• Title/Summary/Keyword: Equilibrium problem

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FIXED POINTS AND VARIATIONAL PRINCIPLE WITH APPLICATIONS TO EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS ON CONE METRIC SPACES

  • Bae, Jong-Sook;Cho, Seong-Hoon
    • Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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    • v.50 no.1
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    • pp.95-109
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    • 2013
  • The aim of this paper is to establish variational principle on cone metric spaces and to give some existence theorems of solutions for equilibrium problems on cone metric spaces. We give some equivalences of an existence theorem of solutions for equilibrium problems on cone metric spaces.

CONNECTEDNESS AND COMPACTNESS OF WEAK EFFICIENT SOLUTIONS FOR VECTOR EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS

  • Long, Xian Jun;Peng, Jian Wen
    • Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society
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    • v.48 no.6
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    • pp.1225-1233
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    • 2011
  • In this paper, without assumption of monotonicity, we study the compactness and the connectedness of the weakly efficient solutions set to vector equilibrium problems by using scalarization method in locally convex spaces. Our results improve the corresponding results in [X. H. Gong, Connectedness of the solution sets and scalarization for vector equilibrium problems, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 133 (2007), 151-161].

WEAK AND STRONG CONVERGENCE OF SUBGRADIENT EXTRAGRADIENT METHODS FOR PSEUDOMONOTONE EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS

  • Hieu, Dang Van
    • Communications of the Korean Mathematical Society
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    • v.31 no.4
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    • pp.879-893
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    • 2016
  • In this paper, we introduce three subgradient extragradient algorithms for solving pseudomonotone equilibrium problems. The paper originates from the subgradient extragradient algorithm for variational inequalities and the extragradient method for pseudomonotone equilibrium problems in which we have to solve two optimization programs onto feasible set. The main idea of the proposed algorithms is that at every iterative step, we have replaced the second optimization program by that one on a specific half-space which can be performed more easily. The weakly and strongly convergent theorems are established under widely used assumptions for bifunctions.

SETVALUED MIXED QUASI-EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS WITH OPERATOR SOLUTIONS

  • Ram, Tirth;Khanna, Anu Kumari;Kour, Ravdeep
    • Nonlinear Functional Analysis and Applications
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    • v.27 no.1
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    • pp.83-97
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    • 2022
  • In this paper, we introduce and study generalized mixed operator quasi-equilibrium problems(GMQOEP) in Hausdorff topological vector spaces and prove the existence results for the solution of (GMQOEP) in compact and noncompact settings by employing 1-person game theorems. Moreover, using coercive condition, hemicontinuity of the functions and KKM theorem, we prove new results on the existence of solution for the particular case of (GMQOEP), that is, generalized mixed operator equilibrium problem (GMOEP).

A Power Allocation Algorithm Based on Variational Inequality Problem for Cognitive Radio Networks

  • Zhou, Ming-Yue;Zhao, Xiao-Hui
    • Journal of Information Processing Systems
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    • v.13 no.2
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    • pp.417-427
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    • 2017
  • Power allocation is an important factor for cognitive radio networks to achieve higher communication capacity and faster equilibrium. This paper considers power allocation problem to each cognitive user to maximize capacity of the cognitive systems subject to the constraints on the total power of each cognitive user and the interference levels of the primary user. Since this power control problem can be formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (NP) equivalent to variational inequality (VI) problem in convex polyhedron which can be transformed into complementary problem (CP), we utilize modified projection method to solve this CP problem instead of finding NP solution and give a power control allocation algorithm with a subcarrier allocation scheme. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm performs well and effectively reduces the system power consumption with almost maximum capacity while achieve Nash equilibrium.

Mixed Strategy of Nash Equilibrium in Power Transaction With Constraints (전력거래에서 제약조건이 고려된 내쉬 균형점의 복합전략 연구)

  • Lee, Gwang-Ho
    • The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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    • v.51 no.4
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    • pp.196-201
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    • 2002
  • An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models for imperfect competition of a deregulated system, the key tack is to find the Nash equilibrium. When the constraints are not considered in the power market, the equilibrium has the form of a pure strategy. However, the constraints are considered, the equilibrium has the form of a mired strategy. In this paper the bimatrix game approach leer finding a mixed equilibrium is analyzed. The Nash equilibrium of a mixed strategy will be used adequately for the analysis of market power.

AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF COMMON POOL RESOURCES THROUGH AN EXTENSION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT

  • Bae, Jaegug;Kim, Jongseok;Kang, Eun Sook
    • Honam Mathematical Journal
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    • v.35 no.2
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    • pp.225-234
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    • 2013
  • Many studies of experimental economics have produced outcomes which contradict the predictions of Nash equilibrium, which relies heavily upon the premise of selfishness of an individual. In the games involving contexts of social conflicts represented by the prisoners' dilemma game, the experiments yields outcomes quite different from what are predicted by the conventional wisdom. In order to fill this gap between the conventional Nash Equilibrium and experimental outcomes, non-selfish (or other-regarding) motives of human behavior are introduced and then a new equilibrium concept, RAE-equilibrium is developed. It is also proved that an RAE-equilibrium exists under quite general conditions. Then it is applied to the prisoners' dilemma game that some of the experimental outcomes can be explained.

A VISCOSITY APPROXIMATIVE METHOD TO CES$\`{A}$RO MEANS FOR SOLVING A COMMON ELEMENT OF MIXED EQUILIBRIUM, VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES AND FIXED POINT PROBLEMS

  • Jitpeera, Thanyarat;Katchang, Phayap;Kumam, Poom
    • Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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    • v.29 no.1_2
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    • pp.227-245
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    • 2011
  • In this paper, we introduce a new iterative method for finding a common element of the set of solutions for mixed equilibrium problem, the set of solutions of the variational inequality for a ${\beta}$inverse-strongly monotone mapping and the set of fixed points of a family of finitely nonexpansive mappings in a real Hilbert space by using the viscosity and Ces$\`{a}$ro mean approximation method. We prove that the sequence converges strongly to a common element of the above three sets under some mind conditions. Our results improve and extend the corresponding results of Kumam and Katchang [A viscosity of extragradient approximation method for finding equilibrium problems, variational inequalities and fixed point problems for nonexpansive mapping, Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems, 3(2009), 475-86], Peng and Yao [Strong convergence theorems of iterative scheme based on the extragradient method for mixed equilibrium problems and fixed point problems, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 49(2009), 1816-828], Shimizu and Takahashi [Strong convergence to common fixed points of families of nonexpansive mappings, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 211(1) (1997), 71-83] and some authors.

Analysis of the Price-Selection Problem in Priority-based Scheduling (우선순위 방식 스케쥴링에서의 가격선택 문제의 분석)

  • Park, Sun-Ju
    • Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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    • v.33 no.2
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    • pp.183-192
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    • 2006
  • This paper analyzes the price-selection problem under priority-based scheduling for QoS (Quality of Service) network services, i.e., how to determine the price associated with each service level. In particular, we focus on the problems with the pricing mechanism based on equilibrium analysis. We claim that the assumptions needed to produce equilibrium nay not hold in some important environments. Specifically, (a) the individual user's impact on the system is not infinitesimal and (b) users do not always have up-to-date global system-status knowledge crucial for optimal user decisions required for equilibrium. These may make the equilibrium models inaccurate in realistic environments. We examine the accuracy of some existing equilibrium methods by using a dynamic model that we have developed for system behavior analysis. The analysis indicates that equilibrium methods fail to model accurately the system behavior in some realistic environments.