• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.50
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• pp.113-138
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• 2016

The purpose of this research is to establish the foundation for understanding the appearance of development, inheritance and acceptance of Toegye Yi Hwang(退溪李滉, 1501~1570)'s theory after his life by examining Udam Jeong Sihan(愚潭 丁時翰, 1625~1707)'s view on the Ido-seol(理到說), the Toegye's latter theory. After Toegye, Ido-seol was translated as 'The principle of matters reaches the human mind'. Galam Yi Hyunil(葛庵 李玄逸, 1627~1704), the contemporary scholar with Udam, criticized this translation for applying the directivity and motility to 'Li', the immovable principle. However, Udam agreed with the conventional interpretation of Ido-seol and understood it as the consilience of mind which got the entire principle(體) of 'Li(理)' and contained the application(用) of all things. He extended this concept as the level of 'sameness between objects and self [物我爲一]' based on his former theory, the exquisite interpretation of 'application of Li'. The meaning of 'sameness between objects and self[物我爲一]' is not amalgamation but applepie order of matter's principle in mind. The Udam's viewpoint is differ from Galam who tried to overcome the structural limit of Ido-seol by transforming 'Do(到)', the predicate of 'Ido(理到)', into 'Jin(盡)'. It means that he tried to interpret 'Ido(理到)' on the more essential aspect. His view can be the useful tool for understanding the Toegye's neo-Confucianism system with 'Li(理)' as central figure. It suggested that Udam's theory of the principle and the applecation of 'Li' can be the important theory to investigate the formation of Toegye schools' though and its development.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.54
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• pp.77-113
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• 2017

In late Chosen(朝鮮), the concept of illustrious virtue(明德) became an important issue of debate. However, previous studies did not focus on how the concept emerged as an issue. This paper aimed to explore the problem, and for this purpose, paid attention to Horak(湖洛) debate. Oiam(巍巖) Yi Gan(李柬), in the course of discussion with Namdang(南塘), finally argued that mind(心) clearly distinguishes from temperament(氣質). The goals of the claim were to clearly divide mind and temperament, and to emphasize mind's control of temperament. Through this, he wanted to reject the possibility of being affected by temperament in aroused state(未發). And he presented the concept of illustrious virtue as a critical evidence supporting his argument. He argued that because mind is same with illustrious virtue, it has a special status that essentially distinguished from the temperament, even if both mind and temperament are all material force(氣). This argument led to new discussion trend in the debate. it was to form a definition of the mind, based on defining the relationship between spiritual perception(虛靈知覺), temperament and illustrious virtue. The trend was reflected in the debate on 'Whether illustrious virtue is the same for everyone or varies from person to person(明德分殊)'. Through the process of analysis in this paper, we could detect a tendency that definition of mind has become an independent subject.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.52
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• pp.107-130
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to catch the characteristics of the Hanju Yi Jinsang (寒洲 李震相, 1818~1886)'s thought of the 'Li(理)' through Hanju's view on the Ido-seol(理到說), the Toegye Yi Hwang(退溪 李滉, 1501~1570)'s latter Mulgyuk(物格) theory, and to establish the foundation for identifying the aspects of development about Toegye School's concept of Li from Toegye's Ido-seol. The Ido-seol was criticized for regarding Li - the immovable principle - as 'living thing'. Toegye School's scholars tried to solve this problem by translating the 'word' correctly. Hanju also translated the word 'Do(到)', the verb of 'Ido', as meaning of 'perfectly understood' based on his translation of the word 'Gyuk(格)' as 'Ku(究)'. On the other hand, he also regarded the principle-application structure of Li and the its characteristic the 'Li as Hwalmul(活物)' as the main point of Toegye's Neo-confucianism thought his methodology 'Three viewpoints[三看法]'. Before Hanju, scholars dose not have more opinion from the translation of the word, and it is too difficult to identifying their scholarly identity through their viewpoints on Ido-seol. On the other hand, Hanju thought that the lack of the idea for comprehensive approach between Xin(心) and Li(理) will cause the misunderstanding the relationship between Xin and Li. In this reason, he evaluated Toegye's Ido-seol based on the concept of 'One principle and its manifoldness[理一分殊]'. Consequently, he concatenated the characteristic of Xin which includes all things with concept of Mulgyuk, and emphasized that Xin which penetrates the principle of all things has the characteristic of 'One principle(理一)'.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.38
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• pp.275-302
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• 2013

