• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.125-150
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• 2019

A coherence theory is adequate as a theory of justification only when justification as conceived by the theory is truth-conducive. But it is not clear how coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This is the alleged truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism. In my 2017 paper, I argued that a certain version of the coherence theory, namely a Sellarsian coherence theory combined with the deflationary conception of truth, can cope with this problem. Against this claim, Kiyong Suk argues in his recent paper that my proposed solution fails on the grounds that there is no practical way of distinguishing between intersubjective justification and objective justification. The purpose of this paper is to clarify my view by way of explaining why Suk's criticism is not correct. In particular, I argue that his criticism is based on a wrong assumption, namely that for one to be objectively justified in believing something, one's justification must be qualitatively transformed into the status of having objective justification from the status of having intersubjective justification.