• Journal of Educational Research in Mathematics
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.565-581
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• 2016

Intuition in the mathematical problem solving has been stressed the importance with the logic because intuition is the cognition that give significant clue or idea to problem solving. Fischbein classified intuition by the origin; primary intuition and secondary intuition And he said the role of the personal experience and school education. Through these precedent research, we can understand the social influence. This study attempt to investigate social intuition model of Haidt, moral psychologist that has surfaced social property of intuition in terms of the mathematical problem solving. The major suggestions in problem solving and the education of intuition are followed. First, I can find the social property of intuition in the mathematical problem solving. Second, It is possible to make the mathematical problem solving model by transforming the social intuitionist model. Third, the role of teacher is important to give the meaningful experience for intuition to their students. Fourth, for reducing the errors caused by the coerciveness and globality of intuition, we need the education of checking their own intuition. In other words, we need intuition education emphasized on metacognition.

• Journal of Ethics
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• no.82
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• pp.73-125
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• 2011

This article aims to search for moral educational implication of J. D. Greene's recent neuro-scientific approaches to deontological ethics. Recently new technique in neuroscience such as fMRI is applied to moral and social psychological concepts or terms, and 'affective primacy' and 'automaticity' principles are highlighted as basic concepts of the new paradigm. When these principles are introduced to ethical theories, it makes rooms of new and different interpretations of them. J. D. Greene et al. claim that deontological moral judgments or theories are just a kind of post hoc rationalization for intuitions or emotions by ways of neuroscientific findings and evolutionary interpretation. For example, Kant's categorical imperative in which a maxim should be universalizable to be as a principle, might be a product of moral intuition. Firstly this article tries to search for intellectual backgrounds of the social intuitionalism where Greens' thought originates. Secondly, this article tries to collect and summarize his arguments about moral dilemma responses, personal-impersonal dilemma catergorizing hypothesis, fMRI data interpretations by ways of evolutionary theory, cultural and social psychological theories, application to deontological and consequential theories, and his suggestion that deontological ethics shoud be rejected as a normative ethical thought and consequentialism be a promising theory etc. Thirdly, this tries to analyse and critically exam those aspects and argumentation, especially from viewpoints of the ethicists whose various strategies seek to defeat Greene's claims. Fourthly, this article criticizes that his arguments make a few critical mistakes in methodology and data interpretation. Last, this article seeks to find its implications for moral education in korea, in which in spite of incomplete argumentation of his neuroscientific approach to morality, neuroethics needs to be introduced as a new approach and educational content, and critical materials as well.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.34
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• pp.363-385
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• 2009

I criticize Mou's moral metaphysics and propose the alternative depending on Kant's analysis on the sublime. (1) Mou's moral metaphysics conflicts with the scientific world view. (2) Kant's 'aesthetic space' does not conflict with the scientific world view. Futhermore, Kant's 'aesthetic space' satisfies the conditions which Mou's moral metaphysics requires. (3) Mencius's autonomous morality is not sufficient for justifying the moral law or categorical imperative. (4) At this point, the sublime plays the important role in bridging between nature and morality. (5) In Kant's context, the possibility of the autonomous moral action is achieved on the basis of the educated feeling of the sublime.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.395-432
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• 2011

The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.233-251
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• 2019

In this paper, I raise objections to Sungsu Kim's argument that Sartorio's hard-line reply to the manipulation argument fails. In attacking Sartorio's argument, Sungsu Kim claims that there are two problems with Sartorio's. I argue that Sungsu Kim's argument fails by responding to these two problems. With respect to the first problem, I provide a new example of dilution of responsibility. With respect to the second problem, I argue that, contrary to what Sungsu Kim assumes, for Sartorio's argument to succeed, our intuition that Ernie is responsible in the Lightning Strike Scenario does not have to be as strong as our intuition that Ernie is not responsible in the Diana scenario.

• Journal of Korea Entertainment Industry Association
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• v.13 no.6
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• pp.211-220
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• 2019

It helps to wisely abstain from errors of the a priori subjective emotions related to human emotions, and orders emotions to make rational choices. These emotional happiness of human and moral sensitivities work directly or indirectly in rational choice of rational thought and reason. Abraham would have been troubled by the divine mandate to sacrifice a son who was only one, and a son who had been healed. Was his reason reasonable at this time? In rational reason, it can be said that the act of dedicating his son is an appropriate act, but is it possible in the human mind? Aristoteles also called human virtue virtue in good for human beings. Because happiness is also a mental activity, we have to know a certain degree about the mind. This ψυχή(psyche, spirit) spirit is an irrational element that is invisible but an intervention in rational principles. Also C. G. Jung states that all human beings have four dynamic psychological functions that are not visible, and that the mind is driven by these four functional dimensions. This means that the elements of S, Sensing, N, Intuition, T, Thinking, and Feeling are combined. David Hume also emphasized the principle of empathy, asserting that morality can not be derived from reason, and Max Ferdinand Scheler, before grasping the visual characteristics of a person, has already captured the whole feeling of the person, And that the value given to this feeling is the value, and that the function of emotion that is elevated to the perceived object by grasping the value through this process and the value is always preceded by the reason. Emmanuel Levinas states that emotional emotions of love are ahead of reason and that emotions precede human reasoning and rationality is the inability of emotional control that we need rational thought and rational and wise action as reason of control and temperance. As part of human emotional education, in the 7th curriculum, Bloom's cognitive, perceptive, and behavioral domain, which is a person with integrated thinking, is trying to be a moral practitioner. It focuses on how to act according to the direction of emotions for virtuous acts and how to develop emotions for emotions on behalf of vicious acts. We can design the possibility and direction of cultivating human emotions and emotional happiness and happy sensitivities by the principle of strengthening virtue and the principle of elimination of ill feeling.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.239-244
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• 2022

Neural Machine Translation (NMT) is gradually breaking down the boundary between human and machine translation. We look at actual cases of human and machine translation and discuss why machine translation needs a human touch. In this paper, we raise three driving questions: Can humans be replaced by machines?; How human translators can remain successful in a NMT-driven world?; Is it possible to eliminate language barrier in the era of NMT and World Englishes? The answers to these questions are all negative. We suggest that machine translation is a useful tool with rapidity, accuracy, and low cost productivity. However, the machine translation is limited in the areas of culture, borrowing, ambiguity, new words and (national) dialects. The machines cannot imitate the emotional and intellectual abilities of human translators since machines are based on machine learning, while humans are on intuition. The machine translation will be a useful tool that does not cause moral problems when using methods such as back translation and human post-editing. To conclude, we propose the blended approach that machine translation cannot be completed without the touch of human translation.