The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.
The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.
The uncodifiability thesis in anti-theory argument is the typical claim for the impossibility of ethical theorizing. Based on this thesis reflecting particularism strongly, contemporary anti-theorists in ethics argue that individual decisions in particular situations cannot be codified into moral principles. The uncodifiability thesis needs to be examined by the following two issues: a theoretical issue of whether the object of codification is moral practices or not; and a practical one of whether moral principles present the decision procedure of moral reasoning or not. The characteristics of practical reasoning show that the object of codification in ethics, as moral theorists insist, is not moral practices but morality itself. Also moral theorists, contrary to the criticisms of anti-theorists, insist that moral reasoning is comprised of not only moral principles but also moral judgments with contextual knowledge and moral wisdom. In brief, moral theorists make a persuasive response to the uncodifiability thesis when they do neither intend to codify moral practices into moral principles nor to deduce the moral reasoning from moral principles. For them moral judgments should be examined by the moral principles which present universal and idealistic morality.
What I wish to show in this paper is the moral educational implication on "The Minor Annotations of Elementary Learning(小學枝言)" in a position to consider the alternatives about personality education problems by searching viewpoints on moral training theory on the book. "The Minor Annotations of Elementary Learning(小學枝言)" was written by Dasan Jeong-yakyong(茶山 丁若鏞, 1762-1836). In the oriental philosophy, a moral training theory is built on the base of human nature theory. Dasan's moral training theory was also built on his human nature theory. Undoubtedly we could consider that his difference from the moral training theory of Confucianism is reflected in his moral training theory putting stress on practice. Dasan criticized the moral training theory of Confucianism because of its static aspect contemplating mind internally. He stands on the position that the virtue can be come true by the concrete practice. The establishment ground of Dasan's moral training theory is on his theory of human nature's preference(性嗜好說). Dasan didn't consider benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom(仁義禮智) as human nature. He considered that the human nature prefers goodness. So there is no perfect human nature or principle originally to human beings but also directionality to be displayed. We can say that the virtue building by cultivation of directionality get connected to moral training theory. Dasan considered ?The Minor Annotations of Elementary Learning(小學枝言)? as a practice book for moral training which develops individuals' personality through practice in the reality. He thought that the book cause individuals to follow 'the elementary way(小道)' and to learn 'the elementary art(小藝)' more than academic pursuit. From this viewpoint he showed the practice(行事) of judgment(權衡) by keeping the attitude for the scripture interpretation to pursue the right principles(義理) based on Chinese exegetics(訓?) and the historical evidences(考證) through the whole book. And in the book he suggested the standard of the whole-person education to develop the human nature based on his theory of human nature's preference(性嗜好說), to cognize relationship as an ethical existence, and to pursue the harmony with graphonomy(字學) and Ethics(道學). So we can regard that he realized his practice centered moral education philosophy in the book.
Toegye and Yulgok both tried to obtain the extent of goodness from the emotion they feel in reality. Toegye thought the extent of goodness is being obtained by Li[理], Yulgok thought it by Chi[氣]. But Four Bases[四端] as goodness from Li[理] would possibly threat the human identity, and the emotion of appropriateness as goodness from Chi[氣] doesn't even prove itself that it is appropriate. They explain the problems and answers through Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind. Toegye explains that Moral Mind is meaningful as it make people identify themselves as moral existence, Yulgok explains Moral Mind is meaningful that it satisfies standard of appropriateness. While Toegye and Yulgok define Moral Mind and Human Mind as emotion of Yi-fa[已發], Chutzu defines Moral Mind and Human Mind as consciousness. and he defines consciousness as 'preparing Li(理) and practicing the emotion'. So according to Chutzu, Moral Mind and Human Mind derives the reaction from the Li(理) in order to respond to the external stimulation. Supervision of mind is completed by consciousness of Moral Mind. It means that mind not limited to Yi-fa[已發]. Then we should think that Toegye and Yulgok's Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind is something newly resulted from their own philosophic problem. Toegye and Yulgok's Theory of Human Mind?Moral Mind is commonly explaining human mind in experiential aspect, and it will be esteemed as definite and realistic theory of Mind because it emphasizes willingness which motivates an essential activity.
Christian communities have long sought to find what type of moral judgment is appropriate and what the Christian behavior is, by taking the church's ethical norms and behavior patterns as objects of reflection. In the same context, Christian education also tried to base the psychological rationalism of J. Piaget and L. Kohlberg, but the reason-centered structural development theory was not the answer. In fact, the structural development theory, which emphasized autonomy while excluding emotions from the moral judgment process, over-emphasizing cognition or reason, eventually led to moral relativism, unlike what was intended. In addition, it was criticized for not being able to adequately elucidate the gap between human moral reasoning and behavior, and for attempting to interpret morality excessively within the context of social culture. Recently, these limitations of structural developmental theory have been reinterpreted by neuroethics, especially moral psychology theories, which claim that moral judgment ability is physically wired in the brain and relies heavily on networks between cortical and limbic system. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the newly emerged research themes of neuroethics, and then to discuss two main theories that explain morality in the perspective of neuroethics and the implications that Christian education should pay attention to.
