• Journal of Korean Theatre Studies Association
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• no.49
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• pp.49-71
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• 2013

Melodrama emerged as a form of the moral in the early modern age. As an approach 'the moral' not only means that rewarding virtue and punishing vice, but also refer to a principle of spiritual life and a way of life. -Melodrama theatricalizes a new vision of human life and society through a new type of the virtuous protagonist and sentiment/-ality. -This allows melodrama to be a dominant cultural form in this modern age, beyond the borders of the theater, mass-media, and literature. Virtue and sentiment/-ality are the core elements of melodrama, which differentiate it from tragedy and comedy especially in the structure and effect of the drama. Actually virtue and sentiment/-ality have been a main target of criticism. Virtue has been regarded as a trite quality of the stereotypical protagonist, and sentiment/-ality as a banal emotion which paralyzes an audience's recognition of reality. -However, this thesis regards both virtue and sentiment/-ality as vehicles for showing and sharing the morals of the modern age. First, the virtues of the protagonist included the general and universal ones of the bourgeois -at that times, the bourgeois represented themselves as a human being- such as the responsibility and obedience of a father, a mother, a wife, a husband, a daughter and a son. They also included the professional ethics such as courage, honesty, and justice and so on. The fall or salvation of the protagonist is largely determined by his/her private individual virtue. Second, sentiment/ality is a theatrical device that makes the audience internalize the protagonist's virtue. The protagonist expresses his/her universal virtue sentimentally, and the audience also expresses their virtue by sympathizing with the protagonist's virtue sentimentally. However, the melodramatic protagonist as an individual, is not connected with society, but remains isolated. As a result, s/he has no influence on the society, where s/he can only ends her/his play alone with a happy-ending. S/he is happy alone, or at best happy with his/her own family. On the contrary to this, tragic protagonist usually fixes social disorder through his/her fall. In that sense, we can say that melodrama presents only the half of the human life.

• American Studies
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• v.44 no.2
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• pp.159-191
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• 2021

"In the United States, you almost never say that virtue is beautiful," Alexis de Tocqueville reports in Democracy in America. Yet Ralph Waldo Emerson, arguably the most prominent American moralist in the nineteenth century, stands as an exception to Tocqueville's generalization. This article explores Emerson's perspective on beauty in the moral education of democratic citizens. His interest in this aesthetic category partly stemmed from his deep concern about both the moral inaction and interest politics in commercial culture. As a response to the crisis, Emerson conceived ethical beauty as a key promoter of public-minded democratic citizenship as exemplified by the American abolitionists, and his own practice as a poetic moralist further illustrates this belief. Emerson's aesthetic approach to the cultivation of public virtue in liberal democracy offers a meaningful comparison to contemporary neo-Tocquevillian emphasis on the language of interest or duty.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.1-25
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• 2017

Kant's doctrine of virtue shows how an actor should behave morally in an individual situation with moral law defines the limits of human action. There is latitude for action in the course of formulating the maxims of action by an actor. And moral judgement, as Aristotle's Pronesis, is very important in the latitude for action. In the doctrine of virtue, Kant suggests two kinds of duty of virtue: one's own perfeciton as an obligatory end, and the happiness to others as an obligatory end-and raises the question of casuistics for each. However, this was the practice and training for the human moral life by application of the moral law. In particular, Kant saw that ethics does not give laws for action, but only give laws for the maxims of action, and further intended to realize the practice in a proper way of seeking truth through casuistical questions. Thus, Kant points out that the casuistic is related only to ethics in a fragmentary way and is added to ethics only as a comment on the system. According to Kant, virtue and judgment are inevitable to apply categorical imperative in the empirical and realistic world. In other words, virtue and judgment are necessary to enable people who are likely to act in accordance to inclination to live a moral life in accordance with the command of reason. Thus Kant saw that in order to take wide duty into narrow ones, human beings must not only have to cultivate virtues as a strong power of will, but also to exercise judgment. In addition, the distinction between duty of law(narrow obligation) and duty of virtue(wide obligation) is dependent on whether there is a latitude for action in the application of both duties. So the role of virtue and training of judgement is very important in the latitude for action that occurs in the process of formalizing actor's maxims. In detail, as the duty is wider, so man's obligation to action is more imperfect, but the closer to narrow duty(Law) he brings the maxim of observing this duty(in his attitude of will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. Thus, it was an effort to show how Kant's best moral principles, that is categorical imperative could be applied to the real world at the time of criticism. Of course, even if it is difficult to assess Kant's efforts as successful, criticizing Kant's ethics as 'formal', 'abstract', or 'monologous' is not persuasive because of critics did not understand his ethics as a whole.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.130
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• pp.47-77
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• 2014

The purpose of this paper is to justify the following four points. 1) Both communitarianism maintaining perfectionism and liberalism maintaining state neutralism are wrong. Communitarian liberalism is right. 2) If we accept a standpoint of communitarian liberalism, every state must make its own moral textbook for the achievement of common good. Of course, it dose not mean that a government must be an author of moral textbook. 3) The subjects of unification education and democratic citizenship education must be included in moral textbook. The crucial difference between moral education and civic education lies not in the educational subject but in the educational method. In order to internalize communal values and virtue, moral education prefer reflective internalization to indoctrination. But civic education prefer indoctrination to reflective internalization. 4) An desirable Korean who shares Korean values and virtue, provisional moral truth of Korea is a citizen of two isms, namely nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

