• International Journal of Quality Innovation
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.20-31
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• 2007

Moral hazard and adverse selection often exist in asymmetric information environment. In this paper, quality investment decision problem is studied under moral hazard. A basic model for quality investment level decision is developed with the supplier as a principal and the buyer as an agent. And then we regard the supplier and the buyer's rational limitations to set up a model when the buyer's quality evaluation and processing activities are hidden. The model is optimized and the results under different backgrounds are discussed and compared. Results show that the buyer's quality evaluation level and processing level are mostly influenced by the supplier's quality assurance payment. Both the supplier and the buyer choose different quality investment levels under moral hazard because of the supplier's payment to the buyer in case of internal failure and external failure.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.395-432
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• 2011

The purpose of this study is (i) to explore arguments of post-kohlbergian approach in moral psychology and; (ii) to analyze Blasi's and Lapsley's positions regarding the relationship between moral philosophy and psychology in terms of reflective reasoning and; (ⅲ) to suggest their's implication concerning the future development of moral identity theory. Moral identity theory has emerged as an alternative approach of the Kohlberg's moral development theory. Theorists of moral identity theory commonly criticize Kohlberg's theory as a philosophical psychology and insist the autonomy of moral psychology. However, one can find different positions within this trend, especially concerning he meaning and role of the reflection in moral functioning. Blasi emphasizes the importance of the reflective reasoning of moral agent, while Lapsley supports moral automacy contrary to Kohlberg's phenomenalism. Although Blasi had been negative about building moral psychology based on the moral philosophy, he has articulated the moral identity theory based on the concept of free will by Frankfurt. However, recently he criticizes intuitionist theory of Haidit and suggests the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post-conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms. Blasi's perspective of moral identity has two version. The one emphasizes the moral understanding which means strong evaluation, while the other refers to reasoning with weak evaluation. This leads to an inevitable inner contradiction within his theory of moral identity. Lapsley considers moral identity as a heuristic idea and suggests moral chronic as a new model of moral identity. This model is based on the social cognitive theory. His social cognitive model of moral personality provides the account for implicit, tacit, and automatic of moral functioning, while reflecting the core of moral identity. Lapsley suggests that moral function involves conscious and unconscious processes. The former occurs in normal situations of life, while the latter in rare and unusual situations. He does not highlight reasoning in moral functioning as Blasi do. In consequence, I will argue the notion of the moral agent with the skill of reflective reasoning, or post conventional thinking in Kohlberg's terms in the moral functioning like Gibbs and Turiel positions in the Journal of Moral Education' s 2008 special issue. Moral philosophy and psychology should be in complementary relations. It means we explore not only more interdisciplinary researches on the moral functioning, but also researches based on the moral philosophy.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.137-160
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• 2018

The present article reviews recent arguments on the moral-conventional distinction in moral judgment and discusses the implications for moral psychology research. Traditional research on moral judgment has considered both the evaluation of transgressive actions of others and the categorization of the norms on the moral-conventional dimension. Kohlberg, Piaget, and Turiel (1983) regard moral principles to be clearly distinguished from social-conventional norms and suggested criteria for the moral-conventional distinction. They assume that the moral domain should be specifically related to the value of care and justice, and the judgment for the moral transgression should be universal and objective. The cognitive developmental approach or social domain theory, which has been generally accepted by moral psychology researchers, is recently being challenged. In this article, we introduce three different approaches that criticize the assumptions for the moral-conventional distinction, namely, moral sentimentalism, moral parochialism, and moral pluralism. Moral sentimentalism emphasizes the role of emotion in moral judgment and suggests that moral and conventional norms can be continuously distributed on an affective-nonaffective dimension. Moral parochialism, based on the evidence from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, asserts that norm transgression can be the object of moral judgment only when the action is relevant to the survival and reproduction of a group and the individuals within the group; judgment for moral transgression can be as relative as that for conventional transgression. Moral pluralism suggests multiple moral intuitions that vary with culture and individual, and questions the assumption of the social domain theory that morality is confined to care and justice. These new perspectives imply that the moral-conventional distinction may not properly tap into the nature of moral judgment and that further research is needed.

• Journal of Korean society of Dental Hygiene
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.251-261
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• 2011

Objectives : A study was designed to evaluate the level of moral development of dental hygienists in Korea. Methods : Data were collected through self reported questionnaires received from 210 dental hygienists from October 5 to December 29, 2010. The Korean version of the DIT(Defining Issues Test) was adopted to evaluate levels of moral judgment, which was measured by the score of P(%). The data were analyzed by a descriptive analyses and t-test, ANOVA. Results : The mean score of P(%) was $34.59({\pm}14.68)$. The score of P(%) revealed significant differences by religion(p=0.005). Ethics learning was 129(62.6%) in inexperience and participation of ethics education was 128(61.0%) in absence. There were significant differences in ethics learning experience(p=0.004). Conclusions : For enhancing dental hygienists' moral development we encourage them to make the most use of supplemental education.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.11
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• pp.415-423
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• 2019

