• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.59-93
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• 2015

A Paradigm shift is in process in China's foreign policies during Xi Jinping's era. Such changes occur with changing national identities from developing country to great power, and from continental power to continental-maritime power. China's pursuit for sea power embraces its global strategy. Accommodating the new identity of maritime power, China is developing its maritime strategy. New silk-road strategy actively utilizes China's advantage in economy, while avoiding direct military challenges against the U.S. China seeks an associated balance of power with the U.S. On the other hand, China make its determination clear to protect its core national interests, particularly Taiwan straits issue, deploying Anti-Access and Area-Denial strategy. 'Pax-Americana 3.0' and 'China's rise 2.0' have convoluted and evolved in complexity. South Korea faces much tougher challenges ahead in its foreign and security environments.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.38 no.6
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• pp.887-905
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• 2003

In this paper, we first understand the concept of imperialism as a 'a dialectical relation between territorial and capitalistic logics of power', as suggested by Harvey, and its history with three phases, the last of which would be seen as the phase of new imperialism. Secondly, we examine the New Security Strategy of the U.S which can be seen as a reflection of the new imperialism of the U.S. with its neo-conservative Bush administration, and explain the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as the implementation of the new imperialism. And then we take a close look on the current geopolitical situation of East Asia, especially North and South Korea, Japan and China, in terms of the new imperialist foreign policy of the Bush administration. Finally, we consider the limits of the new imperialism of the U.S. and globally emerging movements of anti-imperialism.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.5-36
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• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.94-120
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• 2015

The Asia-Pacific Region has emerged as a arena of geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. The Obama administration of the U.S. had laid out the concept of rebalancing strategy toward the region, concentrating its 60 percent of Naval Forces to the region till 2020 and consolidating its network of allies and partners. Whereas Chinese leader Xi Jinping also put forward the concept of new type of major power relations concerning its relations with the U.S. and a concept of 'the Asian Community of Common Destiny' aiming at a more intensified mutual relation among countries in the region. In doing so, Asia-Pacific region gradually became the arena where mutual competition and cooperation between the U.S. and China has crossfired. As a close ally to the U.S. and a partner to Japan, South Korea should develop trilateral naval cooperation by holding joint naval drill with the aim of humanitarian support and disaster relief. At the same time, Seoul also should make efforts to proceed mutual confidence building with Beijing by deepening military-to-military cooperation. These policy options will be helpful to enhance Seoul's security posture in the region.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.47-72
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• 2009

Since the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia has been aggressively seeking a role and place in the U.S.-led international order. Russia conditionally cooperated with the U.S. global policy, efforts to protect and expand the national interests in Post-soviet region. In this context, Post-soviet space is the arena of the struggle among the world powers. Especially in Ukraine as the Axis power of Post-soviet space, hegemony conflicts so called 'New Cold War' between Russia and western powers including U.S. have appeared. This paper examines what are Russian military security strategy and policy, how these come to fruition in Ukraine, what are important factors of complications and its aspect.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.239-270
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• 2010

This thesis is to make an appropriate national defense policy of Republic of Korea through studying the Hegemony Strategy of United States. I searched the theory of hegemony. The hegemony was differently defined by the point of time and region. The strong power nations with the hegemony have been making efforts to maintain their hegemony everytime. I have conclusion that the presence of hegemony once emerged, it brought regional stability in place whether it is coercive or beneficial. The stability and instability of international order IS not exclusively dependent on hegemony. Even if the safety of hegemony cannot guarantee absolute stability of international order, there IS on doubt that the hegemony has enormous impact on that. According to the hegemonic theory, the history of mankind equals to the history of rising and falling hegemony. The international order was changed as the hegemony changes. The United States has been making efforts to maintain her global hegemony during the post cold-war era as well. Taking all these into consideration, relevant military strategy direction able to pursue national interest is that to make up for the relative weakness in the strategic environment. South Korea have to prepare security policy response as following. First, South Korea should build the military force equipped with advanced weapons in military technology sector and solidify military diplomatic relation able to form cooperative relation in wartime. Second, South Korea should make solid Alliance of Korea and U.S. Third, develop and maintain multilateral security cooperation of East Asia. Forth, we could realize that there are means that can neutralize opponent's strong point by seeking one or two and more asymmetry in the aspect of strategy, tactics, and means through asymmetric strategy. Than the military force of South Korea should develop into a force that is able to overcome to the traditional North Korea's threat and new type of conflicts. And the force should have sufficient strength and be deployed to effectively defend the Korean Peninsula. So, we need to establish a denial and defense system against any hostile neighboring country. Therefore, ROK military forces preparing for the future should try to construct a future military power to gradually establish enough strength for self-defense to prepare for a uncertain security environment and when the Korean Peninsula is unified in a future.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.11-25
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• 2023

Since President Biden's inauguration, significant cyberattacks have occurred several times in the United States, and cybersecurity was emphasized as a national priority. The U.S. is advancing efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity both domestically and internationally, including with allies. In particular, the Biden administration announced the National Cybersecurity Strategy in March 2023. The National Cybersecurity Strategy is the top guideline of cybersecurity and is the foundation of other cybersecurity policies. And it includes public-privates as well as international policy directions, so it is expected to affect the international order. Meanwhile, In Korea, a new administration was launched in 2022, and the revision of the National Cybersecurity Strategy is necessary. In addition, cooperation between Korea and the U.S. has recently been strengthened, and cybersecurity is being treated as a key agenda in the cooperative relationship. In this paper, we examine the cyber security strategies of the Trump and Biden administration, and analyze how the strategies have changed, their characteristics and implications in qualitative and quantitative terms. And we derive the implications of these changes for Korea's cybersecurity policy.