• Annual Conference of KIPS
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• 2024.05a
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• pp.114-115
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• 2024

컨테이너 오케스트레이션은 에지 클라우드에 컨테이너를 효율적으로 배포, 관리할 수 있게 해 주는 자동화 기술이다. 지리적으로 떨어져 있을 수 있는 에지 노드의 집합인 에지 클라우드의 규모와 복잡성이 커지면서 에지 클라우드에서 컨테이너의 고속 프로비저닝이 중요해졌다. 이때, 에지 클라우드에서 컨테이너의 배포 속도가 중요한 변수로 작용한다. 본고에서는 배포 속도를 개선하기 위해 이미지 내의 파일을 에지 노드 간에 공유하는 Peer-to-Peer 아키텍처에 기반을 둔 컨테이너 가속화 방법을 제시하고 단순화한 유량 모델을 통해 그 성능을 분석한다.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.33 no.5
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• pp.827-846
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• 2023

Recently, various information technologies such as network communication and sensors have begun to be integrated into weapon systems that were previously operated in stand-alone. This helps the operators of the weapon system to make quick and accurate decisions, thereby allowing for effective operation of the weapon system. However, as the involvement of the cyber domain in weapon systems increases, it is expected that the potential for damage from cyber attacks will also increase. To develop a secure weapon system, it is necessary to implement built-in security, which helps considering security from the requirement stage of the software development process. The U.S. Department of Defense is implementing the Risk Management Framework Assessment and Authorization (RMF A&A) process, along with the introduction of the concept of cybersecurity, for the evaluation and acquisition of weapon systems. Similarly, South Korea is also continuously making efforts to implement the Korea Risk Management Framework (K-RMF). However, so far, there are no cases where K-RMF has been applied from the development stage, and most of the data and documents related to the U.S. RMF A&A are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons. In this study, we propose the method for inferring the composition of the K-RMF based on systematic threat analysis method and the publicly released documents and data related to RMF. Furthermore, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our inferring method by applying it to the naval battleship system.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.1129-1135
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• 2016

The NH-NongHyup network and servers were paralyzed in 2011, in the 2013 3.20 cyber attack happened and classified documents of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd were leaked on december in 2015. All of them were conducted by a foreign country. These attacks were planned for a long time compared to the script kids attacks and the techniques used were very complex and sophisticated. However, no successful solution has been implemented to defend an APT attacks(Advanced Persistent Threat Attacks) thus far. We will use big data analytics to analyze whether or not APT attacks has occurred. This research is based on the data collected through ISAC monitoring among 3 hierarchical Korean Defense System. First, we will introduce related research about big data analytics and machine learning. Then, we design two big data analytics models to detect an APT attacks. Lastly, we will present an effective response method to address a detected APT attacks.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.8C no.5
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• pp.565-572
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• 2001

Recently, due to the open architecture of the internet and wide spread of internet users, the cyber terror threatens to the network\`s weak point are tending grow. Until now, information security solutions are passive on security host and particular security system. This passive information security solution is weak from the attacks through the networks connected worldwide internet systems, and has limitation on the defense against cyber terror attacks. Therefore, network level integrated security function must be provided. In this paper, we consider technology limitations on the information security problems and its environment. Then we present the architecture and functions of policy-based information security services for network level active information security function. This paper also includes design of target system, which provide information security services. Finally, we discuss network level system deployment direction and discuss with Network Security Simulation.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.29-40
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• 2006

Recent trends for cyber threat such as worm and virus exploit vulnerabilities inherent to main information communication infrastructures like the internet to achieve economical and political goals. It needs to develop checking programs for new vulnerabilities published in prompt and apply them to vulnerable systems for the defense of those cyber threats. In this paper, we study of methodologies for new vulnerability checking module development proper to user level. First, we analyze current 7 methodologies for the development of new vulnerability checking modules including GFI LANGuard and Nessus and then compare them. Second, We define and propose the 5 unique methodologies for the development of new vulnerability checking modules in depth. Finally, we induct the best methodology proper to a certain user level by assessing each methodology according to conditions which is set virtually.

