This article discussed the characteristics of several Pareto-optimal incentive contracts between owner and labor, more specifically, four situations: reporting output jointly observable by labor ana owner; reporting both output and effort; incorporating other endogenous elements (like capital) that affect the production process and Pareto-optimal fee schedules; and ascertaining the effects of private pre-decision information private- decision information, and per-contact informational asymmetries. Also presented were several extensions of the basic contractual model, and the different components of agency costs associated with labor-owner contractual relations. In a single-period model, the agency problem exists because the uncertainty prevents the owner from using the cash flow to determine unambiguously the labor's action. Holmstrom(1979) suggests that "when the same situation repeats itself over time, the effects of uncertainty tend to be reduced and dystunctional behavior is more accurately revealed, thus alleviating the problem of moral hazard. " Under these conditions, if the labor selects the first-best level of effect in each period, the cash flow will be independent and identically distributed over time. As the number of periods increases, the variance of the labows average output, if he selects the first-best level of effort in each period, gets smaller. Note that for this diversification effect to occur, it is necessary that the owner evaluate the labor's effort over the entire history of his employment, rather than evaluate each period's performance separately. Radner(1980) and Rubinstein and Yaari(1980) consider the extreme case in which there are an infinite number of observations. They show that the owner can eventually detect and systematic shirking on the part of the labor by comparing the labor's average output with what would be expected if the labor had been selecting the first-best level of effort in each period. In a dynamic model with incentive problems we have demonstrated that the labor's second-period compensation will depend on his first-period performance. This allows the owner to diversify away some of the uncertainty surrounding the labor's actions. In addition, this allows the owner to smooth the labor's income over time by spreading the risk of the first-period outcome over both periods. At least some unexplored avenves in this area invite future accounting research: situations where owner has different incompatible objectives and negotiates a contract with labor; circumstances in which owner deals with multiple objectives and negotiates contracts with several labors simultaneously; the value of costly accounting information systems and communication in establishing, Pareto-optimal incentive contracts, and the value and effects of inside information, Thorough theoretical or empirical research on each of these topics not only would increase our knowledge about the role and significance of accounting information but could also provide explanations of the inherent differences among various organizations and in their economic behavior. behavior.

Tuna and tuna fishing extend over most of the tropical waters of the world oceans, especially, this study of the Indian Ocean and the fish and the fishing vessels are highly mobile. No country can deal in isolation with the problems of its tuna fishery and of any tuna fishery in its waters, without collaborating with other countries. This cooperation is often best established through some formal international mechanism. The essential requirements are for information-on the resources, the fishery, the trade-and to identify where management actions are needed to consore the resources or to maintain the economic or social function of the fishery. These will also usually require some form of international mechanism. With the changes in the Law of the Sea, the siuuation in respect of management of tuna-considered among the highly migratory species, requirng special treatment-has also changed. At present there are both uncertainty regarding tuna management and political arguments as to how such management can be best implemented. Bearing this in mind, together with the fact that only few tuna stocks have shown clear evidence of serious depletion through over-exploitation, present emphasis will be placed on information requirements. This study included compiling the data necessary to review the state of stoks in the Indian Ocean tuna fishing grounds. Information on the resources-where the fish are, their quantity, their movements, etc. is important, whether in planning development of new fisheries, or considering the need for collaboration with other countries (in ascertaining to what extent their catches may affect catches of the natoinal fleet) or for conservation measures. A major source of information is the statistics of for conservation measures. A major source of information is the statistics of catch and fishing effort from existing commercial vessels. These need to be assembled for all fisheries on the same stock on an oceanwide basis. The statistical data also need to be analysed and intepreted, and combined with biological data(e.g., on growth, mortality and migration rates) to provide information that is intelligible and useful for administrators and other decision-makers. This must also be undertaken on a resource-wide or ocean-wide basis. Finally, because of the world-wide similarities in the methods of datching, processing and marketing fish, there is a particular tut not exclusive need in those countries just beginning to develop their tuna fisheries-to have ready access to a syntheis of information on tuna, tuna biology and tuna fisheries and tuna fisheries economics and management on the Indian Ocean.

연어의 미국 양육은 과거 5년동안 평균 300,000톤으로 비교적 안정적이었다. 반면에 동 기간동안 미국의 연어 수입은 1,800,000파운드에서 19,000,000파운드로 10배나 증가하여 왔다. 이러한 연어의 공급은 70%가 노르웨이에서 이루어졌다. 미국은 1981년까지는 노르웨이로부터 미미한 정도의 연어를 수입하였지만, 1983년에는 1,768톤, 1984년에는 3,869톤 그리고 1985년에는 6,272톤을 수입하였다. 카나다산 연어의 수입가격은 과거 5년전에 $2.58/1b에서 1985년에는 $1.25/1b로 지속적으로 하락하여 왔으나, 반면 노르웨이산 연어의 수입가격은 동일기간동안 $3.28/1b에서 $3.45/1b까지 큰 변동없이 유지되어 왔다. 이와같은 노르웨이산 연어는 1985년에 약 $3.35/1b로 카나다산 연어수입 가격의 약 3배에 달하는 것이다. 미국의 연어의 외형상 소비양은 1981년에 50,000톤이었으나 1985년에는 86%나 증가한 92,000톤으로 급격한 증가현상을 보이고 있다. 특히 매년의 1인당 소비는 1981년에 0.47파운드로부터 1985년에는 0.85파운드로 지속적으로 증가하고 있다. 이상과 같은 상황을 기초로 미래의 연어시장가격을 예측하기 위하여 수요모델을 추정하였다. 추정된 수요모델에 의하면 미국시장에서의 매년의 연어 도매가격은 공급의 증가에 의해서는 하락하지만 미국의 GNP증가에 의해서는 상승할 것이라는 점을 나타내고 있다. 본 연구에 의한 결과는 미국의 총공급양이 25% 증가할지라도 미국의 GNP가 매년 $200,000,000,000씩 증가할 때는 1990년의 연어 도매가격은 1985년 수준으로 유지될 것이라는 점이다.