• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.57
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• pp.283-303
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• 2013

When a trade conflict arises related to an officially supported export credit programme, The World Trade Organization(WTO), decides on whether the programme is a forbidden subsidy stipulated in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures(the ASCM Agreement). Korea was taken to the WTO panel two times for the export credit programme. One is the semiconductor case in 2002 and the other was the shipbuilding disputes in 2004. And, In 2012, the U.S. Commerce Department ruled K-SURE's export insurance for Korean refrigerator manufacturers as a forbidden subsidy even if the case was not taken to the WTO. This paper examines the significance of export credit programmes on the WTO ASCM Agreement and discusses how to operate these programmes so they would not infringe upon the Agreement by analyzing the actual cases of WTO subsidy conflicts that involved Korean enterprises in relation to export credit programmes for the purpose of determining the related issues and impacts. From this research the results were as follows: First, on whether export credit is a prohibited subsidy, the deciding factor was whether a benefit has been conferred to the beneficiary. On the presence of a benefit, the WTO panel used market benchmarks as the main criteria. Thus, official export credit agencies(ECAs) should be careful not to provide export credit support which had been granted to the beneficiary at better than market terms. Second, in the case of export credit, the special status of ECA as a public body receiving government support itself does not constitute a subsidy. However, caution must be taken not to provide export credit that may lead to WTO ASCM subsidy conflicts involving a certain exporter or industry by setting up clear and valid regulations and fair work processes in the operation of export credit programmes. Third, item (j) of Annex I cannot be interpreted reversely as this item is for interpreting the presence of a prohibited subsidy, not the presence of a benefit. Thus, an export credit program that confers a financial contribution, a benefit and specificity, could qualify as a prohibited subsidy. Fourth, ECAs not only have to maintain long-term account balance but also introduce additional measures to meet this long-term balance such as a clear and systematic premium system. Finally, export credit programmes that are not defined in item (j) of Annex I of the ASCM Agreement would not deemed as an prohibited export subsidy as long as the continued support of the programmes are not being forced.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.46
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• pp.133-158
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• 2010

Independent guarantee is a creation of the need from the both sides, i.e. the applicant (principal debtor) and the beneficiary (creditor). The former used to have to deposit cash in favor of the beneficiary in case of his default, which laid a burden on his liquidity while the latter still wanted to have the equivalent to cash. Independent guarantee satisfied the both parties by freeing the applicant of a deposit and maintaining the beneficiary's right at the same time. The fact that independent guarantee has three payment mechanisms is not widely known to the public. They are (i) payment on first demand, (ii) payment upon submission of third-party documents, (iii) payment upon submission of an arbitral or court decision. From the applicant's point of view, the order in his favor is (iii), followed by (ii) and (i). As there shouldn't be a case where one party is at a disadvantage against the other, useful insight is being sought for the benefit of the applicant. First, the applicant can offer his intention to provide a payment mechanism (ii) or (iii) rather than (i) if he must deliver it. Second, if the beneficiary still wants to have (i) and the applicant is in a position not to reject it, the latter should thoroughly check any provisions that may work against him later. Third, the applicant could use counterbalancing provisions in underlying contract to cope with protective clauses in the guarantees. Forth, the applicant should review the beneficiary's sincerity to prevent unfair calling risks. The applicant may use an ECA(Export Credit Agency) in his country to which he can transfer not only unfair calling risks, but also political risks. On the other hand, a bank needs to keep the following advice in mind. The foremost important thing for the bank not to forget is that it provides a guarantee as a service provider, not as a responsible party for the feasibility of the project, etc. Credit risk of the applicant should require the greatest attention when issuing a guarantee: the bank should look into the possibility that it can procure immediate reimbursement from its customers after payment to the beneficiary. Second, the applicant's ability to complete the project should be reviewed by checking its track records, techniques and reputation, etc. Third, the bank may also use an ECA to cover the beneficiary's unfair calling risks as well as political risks. In the case of Korea, as Korea Export Insurance Corporation(KEIC) can cover all the risks mentioned above, the bank could use its service called 'Export Bond Insurance.' What's better for the bank is that ECA cover can enhance the bank's asset quality by putting it zero on its risk weighted asset.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.177-191
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• 2023

This study analyzes the types of linkages between major projects used by firms that attracted venture capital among firms that received government support in the field of SME startups. It identifies the types of linkages between support programs related to attracting venture investment and verifies the usefulness of integrated and cooperative support. The main findings of this study are as follows. First, Startup Success Packages, Startup Foundation Funds*, Youth Entrepreneurship Centers, and Training are the main programs used by startups and venture firms, and support-implementing agencies use these programs to provide support for each stage of growth. Second, the majority of startups and venture firms receiving policy support for job creation and manpower enhancement projects. Third, export-type growth companies receive continuous support from MSS, MOTIE, MSIT, and KIPO. Fourth, job creation programs drive the employment performance and creation of companies. Fifth, local government support projects tend to rely heavily on central government support programs. Sixth, growth companies in the startup and venture sector have a clear link to credit guarantee scheme by KIBO. These findings provide empirical evidence on the necessity and feasibility of integrated and collaborative support, and are expected to contribute to the direction of better support policies.