• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.67-99
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• 2019

This paper, focusing on the renewable portfolio standard (RPS), evaluates alternative renewable energy policies. We propose a tractable equilibrium model which provides a structural representation of Korea's electricity market, including its energy settlement system and renewable energy certificate (REC) transactions. Arbitrage conditions are used to define the core value of REC prices to identify relevant competitive equilibrium conditions. The model considers R&D investments and learning effects that may affect the development of renewable energy technologies. The model is parameterized to represent the baseline scenario under the currently scheduled RPS reinforcement for a 20% share of renewable generation, and then simulated for alternative scenarios. The result shows that the reinforcement of the RPS leads to higher welfare compared to weakening it as well as repealing it, though there remains room to enhance welfare. It turns out that subsidies are welfare-inferior to the RPS due to financial burdens and that reducing nuclear power generation from the baseline yields lower welfare by worsening environmental externalities.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.675-685
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• 2013

Generation capacities and transmission line constraints in a competitive electricity market make it troublesome to compute Nash Equilibrium (NE) for analyzing participants' strategic generation quantities. The NE can cause a mixed strategy NE rather than a pure strategy NE resulting in a more complicated computation of NE, especially in a multiplayer game. A two-level hierarchical optimization problem is used to model competition among multiple participants. There are difficulties in using a mathematical programming approach to solve a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents heuristics applied to the mathematical programming method for dealing with the constraints on generation capacities and transmission line flows. A new formulation based on the heuristics is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the heuristics and the newly-formulated equations.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.602-605
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• 2003

This paper describes the consumer's decision-making process fur own optimal electricity consumption schedule and strategy using new load management system (LMS). As a result, it is demonstrated that a consumer in competitive electricity market has the opportunities to reduce electric payment by use of this LMS.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1999.07c
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• pp.1517-1521
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• 1999

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.11b
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• pp.101-104
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• 2002

With the growing competitive pressure from market participants, utilities, consumer and government, analyses of existing competitive electricity market become more important. The presence of congestion in the transmission system can significantly increase the potential of exercising market power. Since the congestion in the network depends on the several factors. the market power cannot be simply analyzed through the existing indices. This paper presents a systematic analysis on local market power under uniform pricing scheme and provides some mitigation of the strategic market power.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.07a
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• pp.386-388
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• 2001

The change of the electricity charge from cost base to price base due to the introduction of the electricity market competition causes consumer to choose a variety of charge schemes and a portion of loads to be affected by this change. Besides, it is required the index that consolidate the price volatility experienced on the power exchange with gaming and strategic bidding by suppliers to increase profits. Therefore, in order to find a mathematical model of the sensitively-responding-to-price loads, the price-sensitive load model is needed. And the development of state-of-the-art technologies affects the electricity price, so the diffusion of high-efficient end-uses and these price affect load patterns. This paper shows the analysis on learning curves algorithms which is used to investigate the correlation of the end-uses' price and load patterns.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.9 no.12
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• pp.245-252
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• 2009

The electrical power industry has been recognized as a natural monopoly industry for its technological and industrial characteristics. However, a competitive market system has been introduced to that industry in Europe, North America and Australia to overcome the inefficiencies originated from the monopolistic system for decades. In Korea, the power industry is expected to be placed in a competitive market system within several years after separation and privatization of vertically integrated industry in progress. Hence, there is a need for a research on the increase of customer value in that industry, however, existing studies have little dealt with that problem and there is no research on the price policy to consider churn and retention of customers. Therefore, this study provides a methodology for increasing customer loyalty and lifetime value by presenting the lowest pricing plan which leads to diminishing customers' cost. It is verified through an empirical examination that firms can enhance customer loyalty using a price element in that industry and maximize their profit by finding out customers whose lifetime values would increase.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.07a
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• pp.550-552
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• 2001

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilization of their own generation equipments. Especially, the electricity demand shows seasonal and weekly regular pattern, which the some capacity should be provided into ancillary service based on the past demand forecasting error and operating results of electricity market. Namely, if generation cost function is applied to SMP and BLMP as announced the previous day, the available generation capacity of the following day could be optimally distributed, and therefore contract capacity of ancillary service applied to CBP(Cost Based Pool) and TWBP(Two-Way Bidding Pool) is determined. Consequently, it is Possible to use the retained equipments optimally. This paper represents on efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.649-651
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• 2003

In the framework of competitive electricity market, the Market Power due to the transmission congestion, lack of demand-side response, various uncertain factors etc. have been significant problem. This paper reviews the market rules of Korea power system and the uplift scheme for constrained on/off generators. Then, this paper points out several problems and the mitigation measures of local market power concerning the compensation for constrained-off generators.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.