• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.13-18
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• 2011

Sid Meier said, "A game is a series of interesting choices." This means the interesting choices make the game funny. In this paper, we define the no interesting options in the gameplay as strategic errors of the gameplay and suggest a detection method of these errors of the gameplay. The suggested method detects the strategic errors of the gameplay by the inspection of the payoff matrices. This method can detect the options of no strategies of the opponent, dominant options, dominated options, similar options with almost same payoffs in the case of the inspection of the payoff matrices. Additionally it can detect the options of the expected payoff with excessively high, the options of the expected payoff with excessively low, the options of the usage probability with excessively high, and the options of the usage probability with excessively low in the case of the inspection of the payoff matrices with the corresponding frequency rates.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.7
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• pp.1199-1204
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• 2007

In a cost based pool market, the generation capacity can be used as strategic bids by generation companies (Gencos) with the cost functions open to the market. Competition using strategic capacities is modeled by Cournot and Perfect Competiton (PC) model, and transformed into two by two payoff matrix game with Gencos' decision variables of Cournot and PC model. The payoff matrices vary when capacity payments are given to Gencos in accordance with their capacity bids. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the matrices also moves with capacity price changes. In order to maximize social welfare of the market, NE should locate in a certain position of the payoff matrices, which corresponds to a PC NE. A concept of a critical capacity price is proposed and calculated in this paper that is defined as a minimum capacity price leading to PC NE. The critical capacity price is verified to work as a tool for suppressing a strategic capacity withholding in simulations of a test system.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.2
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• pp.97-106
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• 2005

This paper presents a method for evaluating the nash equilibrium of the Cournot model for N-Gencos in wholesale electricity market. In wholesale electricity market, the strategies of N-Gencos can be applied to the game model under the conditions, which the Gencos determine their strategies to maximize their benefit. Generally, the Lemke algorithm has known as the approach to evaluate the mixed nash equilibrium in the only two-player game model. In this paper, we have developed the necessary condition for obtaining the mixed nash equilibrium of N-player by using the Lemke algorithms. However, it is difficult to find the mixed nash equilibrium of two more players by using the analytic method since those have the nonlinear characteristics. To overcome the above problem, we have formulated the object function satisfied with the proposed necessary conditions for N-player nash equilibrium and applied the modified particle swarm optimization (PSO) method to obtain the equilibrium for N-player. To present the effectiveness the proposed necessary condition and the evaluation approach, this paper has shown the results of equilibrium of sample system and the cournot game model for 3-players.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.11
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.87-92
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• 1992

The purpose of this paper is to study the sensitivity analysis in the matrix game. The third type sensitivity analysis is defined as finding the characteristic region of an element of the payoff matrix in which the set of current active strategies is preserved. First by using the relationship between matrix game and linear programming, we induce the conditions which must be satisfied for preserving the set of current active strategies. Second we show the characteristic regions of active and inactive strategy. It is found that the characteristic regions we suggests in this paper are same with that of the type one sensitivity analysis suggested by Sung[3] except only one case.

• Archives of design research
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• v.18 no.2 s.60
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• pp.79-90
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• 2005

The aim of this study was to investigate how the psychological factors of human interrelation or human socialization are associated with the visual design based on sociological and psychological theories. To accomplish this goal, human socialization was examined on the basis of physiology, philosophy, and psychology. Then a case study was employed to assess how they function in the area of visual design. In literature, the sources of psychological factors of human socialization were categorized into 11 items including the sexual hedonic pursuit. These items were used for the evaluation of 40 printed media advertisements, all of which were the winners of the Korea Advertising Awards from 1994 to 2003. As a result, it was revealed that most advertisements responded to the items of adaptive value and cultural imprinting as biological bases. Also, it was discovered that the existential foundation of advertising has been based on mutual distrust and the payoff matrix as a mind of social unrest. In conclusions, it was illustrated that future advertising will remain based on adaptive value, cultural imprinting, social learning, and imitation learning, as long as advertising continue to hold its reason for existence.

• The Pure and Applied Mathematics
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.231-249
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• 2020

We present an efficient and robust finite difference method for a two-asset jump diffusion model, which is a partial integro-differential equation (PIDE). To speed up a computational time, we compute a matrix so that we can calculate the non-local integral term fast by a simple matrix-vector operation. In addition, we use bilinear interpolation to solve integral term of PIDE. We can obtain more stable value by using the payoff-consistent extrapolation. We provide numerical experiments to demonstrate a performance of the proposed numerical method. The numerical results show the robustness and accuracy of the proposed method.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.710-712
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as subgame and overall game in this research. The NEs in both game are computed by using analytic method and payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.10
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• pp.616-623
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.