This study focused on establishing the basic direction for the development of officials ethics education contents using value clarification. The value clarification is well known as an effective teaching and learning method to develop moral judgment among others as follows: moral sensitivity, moral motivation, moral practice. This study outlines the teaching-learning method and the evaluation method for the actual officials ethics education. This waits for the further empirical works.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.13-24
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• 2023

This study tested whether the evaluation of moral cleansing behavior following an immoral act depends on the resources available to the wrongdoer. To this end, resource availability was manipulated by the wrongdoer's characteristics (socioeconomic status vs. physical health condition) and type of moral cleansing (donation vs. volunteer work), and participants rated the pain of the moral cleansing behavior, hypocrisy, and forgivability. Study 1 presents a scenario where a wrongdoer, either high or low in socioeconomic status, conducts moral cleansing via donation or volunteer work. Participants judged donation by those high in socioeconomic status to be not so painful, hypocritical, and unforgivable. Study 2 described a scenario in which a wrongdoer, either physically strong or weak, performs an act of moral cleansing either by donation or volunteer work. Participants considered those sickly wrongdoers' volunteer work to be painful, less hypocritical, and (compared with other conditions) more forgivable. Mediation analyses showed that in both Studies 1 and 2, pain in moral cleansing influenced the hypocrisy judgment which, in turn, affected perceived forgivability. These results indicate that, even for the same expiatory behavior, moral judgment depends on the actor's available resources. That is, people believe that moral cleansing should involve pain; otherwise, the act is hypocritical and unforgivable.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.271-307
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to elucidate on moral education's direction in the age of transhumanism. For transhumanism's moral education, I suggest a genetically modified plan, moral artificial intelligence method, and pharmacological method for moral bio-enhancement. I also suggest a plan for anti-transhumanism's moral education. Anti-transhumanism as a position in the ethical debate on human enhancement makes two main claims. One is a moral claim that human enhancement may disregard or violate something intrinsically valuable about human nature. The other is a political claim that human enhancement should be banned or severely restricted. In this article, I try to make a critical evaluation of transhumanism and anti-transhumanism. For this aim, I critically analyze the logic of both. Finally I argue that transhumanism's moral education has technological strengths and ethical weaknesses. But transhumanism's moral education can overcome the ethical weakness through human enhancement debate and real possibility. Anti-transhumanism's moral education needs to make significant influence through traditional education.

• Korean Journal of Human Ecology
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• v.17 no.6
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• pp.1079-1091
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• 2008

This study investigated developmental differences of moral evaluation for different lies. The subjects were 170 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds. Children's understanding of, moral judgment for, and emotional reactions to antisocial lie, white lie, and trick lie were assessed. Major findings were as follows: 1. Children's understanding of lies was increased with age. Children understood well in definition for antisocial lie, whereas they understood poorly in definition for trick lie. 2. There were differences of children's moral judgment for lies according to age and lie types. Six- and 8-year-olds rated trick lie as the least serious lie type, whereas 10-year-olds rated white lie as the least serious lie type. 3. Children anticipated the greatest negative emotional reaction to antisocial lie, and the greatest positive reaction to trick lie by all ages. There was no difference of positive emotional reaction between antisocial lie and white lie for 6- and 8-year-olds. But 10-year-olds anticipated greater positive emotional reaction to white lie than antisocial lie.

• Journal of Korean society of Dental Hygiene
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.99-106
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• 2008

This study was conducted to evaluated the level of moral development of dental hygiene students in Korea. Data were collected through self reported questionnaires received from 197 dental hygiene students from May 6 to 28, 2008. The Korean version of the DIT(Defining issues Test) was adopted to evaluate levels of moral development that the score of P(%) and stage 4. The data were analyzed by a descriptive analyses and t-test. The mean score of P(%) and stage 4 was $45.21{\pm}12.69$ and $21.28{\pm}11.06$ respectively. The score of P(%) revealed significant difference by experience of ethical education, medical ethics education and work ethics education and necessity of medical and work ethics education, clinical practice exercise. The score of stage 4 revealed significant differences by necessity of work ethics education, participation of ethics education and importance of ethics education. In conclusion, for enhancing dental hygienists' moral development it is necessary to improve the curriculum and to develop the ethics education.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.57-63
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• 2023

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the aspects of hybrid warfare and show the limits of jus in bello, a principle that evaluates the moral responsibility of the agents. As a theory of the morality of war presented in traditional warfare, the just war theory has been widely accepted. In particular, jus in bello offers the criteria of moral legitimacy regarding the actions of individuals participating in or involved in war. However, hybrid warfare, in which various aspects of warfare operate in a complex way, has obvious differences compared to traditional warfare, and this difference causes difficulties in determining the moral evaluation and attribution of responsibility for actions in war. In order to appropriately resolve the moral problems arising from hybrid warfare, it is necessary to clarify what the limitations of existing moral justification theories are. To this end, in this paper, we will first present a conceptual understanding of hybrid warfare, specify the differences from traditional warfare, and then show the limits of its application in hybrid warfare in light of the three principles that compose jus in bello.