This article aims to search for moral educational implication of J. D. Greene's recent neuro-scientific approaches to deontological ethics. Recently new technique in neuroscience such as fMRI is applied to moral and social psychological concepts or terms, and 'affective primacy' and 'automaticity' principles are highlighted as basic concepts of the new paradigm. When these principles are introduced to ethical theories, it makes rooms of new and different interpretations of them. J. D. Greene et al. claim that deontological moral judgments or theories are just a kind of post hoc rationalization for intuitions or emotions by ways of neuroscientific findings and evolutionary interpretation. For example, Kant's categorical imperative in which a maxim should be universalizable to be as a principle, might be a product of moral intuition. Firstly this article tries to search for intellectual backgrounds of the social intuitionalism where Greens' thought originates. Secondly, this article tries to collect and summarize his arguments about moral dilemma responses, personal-impersonal dilemma catergorizing hypothesis, fMRI data interpretations by ways of evolutionary theory, cultural and social psychological theories, application to deontological and consequential theories, and his suggestion that deontological ethics shoud be rejected as a normative ethical thought and consequentialism be a promising theory etc. Thirdly, this tries to analyse and critically exam those aspects and argumentation, especially from viewpoints of the ethicists whose various strategies seek to defeat Greene's claims. Fourthly, this article criticizes that his arguments make a few critical mistakes in methodology and data interpretation. Last, this article seeks to find its implications for moral education in korea, in which in spite of incomplete argumentation of his neuroscientific approach to morality, neuroethics needs to be introduced as a new approach and educational content, and critical materials as well.
Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory of Mencius combined xìng(性) that means physical characteristic of human together $sh{\grave{a}}n$(善) that means moral value or moral behavior. Therefore in other to verify the meaning of xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) we need to analysis human nature in Psychology and moral norm in Ethics simultaneously. And that necessity justified Moral Psychological approach to xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). Mencius combined a priori morality and a priori moral norm and asserted xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). And than he presented an example for a basis or a clue of mora norm and explained grounds of moral behavior. But various theory Moral Psychology considered morality as an attachment or derivation of human nature. So another new Moral Psychology is needed to investigate Mencius Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory in a viewpoint of Moral Psychology. And than that must managed morality and moral norm as essential problems firstly. That because Mencius considered human as a moral subjectivity and seek the clue or basis morality and moral norm in human nature. And secondly that must managed moral intelligence as a emotional intelligence, because of $li{\acute{a}}ng$$n{\acute{e}}ng$(良能) $li{\acute{a}}ng$ zhī(良知) of Mencius meaned moral intelligence which was derived from blood tied and moral emotion.
This paper examines the contents and meaning of the education reform theory among the social reform theory of Wie Baek-gyu(1727~1798), a representative Confucian scholar of Honam in the 18th century, and suggests the moral educational implications of his educational reform theory. Wie Baek-gyu, who lived through the Yeongjo and Jeongjo eras, diagnosed the contradictions and problems of society at that time as the absence of morality. And emphasized the reform of school education as a center of ways to overcome social disruption. The educational reform theory he envisioned was to systematize the process from child education to higher education centered on the system reorganization of the school, and to formulate school education in conjunction with the selection of talent. He emphasized the cultivation and practice of moral character in the course of admission and curriculum of the school, and suggested a system that reflects the opinions of the local people in the admission process, thereby establishing the school as the center of the local society. His educational reform theory, which embodies the school system based on moral education and further shapes the school system and educational contents as the center of edification and recruitment of talented people, is a big indication of the curriculum of the current moral curriculum that emphasizes the cultivation and practice of inner morality based on personality education. In this paper, I summarized and reviewed the general contents of his perception of the times and social reform theory, the diagnosis of the educational reality that is the basis of his educational reform theory, and the specific contents of the education reform theory. Based on this, I presented the meaning to the current moral and curriculum.
The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
/
v.8
no.11
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pp.307-316
/
2021
This research aims to investigate the relationship between moral deficiency and moral consumption. Consumers' moral values cannot be separated from their consumption activities. In other words, consumers' spending preferences may be an expression of their beliefs about what is right and wrong. A less explored concept within moral consumption behavior theory is 'moral deficiency'. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research effort to integrate green purchasing and religious purchasing under the banner of moral consumption behavior. There are two studies: Study 1 aimed to measure the moral deficiency of participants through moral scenarios (implicit) and then test its relationship with the green purchase and religious purchase, two proxies of moral consumption. A total of 121 universities were chosen via the nonprobability sampling method. To improve the results of the prior study, Study 2 aimed to measure the moral deficiency of participants through moral deficiency self-report (explicit) and then test its effects on green purchase and religious purchase. A total of 208 participants from the general public were recruited via the nonprobability sampling method. The findings of the two studies suggest that participants with high moral deficiency showed more intention to engage in moral consumption behavior.
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