• 한국경영과학회지
• /
• 제31권3호
• /
• pp.97-105
• /
• 2006

Brand Pricing is the most important issue for the brand manager in the dynamic market. in the typical dynamic pricing model, a linear function has been used based on the assumption that the non-Price Influences and the price influences were independent. However, to incorporate the characteristics of the dynamic market, it is natural to consider the multiplicative relationship. We are going to try the multiplicative linkage between the non-price Influences and the price influences and suggest a new dynamic pricing model with e multiplicative functional form. An empirical study of 19 brands in the Korean cigarette market shows the feasibility of the suggested model.

• 한국경영과학회지
• /
• 제34권4호
• /
• pp.123-138
• /
• 2009

This study examined the first- and second-best pricing by stable dynamics in congested transportation networks. Stable dynamics, suggested by Nesterov and de Palma (2003), is a new model which describes and provides a stable state of congestion in urban transportation networks. The first-best pricing in user equilibrium models introduces user-equilibrium in the system-equilibrium by tolling the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost on each link. Nevertheless, the second-best pricing, which levies the toll on some, but not all, links, is relevant from the practical point of view. In comparison with the user equilibrium model, the stable dynamic model provides a solution equivalent to system-equilibrium if it is focused on link flows. Therefore the toll interval on each link, which keeps up the system-equilibrium, is more meaningful than the first-best pricing. In addition, the second-best pricing in stable dynamic models is the same as the first-best pricing since the toll interval is separately given by each link. As an effect of congestion pricing in stable dynamic models, we can remove the inefficiency of the network with inefficient Braess links by levying a toll on the Braess link. We present a numerical example applied to the network with 6 nodes and 9 links, including 2 Braess links.

• 대한산업공학회지
• /
• 제23권3호
• /
• pp.545-557
• /
• 1997

This paper deals with dynamic optimal pricing for new products by a firm which maximizes the discounted profit stream of it's own in a duopoly. The problem is constructed as differential games and dynamic optimization theory. Cost is assumed to decline as time goes on. A modified customer's choice model is formulated as a diffusion model and we solve a dynamic optimization problem by adopting the diffusion model. Since this paper focus on deriving real prices not showing a time trend, we formulate recursive form equations of costate variables(shadow price) and a simultaneous equation of price. Hence we derive a dynamic optimal pricing model for using in real market. In particular, we construct a dynamic optimal pricing model in the case that there are benefits from not only new subscribers but also previous subscribers. We analyze instant camera market in U.S.A(1976-1985) by utilizing the above model.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
• /
• 제12권6호
• /
• pp.56-67
• /
• 2012

UCC(UCC: User Created Contents)가 온라인상으로 활발히 거래되고 있다. 현재 UCC의 가격은 판매자가 한번 결정을 하면 이후로는 변함이 없는 고정 정책으로 결정된다. 하지만 시장의 수요와 공급은 매시 변화하고, 이러한 변화에 따라 동적으로 가격을 결정하는 연구들이 진행되어 왔다. 본 연구에서는 UCC를 검색하는 사용자들을 분석하여 UCC의 동적인 가격 결정 모형을 제안하였다. 트렌드 변화 반영 결정 모형과 상대적 가격 모형을 고안하였고, 시스템 변수와 시장 변수를 통제하여 다양한 환경에서의 실험을 수행하였다. 또한 컴퓨터 모델링 및 시뮬레이션을 통해 성능을 입증하였다. 본 연구의 결과는 UCC 시장에서의 매출 및 수익 향상에 중요한 지침을 제공할 것이다.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• 제7권3호
• /
• pp.257-265
• /
• 2008

This paper deals with the joint decisions on pricing and ordering for a monopolistic retailer who sells perishable goods with a fixed lifetime or demand period. The newsvendor-typed problem is formulated as a two-period inventory system where the first period represents the inventory of fresh or new-arrival items and the second period represents the inventory of items that are older but still usable. Demand may be for either fresh items or for somewhat older items that exhibit physical decay or deterioration. The retailer is allowed to adjust the selling price of the deteriorated items in the second period, which stimulates demand and reduces excess season-end or stale inventory. This paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model that solves the problem of preseason decisions on ordering-pricing and a within-season decision on markdown pricing. We also develop a fixed-price model as a benchmark against the dual-price dynamic model. To illustrate the effect of the dual-price policy on expected profit, we conduct a comparative study between the two models. Extension to a generalized multi-period model is also discussed.

