• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2021.10a
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• pp.597-599
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• 2021

5G technology will be applied to various technologies related to game changers in the defense field. In addition, the establishment of a mobile work environment will be utilized. 5G has emerged as a new threat due to major technologies different from previous technologies. And due to 5G technology, there is an increasing demand to apply mobile technology to the defense sector. In this paper, we look at the security policy for defense 5G operation and the step-by-step construction plan consisting of three.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.139-156
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• 2009

This study reviewed influential factors on knowledge sharing and examined to verify how attitude and recognition serve toward security in knowledge-related activities. This two-part study will dedicate to diffusion of knowledge sharing in the ROK Army. The findings indicate that trust and computer self-efficacy are influential factors which cause increase in knowledge sharing intention. Friendly attitude of the members result in strengthening the knowledge sharing in National Defense Intranet. As a result, it could be inferred that organizational and systematic efforts are required to foster the knowledge sharing in the army and policy to induce members' friendly attitude toward security is in need as well.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.6
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• pp.1-46
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• 2003

During the ancient times, there was no separative judicial system and administrative , legislative and judiciary functions were ultimately concentrated in the all-powerful monarch. And the three states developed state organization , adopting hieratical structures and placing at the pinnacle . State Codes were promulgated to initiate a legal system to rule the people, these codes instituted under influence of China codes. The people tradition sees crime control as the preservation of the authority of hereditary rulers. In the period of the Koryeo dynasty, government accepted a serious of detailed penal code from Tang dynasty . Legal response to crime stressed preservation of the dynasty rather than making citizen behave according to certain rules. In the period of Early Joseon , the compilation of Grand Code for state administration was initiated, the Kyeongkuk Taejeon ,became comer stone of the dynastic administration and provided the monarchial system with a sort of constitutional law in written form. This national code was in portant means of criminal policy at that time, Late Joseon , the impact of Western culture entering through China gave further impetus to pragmatic studies which called for socio-economic reforms and readjustment. Approach to criminal justice policy emphasized more equitable operation of the criminal justice system ,rehabilitation and crime control. Korea-Japanese Treaty concluded on 22 August ,1910 and proclaim a week later ,Japan gave the coup de grace to the Korea Empire and changed the office of the Resident - General into the Government - General . Thus korean criminal policy were lost during a dark ages ,which lasted for 36 years after fall of Joseon Dynasty (the colnial period,1910${\sim}$1945). After 1945 Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the occupation of devided Korea by the United States and Soviet Union frustrated the efforts of Koreans to establish an independent government, and the transplantation of two conflicting political ideologies to south and the north of the 38th parallel further intensified the national split. U.S. military government office occupied the south of the 38 the parallel and placed emphasis on democracy of criminal policy. ln 1948, the U.S. military government handed over to the ROK government its administrative authority.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.303-325
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• 2015

The latest slogan put forth by the international space community is the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities. The security of outer space activities, in particular, would be defined as the secure state from space-based threats. The latter comprises passive threats (such as collision with other satellites and space debris) and aggressive threats (such as electromagnetic interference, arms race on the earth or in outer space, and military attacks). Has outer space been used for military purposes in practice? If so, does international law regulate the military space activities it? The use of outer space for military purposes is referred to as space militarization and space weaponisation. Satellites has been used in Gulf War, Kosovo War, and Afghan War, recently, and research and development on space weapons are under way. Since only the placement of weapons of mass destruction on orbit around the earth is prohibited in accordance with 1967 Outer Space Treaty, it may be asked whether other weapons may be placed on orbit. It will be necessary to analyze the stance of on the above question, by studying UN space-related treaties including UN Charter. New international space norms represented by PPWT, ICoC, and UN GGE Report are at the center of progressive development of international law. In conclusion, the author will signpost the various points on international norms to be codified on the use of outer space for military purposes.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.55-66
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• 2019

