• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.59-76
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• 2018

What are the conditions make a being x a moral agent? Can an artifact be moral agent? A moral agent is considered to be a rational being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This study critically analyzed Davidson's position on the condition of the rational being and argued that the network of beliefs with propositional attitude and the beliefs as their background cannot be a requisite for the rational being. Later, it proves that the conditions proposed by $Proke{\check{s}}ov{\acute{a}}$ are merely paratactically listed superficial elements. The moral agent in this study includes the rational agent and it is proven that the strong first person viewpoint is the necessary and sufficient condition for rational agent and moral agent. In conclusion, it suggested a the sketch of moderate skepticism which sets the tentative limit on the agent potential in an artifact by suggesting conditions for moral agent instead of intense skepticism that strongly denies the potential as the moral agent.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.47-75
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• 2008

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rational factor or moral emotion, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning or moral intuitions. This research demonstrates that offender' anger can influence moral judgment. The study examined the role of offender's anger (control group versus anger group) on moral domain ( life, interpersonal ethic, traffic regulation: 6 case) : 2(groups) ×6(cases) mixed design. Participants were asked to judge the offender, case, sympathy and one's anger about the him or her who offended against the law or convention. Participants who perceived the offender's anger tended to assess questionnaire generous. In interpersonal ethic domain, participants have not been affected by anger. There was not significantly differences between two groups in interpersonal ethic domain. The results of experiment confirmed hypotheses that influence of anger varies with the moral domains affected a value system of culture. These findings indicate functional emotion for moral judgment and suggest people may be decide how much emotion is considered on moral judgment performance according to moral domains.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.54
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• pp.221-242
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• 2017

How can Selfish people choose moral behaviors. Xunzi thought it can be done with Human reason. For him, people move for their own interest. So they must follow Yi(禮), if they understand the life that following Yi is better than following x?ngq?ng(性情). Xunzi' theory is going to meet following two problems. One, people do not choose Yi because heir selfish is the only power to do. Second, there is nothing to blame or punishment for violators because it is not the duty. I tried to explain with two solutions for Xunzi.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.13-24
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• 2023

This study tested whether the evaluation of moral cleansing behavior following an immoral act depends on the resources available to the wrongdoer. To this end, resource availability was manipulated by the wrongdoer's characteristics (socioeconomic status vs. physical health condition) and type of moral cleansing (donation vs. volunteer work), and participants rated the pain of the moral cleansing behavior, hypocrisy, and forgivability. Study 1 presents a scenario where a wrongdoer, either high or low in socioeconomic status, conducts moral cleansing via donation or volunteer work. Participants judged donation by those high in socioeconomic status to be not so painful, hypocritical, and unforgivable. Study 2 described a scenario in which a wrongdoer, either physically strong or weak, performs an act of moral cleansing either by donation or volunteer work. Participants considered those sickly wrongdoers' volunteer work to be painful, less hypocritical, and (compared with other conditions) more forgivable. Mediation analyses showed that in both Studies 1 and 2, pain in moral cleansing influenced the hypocrisy judgment which, in turn, affected perceived forgivability. These results indicate that, even for the same expiatory behavior, moral judgment depends on the actor's available resources. That is, people believe that moral cleansing should involve pain; otherwise, the act is hypocritical and unforgivable.

• Journal of Gifted/Talented Education
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.67-87
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• 2013

This study explores high school gifted students' perception of cheating in school using the concept mapping method. The map shows the gifted students' concept structure and the different perception between gifted and non-gifted students on cheating. For the purpose, 63 high school gifted students participated at the brainstorming stage to gather the possible related statements. Finally, 64 statements were confirmed and these were divided and evaluated by 13 focus group students. Then, they were analyzed by multidimensional scaling and processed by hierarchical cluster analysis. The results compiled from this procedure show that high school gifted students' perception of cheating is classified into five clusters: "unacceptable cheating behaviors of friends", "an inseparable relation among social structure, giftedness and cheating", "conflict, coping skills, and tolerance related to the cheating", "immorality in one's inner person" and "the judgement based on morality and social justice". In addition, 150 gifted students and 160 non-gifted students checked the degree of agreement to each statement with the likert 6 points scale and the result showed that there was no significant difference in two clusters, "unacceptable cheating behaviors of friends" and "the judgement based on morality and justice", while it turned out that there were significant perception gaps in three clusters, "inseparable relation among social structure, giftedness and cheating", "conflict, coping skills, and tolerance related to the cheating" and "immorality in one's inner person". Implications of the study related to the gifted students' moral behaviors were discussed in depth.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.29-36
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• 2019