The purpose of this paper is to investigate Chu Hsi's theory of Ge Wu by analyzing the $L{\ddot{u}}$ shi daxuexie (呂氏大學解) in the Critique of Adulterated Learning (雜學辨). Critique of Adulterated Learning was written by Chu Hsi(朱熹) for the purpose of criticizing the confucian scholars who inclined to Taoism and Buddhism. Chu Hsi criticized $L{\ddot{u}}$ Pen-chung(呂本中)'s theory of Ge Wu Zhi Zhi, especially focusing on his understandings based on the Buddhist tendency. $L{\ddot{u}}$ Pen-chung considered Ge Wu Zhi Zhi as the processes of emerging Liang Zhi of the Subject to discipline by investigating the Li of things. He said "Regard an awakening as the standard of Ge Wu Zhi Zhi", as he payed more attention to the mind of the Subject rather than a long process of accumulation of Li. In comparison with him, Chu Hsi considered enormous each step to accumulate Li as more important to reach the completions of knowledge. Especially, while grasping Li, he considered they should have an understandings of things from the routines to the origins of the principles - that is from the principles of things to the reasons of things are. Chu Hsi approached to the Ge Wu in the meaning of political theory in his early days. However, Chu Hsi expands the width of his thought with a theoretical tool of 'Li-i fen-shu (理一分殊)' in the course of criticizing $L{\ddot{u}}$ Pen-chung's theory of Ge Wu Zhi Zhi. In that sense, His criticism of $L{\ddot{u}}$ Pen-chung(呂本中)'s theory was not only the process of struggling against Buddhist philosophies, but also the process of deepening of his philosophy.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.42
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• pp.233-258
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• 2014

This article investigates the concept of the xing(性) used by Hu Hong. Hu Hong's philosophical system considered to top priority for xing is called xingbunlun(性本論), and he suggested the characteristics of xing as follows. First, Hu Hong regarded xing as the fundamental of whole world and related to the specific individual things, so he constructed the concept of xing in the perspective of ontology. Namely while xing is ti(體) the root of all the world, it is the realization of the uniqueness of the individual things. Also he considered xing which of the ontological aspect developed various psychological aspect contained xin (心), qing(情), yu(欲), etc. Seond, As Hu Hong regulated that wei fa(未發) is xing and yi fa(已發) is xin, he defined the ideal relation between xing and xin as xingtixinyong(性體心用). And he considered that the sage and the ordinary peoples are equal in the xing's aspect of wei fa, but they are not equal in ability of the xin in the aspect of wei fa. Hu Hong thought that the only sage realized the ideal relation between xing and xin in this world, because he keep his mind silent. So Hu Hong suggested the possibility of moral cultivation to the ordinary peoples, expressing that human nature realized the function of the mind(成性), in order that they realized ideal relation by following ren(仁). Third, unlike the traditional notion, Hu Hong understood the meaning of xing in the aspect of ontology. He interpreted the shan(善) of xingshan(性善) as the meaning of exclamation, which implied that "the innate goodness of human nature(性善)" meant "Human nature is good." Because Hu Hong thought that the meaning of xing transcended the relative concept of good and evil, and accepted the whole world affirmatively. In the opinion of Hu Hong, as the concept of xing had two ways of intentionality; likes and dislikes(好惡), things formed relationship with other in this world. Then the concept of good and evil of the ethical value judgement occurred.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.59
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• pp.343-370
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• 2018

Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) completed "Siqibianzheng"("四七辨證") at the age of 72, and later had the argument over Runwuxingtongyilunzheng(人物性同異論爭) with his disciple, Lee Sik(李?). Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) had the position of Runwuxingyilun(人物性異論) and Lee Sik(李?) Runwuxingtonglun(人物性同論). Yet, the argument over Runwuxingtongyilunzheng(人物性同異論爭) had been forgotten and "Siqibianzheng"("四七辨證") could be acknowledged because Toegye school(退溪學派) and Yulgok school(栗谷學派) were conflicting and criticizing each other's stance at that time. It seems like Lee Hyeon-Il(李玄逸)'s "Liqulishilunsiduanqiqingshubian"("栗谷李氏論四端七情書辨") had a great influence on the completion of "Siqibianzheng" ("四七辨證"). Lee Yi(李珥)'s thought of Siduan(四端) and Qiqing(七情) was 'the position of Hunlun(渾淪)' that 'Qiqing(七情) includes Siduan(四端)', and Lee Hwang(李滉) had the 'position of Fenkai(分開)' that Siduan(四端) and Qiqing(七情) should be interpreted differently. Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) criticized the stance of Hunlun(渾淪) from the position of Fenkai(分開). What did Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) try to pursue through "Siqibianzheng"("四七辨證")? This fact tends to make us forget the controversy over Runwuxingtongyilunzheng(人物性同異論爭) between Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) and disciple Lee Sik(李?). Now we know the fact that Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) criticized Lee Yi(李珥) in "Siqibianzheng"("四七辨證"), but don't care much about the fact that Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) caused the controversy over Runwuxingtongyilun(人物性同異論). Why "Siqibianzheng"("四七辨證") has remained in our memory even though it was an important one? It might be because "Siqibianzheng"("四七辨證") had an impact on Lee Sik(李?), Shin Hu-Dam(愼後聃), and even Jeong Yak-Yong(丁若鏞) in the process of summarizing the arguments over Siduanqiqinglunzheng(四端七情論爭) since Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) regardless of whether Jeong Si-Han(丁時翰) had hoped it or not.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.41
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• pp.93-127
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• 2014

