• International Journal of CAD/CAM
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.61-69
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• 2010

Based on the equivalence principles of physical properties, geometric properties and externally applied forces between a surface and the corresponding curves, we present a fast physics and example based skin deformation method for character animation in this paper. The main idea is to represent the skin surface and its deformations with a group of curves whose computation incurs much less computing overheads than the direct surface-based approach. The geometric and physical properties together with externally applied forces of the curves are determined from those of the surface defined by these curves according to the equivalence principles between the surface and the curves. This ensures the curve-based approach is equivalent to the original problem. A fourth order ordinary differential equation is introduced to describe the deformations of the curves between two example skin shapes which relates geometric and physical properties and externally applied forces to shape changes of the curves. The skin deformation is determined from these deformed curves. Several examples are given in this paper to demonstrate the application of the method.

• Korea-Australia Rheology Journal
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.279-285
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• 1999

Draw resonance is both an important and interesting instability encountered in various extensional-deformation-dominated polymer processing operations. It is important because of its paramount relevance to the productivity and quality issue in the related industry: and it is interesting because of as yet unanswered questions as to what its cause and origin are in terms of physics involved. Specifically, a short chronological account of the draw resonance research is presented in this paper bringing several previous results together and focusing on the derivation of a new criterion for draw resonance based on the interaction of the traveling times of some kinematic waves propagating along the spinline from the die exit to the take-up position. The new explanation of draw resonance put forward here based on the physics of the system is seen to have wide implications on both theoretical and practical aspects of draw resonance instability. The importance of the role played by spinline tension in determining draw resonance is an example of the former whereas interpretation of the mechanism of the draw resonance eliminator is an example of the latter. Finally, an approximate yet a very fast and convenient method for determining draw resonance is also derived based on the above findings and found to agree well with the exact stability results.

• Multiscale and Multiphysics Mechanics
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• v.1 no.3
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• pp.225-231
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• 2016

The formation of silicon-on-nothing (SON) structure during an annealing process from the silicon substrate including the trench structures has been considered as an effective technique to construct the structure that has an empty space under the closed flat surface. Previous studies have demonstrated the mechanism of the formation of SON structure, which is based on the surface diffusion driven by the minimization of their surface energy. Also, it has been fragmentarily shown that the morphology of SON structure can be affected by the initial design of trench (e.g., size, number) and the annealing conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure). Based on the previous studies, here, we report a comprehensive study for the design of the cavity-embedded structure (i.e., SON structure). To do this, a dynamic model has been developed with the phase field approach. The simulation results represent that the morphology of SON structures could be detailedly designed, for example the position and thickness of cavity, the thickness of top and bottom layer, according to the design parameters. This study will give us an advantage in the effective design of SON structures.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.410-421
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• 2019

Distributed compressed sensing (DCS) states that we can recover the sparse signals from very few linear measurements. Various studies about DCS have been carried out recently. In many practical applications, there is no prior information except for standard sparsity on signals. The typical example is the sparse signals have block-sparse structures whose non-zero coefficients occurring in clusters, while the cluster pattern is usually unavailable as the prior information. To discuss this issue, a new algorithm, called backtracking-based adaptive orthogonal matching pursuit for block distributed compressed sensing (DCSBBAOMP), is proposed. In contrast to existing block methods which consider the single-channel signal reconstruction, the DCSBBAOMP resorts to the multi-channel signals reconstruction. Moreover, this algorithm is an iterative approach, which consists of forward selection and backward removal stages in each iteration. An advantage of this method is that perfect reconstruction performance can be achieved without prior information on the block-sparsity structure. Numerical experiments are provided to illustrate the desirable performance of the proposed method.

• Geophysics and Geophysical Exploration
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.227-241
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• 2022

Full waveform inversion (FWI) in the field of seismic data processing is an inversion technique that is used to estimate the velocity model of the subsurface for oil and gas exploration. Recently, deep learning (DL) technology has been increasingly used for seismic data processing, and its combination with FWI has attracted remarkable research efforts. For example, DL-based data processing techniques have been utilized for preprocessing input data for FWI, enabling the direct implementation of FWI through DL technology. DL-based FWI can be divided into the following methods: pure data-based, physics-based neural network, encoder-decoder, reparameterized FWI, and physics-informed neural network. In this review, we describe the theory and characteristics of the methods by systematizing them in the order of advancements. In the early days of DL-based FWI, the DL model predicted the velocity model by preparing a large training data set to adopt faithfully the basic principles of data science and apply a pure data-based prediction model. The current research trend is to supplement the shortcomings of the pure data-based approach using the loss function consisting of seismic data or physical information from the wave equation itself in deep neural networks. Based on these developments, DL-based FWI has evolved to not require a large amount of learning data, alleviating the cycle-skipping problem, which is an intrinsic limitation of FWI, and reducing computation times dramatically. The value of DL-based FWI is expected to increase continually in the processing of seismic data.

• Journal of the Korean Vacuum Society
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.461-467
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• 2011

The valence band maximum and the conduction band miminum of GaAs, GaSb, InAs, and InSb (constituent binaries of the quaternaty alloy $Ga_xIn_{1-x}Sb_yAs_{1-y}$) are calculated by using TB analytical approach method. The band alignment types of their heterojunctions are determined directly from their relative position of band edges (VBM and CBM). For example, the GaAs/InAs, GaAs/InSb, and GaSb/InSb are in a type-I, the GaAs/GaSb in a type-II, and the GaSb/InAs and InSb/InAs in a type-III, respectively. The composition dependent VBM and CBM for the $Ga_xIn_{1-x}Sb_yAs_{1-y}$ alloy are obtained by using the univeral tight binding method. For the alloyed heterojunctions, the band alignments can be controlled by changing the composition which induce a band type transition. For the alloy $Ga_xIn_{1-x}Sb_yAs_{1-y}$ lattice mathced to GaSb, the type-II band alignment in the region of $x{\leq}0.15$ is changed to the type-III in the region of $x{\geq}0.81$. On the other hand, the alloy $Ga_xIn_{1-x}Sb_yAs_{1-y}$ lattice mathced to InAs has the type-II band alignment in the region of $x{\leq}0.15$ and the type-III band alignment in the region of $x{\geq}0.81$, respectively.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.