• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제25권2호
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• pp.370-402
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• 2015

The dynamic capabilities of social media are changing the nature of contemporary news by allowing users to communicate and create content, deliver and share newsworthy information, and consume news. News organizations engage with social media because this computer-mediated tool provides an alternative platform for delivering news and connecting with global audiences. This role of social media is conceptualized as its complementarity. However, when mass user-generated-content is constantly shared with other users, more users are attracted to indulge in news-seeking activities on social media. This phenomenon potentially fulfills users' news requirements on social media, which is contrary to what news companies envisioned when they began engaging with social media. This dichotomous role of social media, providing complementarity and showing the potential for becoming a superior news medium, is conceptualized as its competing-complementarity. This paper offers preliminary evidence of competing-complementarity by analyzing the news consumption of individuals. Such consumption is explained through the theoretical perspective of punctuated equilibrium by conceptualizing news consumption as a deep structure radically impacted by a disruptive technology. Although social media benefit news organizations, its competing potential poses serious challenges to their monopolistic controls on news production, distribution, readership, and revenue generation.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제8권2호
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• pp.27-41
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• 1990

In this study the economic impacts of government support of shipping industry in the labor rich country are appraised in a general equilibrium model. Shipping industry subsidies (which are supposed to be supplied by lump-sum tax) will decrease disposable income by shifting productive resources from traded goods to the comparatively disadvantageous transport sector, and at the same time reduce the implicit tariff effect by lowering transport costs. The net effect of shipping industry subsidies is to increase social welfare because the latter positive effect of shipping industry subsidies is to increase social welfare because the latter positive effect dominates the former negative effect. Such an increase in social welfare can never be expected from competitive traded goods industry subsidies in the case of which social welfare will actually decrease because of inefficient resource allocation resulting from the subsidies. In addition it is worth noting that the subsidies on the most capital intensive shipping industry will rectify unevenness in income distribution by raising relative price of labor contrary to subsidies on capital intensive traded goods.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제61권2호
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• pp.187-193
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• 2012

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is as useful tool for investigating a participant's strategic generation quantity in a competitive electricity market. Cournot model may give a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy when transmission constraints are considered. A mixed strategy is difficult to compute, complicated to understand conceptually, and hard to implement in an electricity market practically. This paper presents that a mixed strategy does not appear in Stackelberg leader-follower model even under a transmission congestion. A solution method is proposed for the leader-follower model under a nondifferentiable space of a strategy variable. Based on the pure strategy NE with a transmission line congested, the merit of leader-follower model is shown from a social welfare point of view.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권5호
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• 무역학회지
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• 제47권4호
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• pp.125-135
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• 2022

This study is to analyze the economic effects of tariff reduction using computable general equilibrium(CGE) model. We set up the social accounting matrix for five-base equilibrium year. Our main findings are as follows. First, the impact of tariff reduction on GDP was different from time to time. It meas that the differentiated economics structure was affected by tariff reduction. As our economic grew up, the impact of tariff reduction was measured much higher. Second, until 1995 the impact of tariff reduction on total export and import was increased, then while 1995 the increase was dropped. This is because we reduced the tariff by the WTO negotiations. Third, the tariff reduction affected the price of imported goods, so it contributed to substitute effects between domestic and imported goods. According to these results, we found out the importance of the linkage between the tariff reduction and economic structure.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한산업공학회/한국경영과학회 1995년도 춘계공동학술대회논문집; 전남대학교; 28-29 Apr. 1995
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• pp.363-374
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• 1995

A duopoly model of R&D competition is presented to investigate whether an equilibrium R&D level with flexible spillovers is insufficient (or excessive) from the viewpoint of social welfare. The model focus on flexible spillovers which include much portion of externality occurring in R&D activity. Flexible spillovers refer to the spillovers that vary with industry equilibrium level of R&D. Innovating firms have incentives to cooperate in R&D in the presence of large spillovers. For any symmetric R&D profile, socially desirable equilibrium output is larger than equilibrium output produced in duopoly. Cooperative equilibrium R&D investment is observed to be socially insufficient in terms of welfare criterion irrespective of the magnitude of spillovers. While noncooperative R&D yields socially excessive expenditure on research project for a certain range of spillovers.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제34권4호
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• pp.123-138
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• 2009

This study examined the first- and second-best pricing by stable dynamics in congested transportation networks. Stable dynamics, suggested by Nesterov and de Palma (2003), is a new model which describes and provides a stable state of congestion in urban transportation networks. The first-best pricing in user equilibrium models introduces user-equilibrium in the system-equilibrium by tolling the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost on each link. Nevertheless, the second-best pricing, which levies the toll on some, but not all, links, is relevant from the practical point of view. In comparison with the user equilibrium model, the stable dynamic model provides a solution equivalent to system-equilibrium if it is focused on link flows. Therefore the toll interval on each link, which keeps up the system-equilibrium, is more meaningful than the first-best pricing. In addition, the second-best pricing in stable dynamic models is the same as the first-best pricing since the toll interval is separately given by each link. As an effect of congestion pricing in stable dynamic models, we can remove the inefficiency of the network with inefficient Braess links by levying a toll on the Braess link. We present a numerical example applied to the network with 6 nodes and 9 links, including 2 Braess links.

• 건축사
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• 통권575호
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• pp.17-17
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• 2017

• 한국사회복지학
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• 제62권1호
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• pp.155-183
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• 2010

본 연구는 사회구성주의 시각에서 보건복지사무소와 사회복지사무소에 참여한 직원들의 보건복지 협력경험을 벤슨의 균형모델(Benson, 1975)과 바이크의 센스메이킹 이론(Weick, 1995)으로 분석함으로써 업무환경과 실무자의 역할을 구상하는데 함의를 얻고자 함에 그 목적이 있다. 두 시범사업의 각 네 지역을 선정하여 총 27명의 직원을 대상으로 반구조화된 면접을 실시한 결과, 양 분야 실무자들이 통합서비스 업무를 담당할 수 있는 구조적 관계적 환경을 초기에 구성하여 직역간 벽을 허물 수 있는 계기를 마련하는 것이 중요하다는 것이 부각되었다. 이러한 연구결과는 향후 이용자 중심 사회서비스 설계에 있어 보건 복지간 협력이 보다 중요해지고 관련된 정책구상이 불가피하다는 점에서 시사하는 바가 클 것으로 본다.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제27권1호
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• pp.1-28
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• 2018

본 연구는 비용조건이 다른 오염배출기업이 가격경쟁을 할 때 환경에 대한 사회적 책임(ECSR)의 정도가 시장균형과 환경오염, 그리고 사회후생에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 순차적 ECSR은 상호보완성을 지니고 있으며 비용조건에 상관없이 후발 기업이 항상 더 높은 이윤을 얻게 된다. 둘째, ECSR의 선택시기를 내생화하는 경우 순차게임이 항상 균형이 되고, 비용 비대칭성이 유의하면 효율적인 기업이 ECSR을 선도하는 것이 보수우위균형이 된다. 마지막으로, 순차적 ECSR이 환경오염과 사회후생에 미치는 효과는 오염의 사회적 한계비용에 의해 영향을 받는다. 사회적 비용이 충분히 크다면 효율적인 기업이 ECSR을 선도하는 균형이 사회적으로 바람직하지만, 비효율적인 기업이 ECSR을 선도하는 균형에서는 사회적 비용의 크기에 상관없이 항상 환경오염이 더 심각해질 뿐만 아니라 시장규모가 작아서 비용 비대칭성이 유의하다면 사회후생은 더 낮아진다.