Korean Journal of Logic (논리연구)

Korean Association for Logic (한국논리학회)
권호 표지

'Belief' and Epistemic acceptance

'믿음'과 인식적 수용

  • Lee, Joohan (Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University)
  • 이주한 (서울대학교 철학사상연구소)
  • Received : 2017.05.15
  • Accepted : 2017.06.22
  • Published : 2017.06.30
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Abstract

The ordinary term 'believe' is polysemous and thus its meaning varies depending on contexts. Little attention, however, has been paid to its context sensitivity in philosophical discussions, and thereby unnecessary problems tend to be brought about in philosophy. This article explores the different meanings of the term 'believe' to serve as a steppingstone to the solving or dissolving of those problems. To begin, it discusses two different mental attitudes 'believe' stands for, i.e., belief as an involuntary mental disposition and pragmatic acceptance as a mental action, and then suggests and explicates another mental action 'believe' referes to, which I call 'epistemic acceptance'. It will be revealed that epistemic acceptance is a secondary mental action which is performed in a context where epistemic reason and non-epistemic reason compete each other. Then, attention is given to several questions concerning epistemic acceptance and answers to them are provided. The issue of whether epistemic acceptance is analyzable and of the relation between epistemic acceptance and judgment will be addressed in the course of answering them. Finally, a brief prospect is put forward that distinction of different mental attitudes 'believe' stands for will bring a new perspective to solve some philosophical problems, especially, with regard to the issue of the nature of epistemic norm.

일상적 표현의 하나인 '믿음'은 다의어로서 맥락에 따라 그 의미를 달리한다. 그러나 이 표현의 맥락 의존성은 믿음에 관한 철학적 논의들에서 주의 깊게 다루어지지 않으며, 그로 인해 불필요한 철학적 문제들이 발생하는 결과를 낳는다. 본 논문은 그러한 철학적 문제들의 해결 혹은 해소를 위한 사전 단계로서 표현 '믿음'이 맥락에 따라 어떻게 의미를 달리하는지 탐구한다. 이를 위해 우선, '믿음'이 가리키는 서로 다른 두 심적 태도, 즉, 불수의적 심적성향으로서의 믿음과 심적 행위로서의 실용적 수용 각각에 관하여 검토하고, 이어서 '믿음'은 이들 두 심적 태도 외에 필자가 '인식적 수용'이라 칭하는 또 하나의 심적 행위를 그 의미의 하나로 가짐을 논의한다. 이를 통해 인식적 수용은 인식적 이유와 비인식적 이유가 서로 경쟁하는 맥락에서 수행되는 이차적인 심적 행위임이 드러날 것이다. 인식적 수용이 어떠한 태도인지 구체적으로 검토한 후, 그에 대하여 제기될 수 있는 몇 가지 물음들을 살펴보고 그에 대한 답변을 시도한다. 이를 통해 인식적 수용의 분석 가능성 여부, 판단 행위와의 관계 등에 관한 문제가 논의된다. 마지막으로, '믿음'이 가리키는 서로 다른 종류의 심적 태도들을 구분하는 것이 관련된 철학적 문제들을 해결하는 데 어떻게 기여할 수 있는지 간단한 전망을 제시한다.

Keywords

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