• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제52권6호
• /
• pp.333-339
• /
• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제12권6호
• /
• pp.2196-2207
• /
• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제1권1호
• /
• pp.1-7
• /
• 2006

In an electricity market, the spot market is normally integrated with a forward or future market. The advantage of the forward market is to allow the market participants to deal in a part or the whole trading portfolio at a fix price in advance and to avoid risk associated to the uncertain price of the spot market. Japan has introduced a continuous auction base forward market from April 2005. This paper analyzes the Japanese forward market rules and operations, and introduces a new algorithm that may improve the efficiency of the market itself. The proposed algorithm enables us to give consideration to the specific characteristics of the power system and to integrate them in the auction mechanism. The benefits of the proposed algorithm are verified on an electronic simulation platform and the results described in this paper.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제52권6호
• /
• pp.340-346
• /
• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
• /
• 제10권2호
• /
• pp.173-216
• /
• 2001

We compare impacts of different $CO_2$ abatement mechanisms using a CGE model. Focus is on the way the tradable permits are initially distributed for emissions trading, namely auction and grandfathering. For three major energy consuming industries (basic chemical, iron & steel and electricity) in Korea, emissions trading is clearly superior to individual $CO_2$ abatement, but auction and grandfathering show somewhat different patterns of impact. We show that depending on how the government uses the revenue from permit auction, auction may be preferable to grandfathering.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• 제8권11호
• /
• pp.3937-3954
• /
• 2014

With the increasing electricity consumption and the wide application of renewable energy sources, energy auction attracts a lot of attention due to its economic benefits. Many schemes have been proposed to support energy auction in smart grid. However, few of them can achieve range query, ranked search and personalized search. In this paper, we propose an efficient multi-keyword range query (EMRQ) scheme, which can support range query, ranked search and personalized search simultaneously. Based on the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem, we use two super-increasing sequences to aggregate multidimensional keywords. The first one is used to aggregate one buyer's or seller's multidimensional keywords to an aggregated number. The second one is used to create a summary number by aggregating the aggregated numbers of all sellers. As a result, the comparison between the keywords of all sellers and those of one buyer can be achieved with only one calculation. Security analysis demonstrates that EMRQ can achieve confidentiality of keywords, authentication, data integrity and query privacy. Extensive experiments show that EMRQ is more efficient compared with the scheme in [3] in terms of computation and communication overhead.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• 제5A권1호
• /
• pp.85-92
• /
• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• 한국지능정보시스템학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국지능정보시스템학회 2003년도 춘계학술대회
• /
• pp.255-263
• /
• 2003

A multi-agent system designed to represent newly deregulated electricity markets in the USA is aimed at testing the capability of the multi-agent model to replicate the observed price behavior in the wholesale market and developing a smart business intelligence which quickly searches the optimum offer strategy responding to the change in market environments. Simulation results show that the optimum offer strategy is to withhold expensive generating units and submit relatively low offers when demand is low, regardless of firm size; the optimum offer strategy during a period of high demand is either to withhold capacity or speculate for a large firm, while it is to be a price taker a small firm: all in all, the offer pattern observed in the market is close to the optimum strategy. From the firm's perspective, the demand-side participation as well as the intense competition dramatically reduces the chance of high excess profit.

• 에너지공학
• /
• 제8권4호
• /
• pp.505-511
• /
• 1999

One of the major challenges confronting a multiservice electric utility is the establishment of the right prices, for its services. The key objectives of particular pricing schemes are reasonableness of company earnings. Economic efficiency, the responsiveness of supply and of the allocation of sources to the desires of consumers, and maintenance of some degree of competition. This paper proposes a value-based pricing mechanism amenable to the current deregulation situation in electricity market allowing service differentiation. The proposed pricing mechanism can be implemented ina nodal auction model, and can also be applied to direct load control.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지
• /
• 제21권12호
• /
• pp.107-114
• /
• 2016

Web system helps high-performance processing for big-data analysis and practical use to make various information using IT resources. The government have started the RPS system in 2012. The system invigorates the electricity production as using renewable energy equipment. The government operates system gathered big-data with various related information system data and the system users are distributed geographically. The companies have to fulfill the system, are available to purchase the REC to other electricity generation company sellers to procure REC for their duty volumes. The REC market operates single auction methods with users a competitive price. But the price have the large variation with various user trading strategy and sellers situations. This papler proposed RPS system modeling and simulation in web environment that is modeled in geographically distributed computing environment for web user with DEVS W/S. Web simulation system base on web service helps to analysis correlation and variables that act on trading price and volume within RPS big-data and the analysis can be forecast REC price.