• Title/Summary/Keyword: regional partnership strategy

Search Result 16, Processing Time 0.018 seconds

A Convergence Comparative Study on Perception toward Technical Vocational Education Training (TVET) and General Higher Education in Cambodia (캄보디아의 일반고등교육 (GHE)과 직업기술교육훈련 (TVET)에 대한 인식차이 비교 융복합 연구)

  • Chanrithy, Sok;Bang, Yong-Hwan
    • Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
    • /
    • v.12 no.7
    • /
    • pp.83-92
    • /
    • 2021
  • The purpose of this study is to explore the perception to Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and General Higher Education (GHE) of students, teachers and TVET institutes' directors in Cambodia. As a research method, the study conducted the focus group discussions at Regional Technical Centers in the five representative regions from May to June in 2019. The result was TVET graduates have better chance with linkage in the labour market than GHE graduates through skill-focused curriculum and public private partnership between institutions and enterprises in Cambodia. The study recommend to implement a national strategy to improve the status and awareness of technical skills related jobs and the career pathways for the technical skill level courses.

The Restructuring of the Chemical Industry in Jilin City, China (중국 지린(吉林)시 화학공업의 재구조화)

  • Lu, Bi-Shun;Zhan, Jun
    • Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
    • /
    • v.15 no.6
    • /
    • pp.720-735
    • /
    • 2009
  • This paper studies the characteristics of the restructuring of chemical industrial complex in JiLin city since 1978 focusing on enterprise organization, the process of production, labor, and consumer market. The number of chemical industrial enterprises and their partnership with subcontractors have increased since 2001. As for the type of cooperation group, research institutes and local government are accounted for the greatest portion. The chemical industrial enterprise in JiLin which has adopted Fordism production method still has the highest percentage in 2007. And in the shift process of production system after China's entry into WTO(in 2001), chemical industrial enterprise in JiLin city takes allowing more investment in production technologies as core strategy, while taking improvement in equipment and development of new products as core strategy in the shift process of production technology. The degree of labor re-education was highest in 2007, and as for the relationship between labor and management, enterprises which evaluate the ability of performance of duty are increasing. The characteristics of restructuring of chemical industrial complex on consumer market, domestic market accounted for the greatest portion, on the other side the export is feeble. As for strategy of market restructuring, industrial enterprise in JiLin city should use Quality improvement and high-value added as core strategies to cope with alteration of market.

  • PDF

INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY versus BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: Implications for hegemony in Asia (인도-태평양 전략 vs. 일대일로 이니셔티브: 아시아 헤게모니에 대한 시사점)

  • Ryou-Ellison, Hayoun Jessie
    • Maritime Security
    • /
    • v.2 no.1
    • /
    • pp.71-123
    • /
    • 2021
  • Seoul is under increasing pressure to choose between the US-led IndoPacific Strategy (IPS) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Accordingly, this paper undertakes a detailed appraisal of the IPS and the BRI in the context of Korea's national policy imperatives. Based on a study of network structure by Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright (2007), the present study seeks to identify a particular network structure within the IPS and the BRI. Through this analysis, the relationship between the core and the participant states will be addressed. Awareness of specific configurations of the IPS and the BRI is important as these reveal what participant states can expect from each network. According to Nexon and Wright, there are four types of network structure: unipolar anarchy, hegemonic order, constitutional order, and imperial order. Based on this, we argue that the IPS has a constitutional order and the BRI has an imperial order. Therefore, we suggest to Seoul that participating in the IPS may make more room for an independent foreign policy than would a BRI partnership with China. South Korea would benefit by participating in the IPS in terms of its national security, striking a favourable regional balance of power.

  • PDF

Cooperation Strategies Using Triangular Cooperation for Central Asia in the Forest Sector (삼각협력을 활용한 중앙아시아 산림부문 협력 전략)

  • Choi, Eunho;Lim, Soojeong;Kim, Eunhee
    • Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
    • /
    • v.109 no.2
    • /
    • pp.223-230
    • /
    • 2020
  • Central Asia has great growth potential for cooperation as the Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA) program expands and diversifies. In the case of the forest sector, Korea's successful greening experience has attracted interest from countries in Central Asia. In particular, the depletion of the Aral Sea and a widespread environmental degradation should motivate regional cooperation as well as highlights the need to establish a multilateral cooperative system. The limitation of existing bilateral cooperation, which is the limitation of South-South cooperation, is underscored by the engagement of new donors or the multilateral cooperation and triangular cooperation of organizations is receiving new attention. In addition, Central Asia is suitable for implementing the basic concepts of triangular cooperation. Korea is able to make complementary regional agreements using friendly partnerships with Kazakhstan (the Emerging Donor) and Uzbekistan (the second South Korean Focus Country of ODA). To reinterpret the basic concept of triangular cooperation, three regional cooperation strategies for Central Asia are proposed in this study: windbreak forest development to guarantee resident settlement, resident income increase, and protection of the Aral Sea from further degradation.

Spatial Strategies and Locational Behaviour of Korean Auto Parts Firms in China: Focused on Parts Suppliers of Donfeng-Yueda-Kia Car Assembler (대중국 한국 자동차 부품기업의 공간 전략과 입지 특성: 동풍열달기아 완성차 기업의 부품 협력기업을 중심으로)

  • Choe, Ja-Yeong;Lee, Sung-Cheol
    • Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
    • /
    • v.51 no.2
    • /
    • pp.235-253
    • /
    • 2016
  • China has been developing a new auto industry growth plan since 2004. In line with this initiative, China actively adopted its policy favoring foreign companies' investment which had a competitive edge over their technologies and manufacturing methodologies. To meet this demand in policy and market change, many foreign auto companies and their parts' manufacturers including Korean auto companies joined this stream. Policy change favoring higher technologies applicable in China requested auto companies' swift adaptation to meet the policy requirements by higher technologies with innovation and introduction of those foreign technologies to China. The spatial (excellence) strategy was followed by the increase in its efficiency and competiveness of each region, which were materialized by or in the form of; Firstly, strategic partnership with China auto companies and encouragement of Korea auto parts manufacturing companies to set up its own factories in China. Secondly, modularization and platform sharing strategy by applying enhanced technologies. Thirdly, strategic utilization of China local government's incentive policies. As production management methodology, JIS was adopted all across the board to meet the on-demand market requirements in the manufacturing processes. Auto part manufacturers had been integrated regionally based on forward linkages and modules. As a result, regional-specific auto industry complexes have been made in the places such as Beijing-Hyundai in the north, Dongfeng-Yueda-Kia in the south, common auto parts at central area like Qingdao, and other parts and raw materials in the vicinity of Shanghai.

  • PDF

Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
    • /
    • v.5 no.1
    • /
    • pp.1-53
    • /
    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

  • PDF