Toegye and Yulgok both tried to obtain the extent of goodness from the emotion they feel in reality. Toegye thought the extent of goodness is being obtained by Li[理], Yulgok thought it by Chi[氣]. But Four Bases[四端] as goodness from Li[理] would possibly threat the human identity, and the emotion of appropriateness as goodness from Chi[氣] doesn't even prove itself that it is appropriate. They explain the problems and answers through Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind. Toegye explains that Moral Mind is meaningful as it make people identify themselves as moral existence, Yulgok explains Moral Mind is meaningful that it satisfies standard of appropriateness. While Toegye and Yulgok define Moral Mind and Human Mind as emotion of Yi-fa[已發], Chutzu defines Moral Mind and Human Mind as consciousness. and he defines consciousness as 'preparing Li(理) and practicing the emotion'. So according to Chutzu, Moral Mind and Human Mind derives the reaction from the Li(理) in order to respond to the external stimulation. Supervision of mind is completed by consciousness of Moral Mind. It means that mind not limited to Yi-fa[已發]. Then we should think that Toegye and Yulgok's Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind is something newly resulted from their own philosophic problem. Toegye and Yulgok's Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind is commonly explaining human mind in experiential aspect, and it will be esteemed as definite and realistic theory of Mind because it emphasizes willingness which motivates an essential activity.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.36
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• pp.173-202
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• 2013

In Korea The understanding about physical body contains several cultural and historical experiences. In the modern times several discussions bring about changes from moral training to physical education. Physical education shows clearly modern physical human being by destructions of confusional human being. In confusional philosophy human body contains moral facts such as moral training. Moral training shows right mind, so every physical acts target mental and cultural training. So in this capitalism, it is needed o training right moral training and right physical education.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.30
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• pp.59-86
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• 2010

This paper tries to study theoretical transformation about modernity by analyzing changes of the concepts of Gaining Knowledge of the Study of Things(格物致知). Gaining Knowledge of the Study of Things(格物致知) was the main concept to explain the thought of Neo-Confucianism(性理學). But in the Modern era Gaining Knowledge of the Study of Things(格物致知) was understood as the meaning of Science. In Neo-Confucianism(性理學) Gaining Knowledge of the Study of Things(格物致知) was closely related to the side of human duty and the moral value judgement. But in the modern meaning Gaining Knowledge of the Study of Things(格物致知: Science) was focused to scientific study of the objective matter. So the Science on Gaining Knowledge of the Study of Things(格物致知學) effect to breakup the thinking of Neo-Confucianism(性理學).

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.30
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• pp.227-257
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• 2010

This paper intends to articulate concretely the contents and methods of Confucius self-cultivation and their practical characteristics through the analysis of S?nsan Wang Fuzhi (船山 王夫之, 1619~1692)'s On Reading Four Classics - Chungyong 讀四書大全說-中庸. The essence of the practical philosophy that penetrates Chungyong (中庸: The Doctrine of the Mean) is the practice of self-cultivation through Chonyang (存養: Preserving one's self) and $S{\breve{o}}ngchal$ (省察: Self-reflection). It can come down to two cultivation practices: 1) careful and discrete thinking without seeing or listening (Kyesingonggu: 戒愼恐懼), 2) solely looking into what is hidden and covert (Sindok: 愼獨). $S{\breve{o}}nsan$ grasped the importance of the two concepts for practical philosophy and articulated the principles of practical self-cultivation of Chungyong by paying attention to the differences and mutual-relations of the two concepts. Especially, he put the emphasis on the study through Chonyang and then focused on the relations between Chonyang and $S{\breve{o}}ngchal$. He consistently argued that the Kyesingonggu's Chonyang study was what enabled the Sindok's $S{\breve{o}}ngchal$ study and clarified the meanings of Chonyang in self-cultivation. Furthermore, he established the self-cultivation study of Chungyong as the primary self-cultivation theory of Confucianism by maximizing the practical characteristics within $Chonyangs{\breve{o}}ngchal$.