• 경영과학
• /
• 제29권2호
• /
• pp.91-103
• /
• 2012

Revenue management problems originated in the 1970's in the context of the airline industry have been successfully introduced in airline industries. It has started on the capacity control by booking classes for available seats, and has been recognized as a powerful tool to maximize the total revenue. Changing customer behavior and airline market environments, however, has required a new mechanism for improving the revenue. Dynamic pricing is one of innovative tools which is to adjust prices according to the market status. In this paper, we consider a dynamic pricing and seat control problem for discrete time horizon. The problem can be modeled as a stochastic programming problem. Applying the linear approximation technique and given the price set for each time, we suggest a mixed Integer Programming model to solve our problem efficiently. From the simulation results, we can find our model makes good performance and can be expanded to other comprehensive problems.

• Journal of information and communication convergence engineering
• /
• 제13권2호
• /
• pp.86-96
• /
• 2015

In mobile communication, mobile services [MSs] (e.g., phone calls, short/multimedia messages, and Internet data) incur a cost to both mobile users (MUs) and mobile service providers (MSPs). The proposed model MobPrice consists of dynamic data pricing schemes for mobile communication in order to achieve optimal usage of MSs at minimal prices. MobPrice inspires MUs to subscribe MSs with flexibility of data sharing and intra-peer exchanges, thereby reducing overall cost. The main contributions of MobPrice are three-fold. First, it proposes a novel k-level data-pricing (kDP) scheme for MSs. Second, it extends the kDP scheme with the notion of service-sharing-based pricing schemes to a collaborative peer-to-peer data-pricing (pDP) scheme and a cluster-based data-pricing (cDP) scheme to incorporate the notion of 'cluster' (made up of two or more MUs) in mobile communication. Third, our performance study shows that the proposed schemes are indeed effective in maximizing MS subscriptions and minimizing MS's price/user.

• Architectural research
• /
• 제19권3호
• /
• pp.71-77
• /
• 2017

Dynamic pricing refers to a system in which a tariff varies, according to a level of charging and applied time depending on time change. The power billing system used in the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) is based on time of use (TOU) pricing, which is one of the dynamic pricing systems. This paper aimed to determine the operational results of a variable refrigerant flow system, to which a new control algorithm was applied, in order to respond to dynamic pricing, in summer and the utility of the new control. To do this, real measured data was acquired from a VRF system installed in a building for educational purposes, where dynamic pricing was applied for about 100 days during summer time. At the maximum load operation time period in TOU, the new control minimized operation within the indoor comfort range, an increase in refrigerant evaporation temperature in the indoor unit and the number of revolutions in a compressor in the outdoor unit was limited. As a result, power usage was decreased by 11%, and the operational cost by 14.6%. Furthermore, measurement results using the Predicted Mean Vote (PMV) model, that represented satisfaction of thermal environment, showed that 82.8% to 90.4% of the occupants of the building were satisfied during operation when the new control was applied.

• 한국전자거래학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국전자거래학회 2004년도 e-Biz World Conference
• /
• pp.112-116
• /
• 2004

· Dynamic Pricing vs. Fixed Pricing Auctions make both buyers and sellers engage in the price discovery process, Auctions of various kinds will replace the fixed pricing model that now pervades much of the web(pmitted)

• Asia Marketing Journal
• /
• 제16권1호
• /
• pp.35-69
• /
• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.