• ETRI Journal
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.387-396
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• 2016

This paper introduces a new type of collision attack on first-order masked Advanced Encryption Standards. This attack is a known-plaintext attack, while the existing collision attacks are chosen-plaintext attacks. In addition, our method requires significantly fewer power measurements than any second-order differential power analysis or existing collision attacks.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.2 no.9
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• pp.393-398
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• 2013

This paper introduces a new collision attack on first-order masked AES. This attack is a known plaintext attack, while the existing collision attacks are a chosen plaintext attack. In addition, our method is more efficient than the second-order power analysis and requires about 1/27.5 power measurements by comparison with the last collision attack. Some experiment results of this paper support this fact. In this paper, we also introduce a simple countermeasure, which can protect against our attack.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.264-271
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• 2021

From an information security perspective, protecting sensitive data requires utilizing algorithms which resist theoretical attacks. However, treating an algorithm in a purely mathematical fashion or in other words abstracting away from its physical (hardware or software) implementation opens the door to various real-world security threats. In the modern age of electronics, cryptanalysis attempts to reveal secret information based on cryptosystem physical properties, rather than exploiting the theoretical weaknesses in the implemented cryptographic algorithm. The correlation power attack (CPA) is a Side-Channel Analysis attack used to reveal sensitive information based on the power leakages of a device. In this paper, we present a power Hacking technique to demonstrate how a power analysis can be exploited to reveal the secret information in AES crypto-core. In the proposed case study, we explain the main techniques that can break the security of the considered crypto-core by using CPA attack. Using two cryptographic devices, FPGA and 8051 microcontrollers, the experimental attack procedure shows that the AES hardware implementation has better resistance against power attack compared to the software one. On the other hand, we remark that the efficiency of CPA attack depends statistically on the implementation and the power model used for the power prediction.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.109-115
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• 2010

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is well known as one of efficient physical side-channel attack methods using leakage power consumption traces. However, since the power traces usually include the components irrelevant to the encryption, the efficiency of the DPA attack may be degraded. To enhance the performance of DPA, we introduce a pre-processing technique which extracts the encryption-related parts from the measured power consumption signals. Experimental results show that the DPA attack with the use of the proposed pre-processing method detects correct cipher keys with much smaller number of signals compared to that of the conventional DPA attack.

• Journal of information and communication convergence engineering
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.676-682
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• 2011

Sybil attack can disrupt proper operations of wireless sensor network by forging its sensor node to multiple identities. To protect the sensor network from such an attack, a number of countermeasure methods based on RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) and LQI (Link Quality Indicator) have been proposed. However, previous works on the Sybil attack detection do not consider the fact that Sybil nodes can change their RSSI and LQI strength for their malicious purposes. In this paper, we present a Sybil attack detection method based on a transmission power range. Our proposed method initially measures range of RSSI and LQI from sensor nodes, and then set the minimum, maximum and average RSSI and LQI strength value. After initialization, monitoring nodes request that each sensor node transmits data with different transmission power strengths. If the value measured by monitoring node is out of the range in transmission power strengths, the node is considered as a malicious node.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.362-369
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• 2010

While the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is getting more popular in securing numerous systems, implementations without consideration for side-channel attacks are susceptible to critical information leakage. This paper proposes new power attack countermeasures for ECC over Koblitz curves. Based on some special properties of Koblitz curves, the proposed methods randomize the involved elliptic curve points in a highly regular manner so the resulting scalar multiplication algorithms can defeat the simple power analysis attack and the differential power analysis attack simultaneously. Compared with the previous countermeasures, the new methods are also noticeable in terms of computational cost.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.296-308
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• 2015

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is widely used for protecting wireless sensor network (WSN). At the Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) 2012, G$\acute{e}$rard et al. proposed an optimized collision attack and break a practical implementation of AES. However, the attack needs at least 256 averaged power traces and has a high computational complexity because of its byte wise operation. In this paper, we propose a novel double sieve collision attack based on bitwise collision detection, and an improved version with an error-tolerant mechanism. Practical attacks are successfully conducted on a software implementation of AES in a low-power chip which can be used in wireless sensor node. Simulation results show that our attack needs 90% less time than the work published by G$\acute{e}$rard et al. to reach a success rate of 0.9.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.135-140
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• 2004

The ID-based cryptosystem and Power Analysis Attack are attracting many researchers and have been developed aggressively to date. Especially, DPA (Differential Power Analysis) attack has been considered to be the most powerful attack against low power devices, such as smart cards. However, these two leading topics are researched independently and have little hewn relations with each other. In this paper, we investigate the effect of power analysis attack against ID based cryptosystem. As a result, we insist that ID-based cryptosystem is secure against DPA and we only need to defend against SPA (Simple Power Analysis).

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.335-344
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• 2016

It is known that power analysis is one of the most powerful attack in side channel analysis. Among power analysis single trace attack is widely studied recently since it uses one power consumption trace to recover secret key of public cryptosystem. Recently Sim et al. proposed new exponentiation algorithm for RSA cryptosystem with higher attack complexity to prevent single trace attack. In this paper we analyze the vulnerability of exponentiation algorithm described by Sim et al. Sim et al. applied message blinding and random exponentiation splitting method on $2^t-ary$ for higher attack complexity. However we can reveal private key using information exposed during pre-computation generation. Also we describe modified algorithm that provides higher attack complexity on collision attack. Proposed algorithm minimized the reuse of value that are used during exponentiation to provide security under single collision attack.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.37-44
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• 2012

This paper focuses on scheduling problems arising in the military. In planned artillery attack operations, a large number of threatening enemy targets should be destroyed to minimize fatal loss to the friendly forces. We consider a situation in which the number of available weapons is smaller than the number of targets. Therefore it is required to develop a new sequencing algorithm for the unplanned artillery attack operation. The objective is to minimize the total loss to the friendly forces from the targets, which is expressed as a function of the fire power potential, after artillery attack operations are finished. We develop an algorithm considering the fire power potential and the time required to destroy the targets. The algorithms suggested in this paper can be used in real artillery attack operations if they are modified slightly to cope with the practical situations.