• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.25 no.8
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• pp.1-24
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• 2021

Purpose - This study categorizes factors that influence the utilization of preferential tariffs based on the characteristics of rules of origin (RoO) and identifies and analyzes the influence of these characteristics on the utilization of preferential tariffs and the trade performance of companies. Design/methodology - In this study, we categorized factors that have an influence on the utilization of preferential tariffs based on the characteristics of RoO and investigated and tested the influence of these characteristics on the utilization of preferential tariffs and the trade performance of companies. For empirical analysis, we categorized the characteristics of RoO into restrictiveness, complexity, and uncertainty. We then developed a research model and formulated hypotheses based on previous studies, and tested the hypotheses using statistical software-(SPSS 25.0 and AMOS 18.0.) Findings - Previous studies suggested that each characteristic of RoO is determined by unique features of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA). This study conducted an empirical analysis on the influence of the characteristics of RoO on the utilization of preferential tariffs and trade performance. The results confirmed that, overall, the characteristics of preferential rules of origin (PRoO) are related to and influence Korean companies' utilization of preferential tariffs and trade performance. As for the degree of the influence, the characteristics were in the order of uncertainty> restrictiveness> complexity. Nevertheless, complexity turned out not to have an influence large enough to change a company's decision on the utilization of preferential tariffs. Based on these results, this study identified unique features of PRoO and related problems for Korean companies that want to utilize preferential tariffs and suggested countermeasures for their effective utilization of preferential tariffs in the future. Originality/value - Companies that want to use preferential tariffs in international trade have to satisfy PRoO. The issue of origin can be regarded as an essential part of an RTA and RoO, are a crucial criterion in using preferential tariffs. The rules are requirements to claim benefits of preferential trade agreements and are the primary reasons companies have trouble in utilizing preferential tariffs. In this sense, this study categorized the characteristics of RoO, which are a key part of an RTA, and surveyed working-level professionals in charge of international trade at Korean companies to investigate the relationship between these characteristics and the utilizations of preferential tariffs and trade performance of the companies.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.55-63
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• 1994

Optional two-part tariffs are in growing use in telecommunication services markets. This paper considers the problem of designing profit-maximizing optional two-part tariffs for heterogeneous user groups. It is shown that, at an optimum, one of usage charges among a set of optional two-part tariffs should be made equal to marginal cost. It is also shown that, if demand curves cross, then one of usage charges at the optimum can be below marginal cost. An example with linear demand functions is given to illustrate the important features of optimal two-part tariffs.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.49-68
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• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.105-114
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• 1996

Telecommunication services are typically offered with two-part tariffs which consist of the access charges and the usage charges. In the previous analyses of optimal two-part tariffs, consumers have been assumed to be final users. In this paper, we take the telecommunication service as an input factor which is purchased by business consumers. We proposed a two-stage market model in which the good in queston is produced by an upstream monopolist and purchased as an input by firms and they sell their final outputs in a downstream market. We derive the optimal two-part tariffs of inputs in the case of oligopolistic downstream market with heterogeneous downstream firms. It is shown that two-part tariffs are more desirable than uniform prices from a welfare standpoint. It is also shown that if an upstream monopolist earns positive profits, usage charge is less than marginal cost in the optimal two-part tariffs.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.34
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• pp.189-223
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• 2007

In Korea-U.S.A. FTA Negotiation, U.S.A. request to eliminate barriers of tariffs and non-tariff in trade of cosmetics. Korea applies tariffs of 8% on most cosmetics and personal care products. There are some non-tariffs barriers in cosmetics trade between Korea and U.S.A., for example, transparency on restriction and regulatory, cosmeceuticals, import clearance review, quality control testing, ingredient labelling. Tariffs of 8% on most cosmetics should be eliminated, a proviso of complementary measures on sanitation of Korean people about imported cosmetics. This is a meaning of reformation of prior management(tariffs) by strong ex post management in cosmetics trade. It is important that Korea should construct system of ex post management, for instance, construction of data base on manufacturer, importer, bland name of cosmetics and all ingredients of cosmetics. This is concerned with labelling of cosmetics and cosmeceutical and publication of Korean edition of INCI(International Nomenclature of Cosmetic Ingredient).