Previous resarch demonstrated that moral judgment is not an outcome of rational reasoning, but an independent variable determined by diverse factors. The effects of disgust on moral harshness, audience effect on moralistic punishment are some examples that support this view. The variability of moral judgment raises a question on what effects video stimuli might have on moral judgments. Although a few studies (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010) have shown that watching a prosocial video clip promote moral behavior, no research have simultaneously tested the effects of both positive and negative video clips on moral (not bahavior but) judgments. Hence, this research tested the effects of viewing videos about good and evil on moral judgments regarding the self and others. To this end, participants were asked to view a video clip depicting content of either positive or negative human behavior and required to make moral judgments on conduct described in a scenario assuming that the person committing the act was either themselves or another person. The results showed significant effects of both video contents (positive, negative) and the actor (self, others) on moral judgments, but they were qualified by the interaction between the two. In particular, participants who watched evil deed of others made harsher judgments on others' moral transgression. Theses results demonstrate that video contents influence moral judgments, and the effect depends on the actor of the immoral behavior. In general discussion, we interpreted the results based on moral disgust, framing effect, and fundamental attribution error.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.85-104
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• 2019

Past research showed that presence of others induces morally desirable behavior and stricter judgments. That is, presence of others makes people become a moral being. On the other hand, little research has been conducted to test what effects facial expression of others have on moral judgments. In this research, we tested the effects of emotion exposed by facial expression on moral judgments. To this end, we presented descriptions of immoral or prosocial behavior along with facial expression of various emotions (in particular, disgust and happiness), and asked participants to make moral judgments on the behavior in the descriptions. In Experiment 1, facial expression did not affect moral judgments, but variability of judgments was increased when descriptions and facial expression were incongruent. In experiment 2, we modified potential reasons of the null effect and conducted the experiment using the same procedure. Subjects in Experiment 2 made stricter judgments with disgust faces than with happy faces for immoral behavior, but the effect did not occur for prosocial behavior. In Experiment 3, we repeated the same experiment after having subjects to consider themselves as the actor in the descriptions. The results replicated the effects of facial expression in Experiment 2 but there was no effect of the actor on moral judgments. This research showed that facial expression of others specifically affects moral judgments on immoral behavior but not on prosocial behavior. In general discussion, we provided further discussion on the results and the limitations of this research.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.51-82
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• 2017

In Meditation II, Descartes questions "sed quid igitur sum" ("But what then am I?"). To this question to rule our essence, A. Clark insists that "We are soft selves". The idea by Clark is a spontaneous conclusion of the extended mind theory stating that cognitive process, cognitive state, and self may be extended over biological organisms. However, it seems that it is difficult for the extended self to have the qualifications as a moral agent. There have been disputes about expandability of cognitive process and cognitive state, but there have not been many disputes about the possibility of accountability of behavior by the extended self. First of all, in this thesis, it will be revealed that the extended self through the analysis of metaphorical theories and the ontological essence of agent and behavior by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson is just metaphorical rhetoric, which is not suitable for rational comprehension of ontological essence of agent and behavior. Moreover, the analysis of problem about artificial moral agent (AMA) proposes the "Strong First-person Viewpoint" as a requirement of the agent. Finally, the concept of extended self will be shown to be unsuitable for theoretical explanation of us, and the concept of human person will be proposed as an alternative solution.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.93
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• pp.121-148
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• 2011

The uncodifiability thesis in anti-theory argument is the typical claim for the impossibility of ethical theorizing. Based on this thesis reflecting particularism strongly, contemporary anti-theorists in ethics argue that individual decisions in particular situations cannot be codified into moral principles. The uncodifiability thesis needs to be examined by the following two issues: a theoretical issue of whether the object of codification is moral practices or not; and a practical one of whether moral principles present the decision procedure of moral reasoning or not. The characteristics of practical reasoning show that the object of codification in ethics, as moral theorists insist, is not moral practices but morality itself. Also moral theorists, contrary to the criticisms of anti-theorists, insist that moral reasoning is comprised of not only moral principles but also moral judgments with contextual knowledge and moral wisdom. In brief, moral theorists make a persuasive response to the uncodifiability thesis when they do neither intend to codify moral practices into moral principles nor to deduce the moral reasoning from moral principles. For them moral judgments should be examined by the moral principles which present universal and idealistic morality.

• Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.25-45
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• 2020

Intentionality judgement in criminal cases is a core area of fact finding that is root of guilty and sentencing judgment on the defendant. However, the third party is not sure the intentionality because it reflects subjective aspect of agent. Thus, mechanism behind intentionality judgment is an important factor to be properly understood by the academia and the criminal justice system. However, previous studies regarding intentionality judgment models have shown inconsistent results. Mental-state models proposed foreseeability(belief) and desire of agent at the time of the offence as key factors in intentionality judgment. These factors consistent with central things on intentionality judgment in criminal law. However, key factors in moral-evaluation models are blameworthiness of agent and badness of outcome reflected on the consequent aspect of act. Recently, deep-self concordance model emerged suggesting important factors on intentionality judgment are not mental states and moral evaluations but individual's deep-self. However, these models are limited in that they do not consider the important features of criminal cases, that the consequence of the case is inevitably negative, and therefore the actor who is a party to legal punishment rarely expresses his or her mental state at the time of the act. Therefore, this study suggests that, based on the existing intentionality judgment studies and the characteristics of the criminal case, the inference about who the agent was originally will play a key role in judging the intentionality in the criminal case. This is the moral-character model. Futhermore, In this regard, this study discussed what the media and criminal justice institutions should keep in mind and the directions for future research.