" in shaping the GVC of East Asia, where China plays 'factory for final assembly' and the US plays 'the largest consumer'. Under New Normal, digital technology is likely to play the opposite role of "disrupting" the GVC of East Asia, unlike ICT. The paper explores the mechanism behind this great disruption. What is driving New Normal is the US-China power competition, seeking for dominance in East Asia and beyond. This paper argues that New Normal is not temporary shock, but will last for some time. Under this presumption, the paper presents three scenarios for the future trajectory of GVC in East Asia.