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.10
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• pp.500-506
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• 2005

With the advent of electric power systems moving to a deregulated retail electricity market environment, calculating distribution service tariffs has become a challenging theme for distribution industries and tariff regulators. As distribution business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to be regulated. And as multiple distribution companies compete with each other, it would be efficient to adopt competition to the determination of distribution service tariffs. This paper proposes a method to calculate distribution service tariffs using yardstick regulation, which can lead to competition among multiple distribution companies. The proposed method takes into account not only recovering revenue requirements but also the advantages of the yardstick regulation based on long-term marginal costs of distribution network expansion algorithms. A computer simulation is carried out to illustrate effectiveness of the proposed method and it is estimated that the algorithm can be applied to compute the distribution service tariffs under retail electricity markets.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.145-166
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• 2017

The FTA conventional tariffs shall be applied that the imported goods are subject to the conventional tariffs under any agreement, and the origin of the good is the contracting state in accordance with the criteria for determination origin under any agreement. An importer who intends to be eligible for the application of a conventional tariff shall file a request for the application of a conventional tariff with the head of the competent customs house before the relevant import declaration is accepted. The purpose of this study is to examine the legal standard and verification cases for the judgement of the tax tribunal of FTA conventional tariffs. Through this study, this paper is to provide several implications for companies seeking the benefits of FTA conventional tariffs. The Korean companies to do the following: confirm the effective requirements for direct transport of goods through non-parties under the Korea EU FTA, confirm the criterion for application of conventional tariffs such as certificate of origin and claims for ex post facto conventional tariffs under the Korea US FTA, confirm the issuer of origin declaration and the recognition of origin declaration of bill of lading under the Korea EU FTA, utilize the tax appeal system by denial of FTA conventional tariffs, and prepare the discrepancies in interpretation of legal standard under FTA and FTA Special Customs Act.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

Traditionally, tariffs have been used to protect domestic industries. In particular, a country with more bargaining power makes a punitive threat to maintain a certain level of market share in the market of other country. In this paper, we study the effect of punitive tariffs on an irrelevant industry. In particular, when a country tries to achieve a market share or quantity target in an industry, we examine the effect of threats to impose tariffs on the major export of another industries which are irrelevant to the targeted industry. Using a simple duopoly model, we show that there is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium which supports that a country has an incentive to resolve a trade dispute voluntarily to protect its major export industry under the credible treat of punitive tariffs. This result is mainly due to the fact that the trade policy of a country concerns the aggregate benefits from trade over all its export industries. To obtain this result, this paper employs the linkage between the targeted and irrelevant industries by using the lobby of the irrelevant industry to curb the targeted industry. A lot of recent bilateral trade agreements can be applied to our results.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.84-104
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper explains why free trade agreements (FTAs) are more popular than customs unions (CUs) in respect of tariff coordination. Design/methodology - This paper employs an equilibrium theory of trade agreements with tariff coordination. I set up three-country partial equilibrium model with competing exporters. Domestic and exporting firms decide their optimal production under given tariffs and each country levies its tariff under the trade agreements. I found stability of implicit tariff coordination and preference of each country between an FTA and a CU. Findings - I demonstrate that two FTA members can keep their external tariffs higher than separately decided external tariffs by keeping the status-quo. This implicit tariff coordination can benefit each member through trade diversion. In a CU, each member country must have a common optimal external tariff and it must incur costs because each country may seek different external tariffs for their own national welfare. The benefit of implicit coordination in an FTA and the cost of explicit coordination in a CU account for the popularity of the FTA. Originality/value - This paper uses the idea of implicit tariff coordination in trade agreements. In a CU, tariff coordination is explicit and mandatory. All member countries must have a single common external tariff for each good. On the other hand, in an FTA, each country establishes its external tariff with the goal of maximizing its own welfare. However, each country can also coordinate "implicitly" by keeping the status-quo after establishing an FTA.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.173-201
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• 2020

As the US's trade deficit with China and China's manufacturing industry has risen rapidly, the US has begun to regulate trade items as part of China's checks. Four rounds of reprisal measures have greatly altered the trade structures of both countries. In particular, Korea, which is highly dependent on the US and China, has been directly affected by US-China trade disputes. The purpose of this study was to analyze the effects of US-China trade disputes on the stock price of Korean export firms by performing an event study. This study analyzed stock price fluctuations for 7 days before and after entry into forced [Please check] retaliatory tariffs on Korean exporters' export items subject to retaliatory tariffs. According to the analysis results, among companies that produce goods with major tariffs imposed on China by the US, such as electronic appliances, semiconductors, machinery, and automobiles, those producing electronics and semiconductor products were positively affected by the tariff incident. Secondly, among the companies producing steel, chemicals, and machinery, which the main tariffs imposed by the United States, companies producing steel and chemicals were negatively affected by the incident due to the stagnation of trade between China and the US. The results of this study suggest future trade policy directions for Korea and help to establish an export strategy for major industries.