• Journal of Korean Home Economics Education Association
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.13-34
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• 2007

This study approached the concept of practical or praxis in Family and Consumer Science based on the review of the concept of phronesis in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle divided human soul into rational part and irrational part. A virtue related with rational part is intellectual virtue and a virtue related with irrational part is moral virtue. Rational part is divided into calculative part and scientific part. Phronesis is one of an intellectual virtue in calculative part of soul. Aristotle defines phronesis as a state of soul that issues in praxis. Phronesis in narrow sense is a virtue which leads to praxis and it is differ from either sophia or techne. Phronesis in broad sense it includes both praxis and poiesis. Phronesis is closely related with moral virtue. Because moral virtues are habits according to right reason, hence right reasons should be considered, and this is intellectual virtue. It is called for attention that what the concept of practical or praxis in Family and Consumer Science Education should be for the determination of the relation with Practical Arts and Technology. This study proposed a tentative conceptualization of praxis and phronimos in context of Family and Consumer Science Education.clothing planning and the most categories(83.3%) had connections of repetitions. In the clothing material section, categories evaluated as gaps and developments were 55.6% and 44.4%. The clothing construction.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.57-79
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to explain MacIntyre's critique of moral pluralism of modern society and reveal the limits of his critique of liberalism. It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettleable. Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and counter-assertion because the protagonists of rival positions invoke incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other. We usually call this situation 'modern moral pluralism' and concede as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free institution. But in After Virtue, MacIntyre vigorously criticizes modern moral pluralism. The main cause he took which brought about this state of affairs was the failure of 'the Enlightenment project'. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment project which has dominated philosophy for the past three hundred years promised a conception of rationality independent of historical and social context, and independent of any specific understanding of man's nature or purpose. But not only has that promise in fact been unfulfilled, the project is itself fundamentally flawed and the promise could never be fulfilled. In consequence, modern moral and political thought are in a state of disarray from which they can be rescued only if we revert to an Aristotelian paradigm, with its essential commitment, and construct an account of practical reason premised on that commitment. But one of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre advocates. Especially when we consider we are not only the characters found in our narratives but also we ourselves are the author of our own narratives. Moral pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.323-347
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• 2017

In the 1980s, traditional analytic epistemology was abuzz with proposed solutions to the Gettier problem, responses to skepticism, newly minted objections to a variety of internalist and externalist theories of justification, and enthusiastic criticisms of foundationalism and coherentism. Debates over competing analyses of knowledge and justification raged. Since then, virtue epistemology has become a diverse and increasingly well-established field. I think that most researchers in Korea will feel the name "virtue epistemology" itself as strange or unfamiliar. It is primarily because virtue epistemology has a brief history. So, virtue epistemology did not present many opportunities for its introduction to Korean researchers. Another reason is that the name of "virtue epistemology" itself has a strangeness or unfamiliarity. Since the concept of "virtue" has mainly been used in moral or ethical contexts, virtue ethics is very familiar to most people. In contrast, the name of "virtue epistemology", combining "virtue" with "epistemology", is strange to many people. This paper primarily aims to introduce virtue epistemology in our philosophical society. What is it? How is virtue epistemology different from traditional analytic epistemology? What is the nature of virtues in virtue epistemology? What are the advantages, urgent tasks, and prospects of virtue epistemology? Focusing on these questions, I seek to understand the background to the rise of virtue epistemology, the differences and relations between virtue epistemology and traditional epistemology, and the nature of virtue and the main theories in virtue epistemology.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.41
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• pp.223-246
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• 2014

The main concern of classical Confucianism, which has Kongzi as its main thinker, is how one can attain moral perfection. In this respect, all of the Confucian teachings can be characterized as an attempt to expound the nature of sages or gentlemen who are believed to attain moral perfection. In Confucianism, de 德 (moral virtue) refers to moral principles or the attributes of things, and it also signifies moral qualities and abilities of humans which are believed to be bestowed by the moral source. Kongzi substantiated the details and practical methods of de, through his teachings of ren as its internal principle and li as its external form. in this way, he put a special emphasis on moral practicality of de. To study Kongzi's practical moral teachings focusing on de can be understood as a reflection on current educational issues.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.219-243
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• 2018

In both the East and the West, the most classical question in classical philosophy was, "What is truly a human virtue and a good man?" A good man realized a human virtue. A good man was composed of mind and body. The question is harmony of mind and body. This article aims to articulate the terms related on Mind and Body in Confucian analects. We analyzed the terms related to Mind (mind, mind-heart, human nature, feeling, will etc) and we analyzed the terms related to Body (body, self, ki etc). Confucius's Theory of Mind and Body Relation focus on self-cultivation and revelation of universal virtue. Chu-his(1130-1200)'s commentary of the terms related on Mind and Body in Confucian analects is based on Heaven's principle vs. man's desire. He advanced the theory of the human mind and moral mind on the bases of Li-Ki. Dasan(1762-1836) deconstructs the mind-law of 16 characters and the theory of Li-KI. He argues that the human mind and moral mind coexist as a servant and a master. Dasan insists that the human mind is controlled by the moral mind but he wants to reconstruct the new theory of mind-body, mind-heart.