• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.49-82
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• 2016

In this paper, I argue that it is Kripke's Tractarian notion of rule-following that prevents him from giving a non-skeptical (straight) solution to Wittgenstein's paradox. I characterize the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the 'determinate/infinistic' notion of rule-following. The later Wittgenstein, however, advocates an opposite notion of rule-following: the 'indeterminate/finistic' notion. Considering the later Wittgenstein's context-sensitive, pragmatics-oriented approach to meaning and rule-following, the later Wittgenstein could not have endorsed the determinate/infinistic notion of rule-following. To the contrary, a motive behind Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox was to blame the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the major culprit giving rise to the paradox. At the end, I argue that Kripke's adherence to the Tractarian-correspondence theory of truth also contributes to his failure to offer a non-skeptical solution to the paradox. If Kripke had noticed that the later Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth, he could have avoided his skeptical conclusion.

• Language and Information
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.127-153
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• 2015

Negative expressions have their semantic function of classical negation as a pure reverser of truth-values. They also have various kin and foes of their pragmatic functions such as association of bad feelings (Russell 1948), emphasis/attenuation by negative polarity items, sarcasm, and metalinguistic negation (MN). This paper explores how MN and descriptive negation (DN) differ and whether the difference creates pragmatic ambiguity (Horn 1987) or reflects merely contextual variations of one logical negation (Carston 1996). To test the debate, this paper treats certain degree modifiers licensed exclusively by MN as in Mia-ka POTHONG/Yekan yeppu-n key an-i-a [external neg] (vs. modifier NPIs like cenhye 'at all', licensed only by DN) and contrasts them with bad utterances of the MN modifiers in [short form neg] sentences (not for MN) such as Mia-ka POTHONG an yeppu-e. The ERP results of the well-formed vs. ill-formed conditions evoked the N400 at Cz in written stimuli and the N400 near the center on both hemispheres in spoken stimuli. The results suggest that the anomalies are meaning-related and tend to support the pragmatic ambiguity.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.109-141
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• 2005

In this paper, I raise an objection to "sensitivism" about "know", according to which knowledge ascription is sensitive to contexts of utterance or subjects. While Peter Unger once proposed insensitivism about "know" in terms of insensitivism with respect to absolute terms, David Lewis provided sensitivism about "know" in terms of sensitivism with respect to absolute terms, on the common ground that "know" belongs to a class of absolute terms. On the one hand, I object to Unger-style insensitivism about 'know,' for, I claim, we have reason to opt for sensitivism rather than insensitivism with respect to absolute terms in virtue of the maxim that I call "semantic razor." On the other hand, I also object to sensitivist approaches to "know," for, on reflection, there is such a deep difference between "know" and absolute terms (or, sensitive terms altogether) that "know" cannot be taken to sensitive to contexts as opposed to absolute terms (or, sensitive terms altogether). These claims jointly indicate that "know" should be thought of as an insensitive term even though sensitivism has enjoyed wide acceptance in many other cases.