• Title/Summary/Keyword: 진리개연성 문제

Search Result 3, Processing Time 0.021 seconds

Intersubjective Justification and Objective Justification (상호주관적 정당화와 객관적 정당화)

  • Lee, Byeongdeok
    • Korean Journal of Logic
    • /
    • v.22 no.1
    • /
    • pp.125-150
    • /
    • 2019
  • A coherence theory is adequate as a theory of justification only when justification as conceived by the theory is truth-conducive. But it is not clear how coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This is the alleged truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism. In my 2017 paper, I argued that a certain version of the coherence theory, namely a Sellarsian coherence theory combined with the deflationary conception of truth, can cope with this problem. Against this claim, Kiyong Suk argues in his recent paper that my proposed solution fails on the grounds that there is no practical way of distinguishing between intersubjective justification and objective justification. The purpose of this paper is to clarify my view by way of explaining why Suk's criticism is not correct. In particular, I argue that his criticism is based on a wrong assumption, namely that for one to be objectively justified in believing something, one's justification must be qualitatively transformed into the status of having objective justification from the status of having intersubjective justification.

A Study on the Divinity of 'the Supreme God and Celestial Worthy of the Ninth Heaven Who Spreads the Sound of the Thunder Corresponding to Primordial Origin': Focusing on the Relationship between the Divine Qualities of Being 'the Celestial Worthy of Universal Transformation' and 'the Lord God of Great Creation in the Ninth Heaven' (구천응원뇌성보화천존상제 신격 연구 - '보화천존'과 '구천대원조화주신'의 관계를 중심으로 -)

  • Park, Yong-cheol
    • Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
    • /
    • v.29
    • /
    • pp.71-100
    • /
    • 2017
  • This study focuses on examining 'the Supreme God and Celestial Worthy of the Ninth Heaven Who Spreads the Sound of the Thunder Corresponding to Primordial Origin', which Daesoon Jinrihoe believes in as the highest divinity. The name of this divinity was first found in Chinese Daoist scriptures. This study starts by considering the global propagation of virtue and then research connected to this topic. There are two alternative names for this divinity in relation to his human avatar, Kang Jeungsan, the subject of faith in Daesoon Jinrihoe. One is 'the Lord God of Great Creation in the Ninth Heaven' meaning the divinity before assuming a human avatar, and the other is 'the Celestial Worthy of Universal Transformation' the same divinity after he discarded his human avatar and returned to his celestial post. To understand how the belief system of Daesoon Jinrihoe differs from that of Daoism, it is necessary to study the divinity's change from being 'the Lord God of Great Creation in the Ninth Heaven' to becoming 'the Celestial Worthy of Universal Transformation'. If this distinction is not made clear, it brings about confusing arguments concerning the term 'Supreme God (Sangje)' as used in Daoism and Daesoon Jinrihoe. In order to offer a specific explanation, this study suggests three possible directions. The first hypothesis is that although these two names, 'the Celestial Worthy of the Ninth Heaven Who Spreads the Sound of the Thunder Corresponding to Primordial Origin' from Daoism and 'the Supreme God of the Ninth Heaven Who Spreads the Sound of the Thunder Corresponding to Primordial Origin' from Daesoon Jinrihoe, are similar, they actually have nothing to do with one another. The second hypothesis is that they are in fact the same divinity. Lastly, the third hypothesis is that they are closely connected, however, the former (the Celestial Worthy of the Ninth Heaven Who Spreads the Sound of the Thunder Corresponding to Primordial Origin) is a position needed to fulfill the mission of Jeungsan, whereas the latter (the Supreme God of the Ninth Heaven Who Spreads the Sound of the Thunder Corresponding to Primordial Origin) is a name received after the human avatar passes and the deity returns to the Noebu, 'the department of lightning'. These hypotheses face certain problems such as arbitrary mixing, the need for the theoretical clarity, and argumental weakness. Therefore, by leaving some unresolved questions, this study encourages future follow-up studies.

Persuasion and Truth in Gorgias' Rhetoric: A Feature of the Sophistic Reception of Parmenidean Logos Tradition (고르기아스 수사학에서 설득과 진리: 파르메니데스적 로고스 전통에 대한 소피스트적 수용의 한 국면)

  • Kang, Chol-Ung
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
    • /
    • no.116
    • /
    • pp.251-281
    • /
    • 2017
  • The Parmenidean tradition of logos which previous researches fail to fully appreciate has three dimensions of reality-knowledge-discourse. Parmenides is not just an ontologist, as the traditional view emphasizes, but also an epistemologist, as the revisionist view begins to emphasize, and, at the same time, a meta-discourser, as those two established views fail to embrace. In order to reach the third view which fully grasps such a dynamic and integrated feature of Parmenides, we should closely pay attention to the organic interconnectedness of three discourse parts of truth-doxa-proem, especially the significance of proem and meta-discourse. In the Eleatic tradition of discourse, the figure who clearly appreciated and further developed such an authentic feature of Parmenides' discourse is not, as one might easily expect, one of the second-generation Eleatics, but Gorgias who has commonly been positioned at the opposite side of Eleatism. This paper investigates how he actually both innovated and succeeded the Parmenidean tradition of logos; especially, it characterizes his discourse as an antilogy(antilogia) from within the tradition: as a 'devil' advocate' who complemented and completed Parmenidean persuasion by positing the Parmenidean tradition of logos as an arena of a huge intellectual discipline and cultivation, offering himself as a sparring partner to it, and bringing up an antilogy. In the process of this antilogy he performed in his rhetorical speeches such as the Encomium of Helen and the Defense of Palamedes he experimented and examined a possibility of persuasion operating independently from truth, which, however, is not merely sacrificing truth in favor of persuasiveness and probability (to eikos) as Plato criticized mainly focussing on his 'philosophical' writing On not-being. Rather, it was an 'opposition for opposition's sake' and serious play which purported to provide balance and flexibility to contemporary intellectual society which had too much inclined towards truth and knowledge and become stiff and to put weight on the opposite side of mainstream. It is wholly our eranos (i.e. our share of contribution) to summon and examine such sophistic tradition for the sake of the task of our times, not for the sake of Plato's task, that we should build up a healthy culture of discourse where we can share serious play.