• IEIE Transactions on Smart Processing and Computing
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.65-73
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• 2014

An overall responding security-centered framework is necessary required for infringement accidents, failures, and cyber threats. On the other hand, the correspondence structures of existing administrative, technical, physical security have weakness in a system responding to complex attacks because each step is performed independently. This study will recognize all internal and external users as a potentially threatening element. To perform connectivity analysis regarding an action, an intelligent convergence security framework and road map is suggested. A suggested convergence security framework was constructed to be independent of an automatic framework, such as the conventional single solution for the priority defense system of APT of the latest attack type, which makes continuous reputational attacks to achieve its goals. This study suggested the next generation convergence security framework to have preemptive responses, possibly against an APT attack, consisting of the following five hierarchical layers: domain security, domain connection, action visibility, action control, and convergence correspondence. In the domain, the connection layer suggests a security instruction and direction in the domains of administrative, physical and technical security. The domain security layer has consistency of status information among the security domain. A visibility layer of an intelligent attack action consists of data gathering, comparison and decision cycle. The action control layer is a layer that controls the visibility action. Finally, the convergence corresponding layer suggests a corresponding system of before and after an APT attack. The administrative security domain had a security design based on organization, rule, process, and paper information. The physical security domain is designed to separate into a control layer and facility according to the threats of the control impossible and control possible. Each domain action executes visible and control steps, and is designed to have flexibility regarding security environmental changes. In this study, the framework to address an APT attack and load map will be used as an infrastructure corresponding to the next generation security.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.175-181
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• 2024

The U.N. Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee estimated that the amount of North Korea's cyberattacks on virtual asset-related companies from 2017 to 2023 was about 4 trillion won. North Korea's cyberattacks have secured funds through cryptocurrency hacking as it has been restricted from securing foreign currency due to economic sanctions by the international community, and it also shows the form of technology theft against defense companies, and illegal assets are being used to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and develop nuclear and missile development. When North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, and declared the completion of its national nuclear armament following the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on November 29 of the same year, the U.N. imposed sanctions on North Korea, which are considered the strongest economic sanctions in history. In these difficult economic situations, North Korea tried to overcome the crisis through cyberattacks, but as a result of analyzing the changes through the North's cyber attack cases, the strategic goal from the first period from 2009 to 2016 was to verify and show off North Korea's cyber capabilities through the neutralization of the national network and the takeover of information, and was seen as an intention to create social chaos in South Korea. When foreign currency earnings were limited due to sanctions against North Korea in 2016, the second stage seized virtual currency and secured funds to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and advance nuclear and missile development. The third stage is a technology hacking of domestic and foreign defense companies, focusing on taking over key technologies to achieve the five strategic weapons tasks proposed by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. At the national level, security measures for private companies as well as state agencies should be established against North Korea's cyberattacks, and measures for legal systems, technical problems, and budgets related to science are urgently needed. It is also necessary to establish a system and manpower to respond to the ever-developing cyberattacks by focusing on cultivating and securing professional manpower such as white hackers.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.25 no.6
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• pp.1571-1582
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• 2015

This paper suggests a methodology for linking technology classification of nongovernmental information security field and technology classification of cyber-warfare in national defense field. Based on this methodology, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory(MAUT) is applied for the purpose of selecting promising nongovernmental technology that is worthy of later introduction or development. After studying the result of the survey regarding the research progression plan of the selected promising technology, the following three facts are discovered: Firstly, the greater the social spillover effect, the greater the need for the government lead R&D. Secondly, among the spillover effects, the social aspect has the highest correlation with respect to the need for the government lead R&D, while the economical aspect and the technological aspect come in the second and the third place, respectively. Finally, according to the correlation analysis, the defense application and the technological importance do not affect the subject of investment or the subject of development. This indicates that even though the R&D for technology with high social spillover effect should be lead by the government, the subject of the investment or the development cannot be determined solely by factors such as military application and technological importance.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.177-189
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• 2021

Defense R&D is a key process for securing weapons systems determined by mid- and long-term needs to cope with changing future battlefield environments. In particular, the test and evaluation provides information necessary to determine whether or not to switch to mass production as the last gateway to research and development of weapons systems and plays an important role in ensuring performance linked to the life cycle of weapons systems. Meanwhile, if you look at the recent changes in the operational environment of the Korean Peninsula and the defense acquisition environment, you can see three main characteristics. First of all, continuous safety accidents occurred during the operation of the weapon system, which increased social interest in the safety of combatants, and the efficient execution of the limited defense budget is required as acquisition costs increase. In addition, strategic approaches are needed to respond to future battlefield environments such as robots, autonomous weapons systems (RAS), and cyber security test and evaluation. Therefore, in this study, we would like to present strategies for improving the testing and evaluation of weapons systems by considering the characteristics of the security environment that has changed recently. To this end, the improvement strategy was derived by analyzing the complementary elements of the current weapon system operational test and evaluation system in a multi-dimensional model and prioritized through the hierarchical analysis method (AHP).