For the past 66 years, the Korea-U.S. alliance has been a typical asymmetric alliance in which the U.S. supports South Korea's security during the Cold War and South Korea gives some of its policy autonomy to the U.S. But Lee Myung-bak government military alliance the 'comprehensive strategic alliance' of the character, 'value of alliance', Park Geun-hye ' a global, 'Frontier of cooperation', the government.'reciprocal, comprehensive alliance' Moon Jae-in, the government and partnerships developed with ' euroui the development of national security strategy said. The purpose of this study is to explore ways to build a reciprocal and comprehensive Korea-U.S. alliance for the development of the Korea-U.S. alliance policy in order to ensure South Korea's policy autonomy following changes in the Trump administration's alliance policy. The results of the research show the need for Korea to participate in the U.S.-led 'India-Pacific Strategy' continue diplomatic efforts for the mutual economic benefits of the two countries and strengthen public diplomacy in order to build the Korea-U.S. alliance in a reciprocal and comprehensive manner.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.21 no.12spc
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• pp.689-695
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• 2021

The study is based on the elaborated normative and legal documentation regulating the national security of modern Ukraine and the normative and legal documents adopted by NATO in the responding policy to the challenges that arose after 2014. The main advantages of cooperation with NATO are ensuring military security, developing army standards, improving the country's investment climate, and reducing expenditures on the army. The disadvantages of cooperation with NATO in hostilities with Russia are not highlighted. Still, defined obstacles show that Ukraine is not ready to realize entry into NATO in the short term. Such factors include weak information support, corruption, and unclear diplomatic decisions.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.843-859
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• 2018

Cybersecurity has emerged as a serious problem in Korea and there have been relevant movements to improve domestic cybersecurity policy and system. However, discussions have yet to result in actual progress and the legislation for improvement of cybersecurity policy and system have been stagnant until now. As evidenced by the introduction of primary government legislation bill for national cybersecurity in 2017, the preparations for improvements to the policy and system are still in progress. However, we cannot be positive about the possibility of implementing these improvements during the process. Recognition of the importance of cybersecutiry has gradually risen and is more prevalent than in years past, however, in-depth discussions are not being made. In principle, misunderstandings about cybersecurity itself and insufficient understandings of the relevant legislation seem to cause such problems. Therefore, it is necessary to review key issues related to the improvement of cybersecurity policy and system and reconsider tasks for the future. Such issues include the relationship between cybersecurity and fundamental rights, establishing responsibility and capability of each of entities for cybersecurity, and the role of the military in cybersecurity. This type of in-depth discussion will be helpful for finding ways to improve upon cybersecurity policy and system. Moreover, this study aims to key issues with questionnaire survey and political and normative inquiry.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.13 no.5
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• pp.77-87
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• 2013

Mobilization is defined as a use of national authority to effectively control, manage and utilize all personnel and material resources of a nation in a national emergency situation. Therefore, the complete posture of mobilization many deter war and secure victory as well as serve as a driving force for national economy during peacetime The future of military mobilization policies will need to be developed in relation to other government and administrative departments. Also mobilization of reserve forces can increase its swiftness and effectiveness by integrating the civilian, governmental and military departments. Additionally, the mobilization of military reserve forces policy after the unification in this Peninsula will need to be developed through active researches.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.42
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• pp.205-227
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• 2015

The Korean Peninsula is put in a position to carry out a highly strategic game vis-a-vis nK, which is asserting itself as a nuclear power amongst Northeast Asia's complex dynamics. While the international community recognizes nK's possession of nuclear weapons as released secret based on nK's three nuclear tests, shrewd strategic thinking is needed by ROK to secure itself as a non-nuclear nation in order to assume a responsible role to the international community, while simultaneously being ready to respond at all times for nK's military provocations. ROK must continue with its twofold strategy, by firm response to military confrontation with nK and maintaining flexible policy of tolerance in the areas of economy and ethnicity. Various strategic options to overcome nK's nuclear threats have been presented to ROK, whose possession of nuclear weapons have been difficult, and nK's nuclear capability is a real threat to ROK's national security. We must be able to respond to nK's nuclear threats strictly from ROK's national security perspective. This thesis aims to propose a response policy for nK's nuclear capability and nK's nuclear attack based on analysis of such nuclear damage, ROK Government's response posture against nK's nuclear threats, centered around ROK Government's non-military response posture.