• Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.61 no.3
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• pp.515-545
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• 2024

Consider a Noetherian domain R₀ with quotient field K₀. Let K be a finitely generated regular transcendental field extension of K₀. We construct a Noetherian domain R with Quot(R) = K that contains R₀ and embed Spec(R₀) into Spec(R). Then, we prove that key properties of abelian varieties and smooth geometrically integral projective curves over K are preserved under reduction modulo p for "almost all" p ∈ Spec(R₀).

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.167-203
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• 2017

In this paper I will investigate the problems of the Ego of Kant, Husserl and $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ from the standpoint of $trisvabh{\bar{a}}va$ and the transformation of the basis of $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$. Kant's Copernican revolution and Husserl's Phenomenological reduction are the keys to understanding their philosophies. We especially want to look into the comparison between the Ego of Kant, Husserl and $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$. According to Kant, we need the transcendental Ego as absolute in order to unite consciousness. Kant criticizes traditional metaphysics which had argued that the metaphysicians regard the transcendental Ego as substance. If they regard the transcendental Ego as an empirical object, this attempt will be in vain, because they seek to know unknown things. Husserl's phenomenological reduction is properly understood as a method designed to transform a philosopher into a phenomenologist by virtue of the attainment of a certain perspective on the world phenomenon. We will find the field of the transcendental, absolute ego through phenomenological reduction. Transcendental, absolute ego constitutes our whole world and gives meaning to the world. $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ argues that what our ordinary consciousness (the sixth consciousness) regards subjectivity and objectivity as separate, or that self and the world is an imagination that $alaya-vij{\tilde{n}}ana$, the mind more profound than the ordinary consciousness, created. $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra^{\prime}s$ $alaya-vij{\tilde{n}}ana$ creates the whole objects and the consciousness (the sixth), so we must regard them as illusionary. $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ insists that there are three natures of mind and we attain the transformation of the basis in mind. Based on this point of view, Kant, Husserl and $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ want to transcend and overcome the limits of the ordinary consciousness, and then they want to find the absolute truth (everything) and want to be a men of freedom.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.49-77
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• 2018

This essay examines the ego (I-Subject) problem in Husserl's phenomenology and consists of four parts, as follows. Section I describes the meaning of this research on ego and some important points to note in relation to this study. Section II discusses two aspects of the problem of pure ego, which appears as an ego-problem for the first time. The first aspect is the two opposing positions that Husserl himself took regarding pure ego. Husserl initially rejected pure ego as an object of research in Logische Untersuchungen I (1901) however, he withdrew this position in Logische Untersuchungen II (1913). The second aspect is the content of pure ego that Husserl explored in Ideen I (1913) after he accepted pure ego as a phenomenological problem. The theme of section III is the "theory of three egos" which appeared in Ideen II (1912, 1952). Here, two issues have been noted, one of which is the methodological basis for enabling this theory: the phenomenological "attitude change" (Einstellungsaenderung) and the "Underlying" (Fundierung). The other is the explanation of the content of the three egos: the "physical ego", "personal ego" and the "pure ego". Section IV concerns two themes of the "monadic ego" that appeared in the Cartesianische Meditationen (1931). The first theme is the theoretical premise for the establishment of the monadic ego. In conjunction with this theme, phenomenological-psychological reduction was used as a new method to open up new problem horizons. The second theme brings up the content of the monadic ego, the essence of which can be summarized as follows. 1) This ego is based on a pluralistic and independent ego-concept in which each ego is equal to its own self. 2) It must be asked whether each of the monadic egos is different from one another. 3) The "other" of a certain transcendental ego is not the ego-other relationship but ego-another ego (alter-ego). 4) This phenomenological monadic ego can mutually communicate with alter-egos through empathy, unlike Leibniz's metaphysical monads.

• Journal of Science of Art and Design
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• v.3
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• pp.87-144
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• 2001

This study looks into historical genealogy of autonomy in art criticism on modernism and presents the view of the judgment and correction about that. A matter of autonomy in art appeared in the attempt to totally reconsider and upset the theory of 'Mimesis' or 'Representation' which was the basis of traditional aesthetic theory. In the traditional theory of representation, they assumed primary image exists first and then tried to obtain visual similarity to it through art works. However, in the theory of autonomy in modernism, they maintained the reduction to pure form' or medium', regarding what art works represents and how similar to primary image are not the true essence of art. In the early 20th century, C. Bell laid the foundation stone of the theory of Formalism', providing that a matter of autonomy is significant form', which is the combination of lines and colors Aesthetic autonomy theory came to a climax by C. Greenberg, who systemized art criticism on modernism in the middle 20th century. According to his theory, the pursuit of the essence of form resulted in the specificity of medium' and flatness. They thought that the autonomy of art would be achieved by eliminating outward social factors from art works. This theory ended by Minimalism preventing the instructive function of art work and only emphasizing its material property. Since the middle 20th century, the autonomy theory was confronted with the limit and intense attack because it resulted in this fixed canon and materialism, so they began laying emphasis on those extrinsic factors around art works such as human life, society, history, and so on. This study focuses on arguing and complementing the limit of autonomy such as the adhesive and fixed canon, and then defining the more dynamic area of it. For this, first, I introduced the view of T. J. Clark and T. Crow who criticized the aesthetic autonomy theory. They denied the transcendental structure of form, and found form only in the association with substantial life and society. And they insisted the dynamism of form by emphasizing form as a result of negation insisted by avant-garde. Second, I researched the view of A. C, Danto and M. Fried, who complemented the traditional autonomy theory. They made autonomy emerge from the fixation of form like flatness through connecting essentialism with historical view. In conclusion, I insist that autonomic position of art make it possible to connect or mediate between material form and human or social elements. Therefore, autonomy should not be reduced to the axis of form or that of society but make interaction between two heterogeneous axes.