• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 2006.02a
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• pp.78-102
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• 2006

Networks, services and industries have been converging with the advent of digital convergence by technology advancements of digitalization, broadband and interactivity in the areas of information-communication and broadcasting technologies. Especially, this convergence of technology and market has been blurring the boundary of telecommunication and broadcasting sectors, and the severe competition seems to be inevitable due to the lack of the differentiation in broadcasting media and contents. In this study, we regard the competition phenomenon in the digital convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting as the platform competition in two-sided markets which have been actively studied since 2000, and analyzed it using modified Hotelling's location model. According to the analysis of platform competition on the effects of the differentiation of platform (t) , killer component $(\mu)$ and component compatibility $(\theta)$ , it is shown that two differentiated platforms are simultaneously used in case of the decrease of substitution effects, and the profit of platform with killer contents is increased, but the profit of platforms with higher compatibility is decreased. The policy implication is that it is especially necessary to modify the policy and regulation on media contents considering the growing competition in media. On the other hand, differentiated and reasonable policy is required to make fair competition and active market environment.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.85-100
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• 2009

An online marketplace, such as eBay, is an example of two-sided markets. In online marketplaces, there are transactions between sellers and buyers and direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. Previous research on two-sided market has not handle these competition effects and mostly focused on indirect network externalities between sellers and buyers. We analyze the fee structure of an online marketplace considering direct competition effects among sellers and among buyers. We find that when fees for sellers and buyers can be imposed, an auction or fixed-pricing rule can be chosen according to the characteristics of a product traded. But when only fees for sellers can be imposed, an auction can be taken as a trading mechanism solely.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.95-114
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to search information attributes suitable for SNS and to identify the influence of individuals or groups who contribute to the creation and diffusion of information in the SNS. The researchers extracted the accuracy, two-sided information, novelty, diversity, and experiential factors that influence the acceptance and diffusion of information in the SNS, and identified the relationships among the variables, the usefulness of information and the degree of information diffusion intention. And researchers studied market maven who play the key role in creating and diffusing SNS information. A total of 600 questionnaires were collected and 549 questionnaires were used to test the research hypothesis. The results of the study are as follows. Consumers considered information, which had accuracy, two-sided, and experiential attributes, as useful. But novelty or diversity information were regarded as unuseful because of motive to avoid ambiguity. In the Market Maven Group who have the ability to acquire and edit SNS information, however, there were weak or negative causality between experience and accuracy and information usability factors. but positive causality between novelty and diversity factors of information and usability.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.16 no.6
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• pp.173-184
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• 2016

This research explores strategy for game developers to select platforms in the game industry where are traditional two-sided market focusing on mobile game platforms. We conducted content qualitative analysis by collecting data through contents on online and offline and interviewed four CEO of game developers to secure validity and reliability as well. The results of the research are the following: First, platforms selection factors of game developers are game implementation ability and technical stability, marketing competence of platforms, and profitability creation. Second. the initiative of mobile game platforms has handed over from first generation of mobile games to second mobile games according to their value creation and value capture.